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The federal Income Tax Act contains an extensive
number of provisions addressing the taxation of fami-
lies with disabled persons. These provisions, however,
have been the subject of a series of ongoing incre-
mental adjustments, and do not reflect a comprehensive
and coherent approach to the taxation of these indi-
viduals in light of their unique financial circumstances.
This article considers the existing income tax provi-
sions regarding families with disabled persons, ana-
lyzing the relationship between disabilities and appro-
priate tax liabilities, and providing suggestions for re-
form of the current tax structure. Focussing on the
goals of tax policy narrowly defined as compared to the
broader social policy goals that may be pursued
through the tax system, the article evaluates in turn (i)
existing provisions aimed at recognizing the costs of
disability for disabled individuals and their families; (ii)
tax measures designed to facilitate participation by dis-
abled persons in the paid labour force; and (iii) current
tax rules on income support for disabled persons who
have difficulty supporting themselves. In each of these
areas, the article undertakes critical analysis of the pre-
sent tax provisions and makes proposals for their im-
provement or replacement, bearing in mind the over-
riding rationale of promoting horizontal equity between
individuals with and without disabilities and between
persons who support disabled individuals and persons
without such support obligations.
La Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu contient un grand
nombre de dispositions visant l’imposition de familles
avec des personnes handicapées. Cependant, ces dispo-
sitions ont été assujetties à une série de réajustements
progressifs et ne semblent pas témoigner d’une politi-
que d’imposition suffisamment complète et cohérente,
étant donné la situation financière particulière de ces
individus. Cet article passe en revue les dispositions
actuelles visant les familles avec des personnes handi-
capées, tout en analysant le rapport entre les handicaps
physiques ou mentaux et les assujettissements à l’impôt
appropriés et en suggérant des moyens de réformer la
structure actuelle du système d’imposition. En se con-
centrant sur les buts visés par la politique d’imposition,
définie de façon restrictive, comparés aux buts plus lar-
ges de politique sociale pouvant être poursuivis par
l’entremise du système d’imposition, l’article évalue, à
tour de rôle, (i) les dispositions actuelles visant à pren-
dre en compte les coûts de l’handicap pour les person-
nes handicapées et leurs familles, (ii) les mesures cher-
chant à faciliter l’intégration des personnes handica-
pées à la main d’œuvre rémunérée, et (iii) les règles
actuelles portant sur l’allocation de pensions alimentai-
res aux personnes handicapées ayant des difficultés à
subvenir à leurs propres besoins. L’auteur fait une ana-
lyse critique des dispositions actuelles dans chacun de
ces domaines, et propose soit de les améliorer soit de
les remplacer, tout en tenant compte du but primordial
de promouvoir l’équité horizontale parmi les individus
avec et sans handicap, ainsi que parmi les personnes
qui subviennent aux besoins de personnes handicapées
et celles qui n’ont pas de telles obligations.
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 Introduction
In recent years, federal, provincial, and territorial governments have devoted in-
creasing attention to the status of disabled Canadians, emphasizing the integration of
disabled persons as equal citizens within the broader community through policies de-
signed to promote equal access to generic programs and services, while simultane-
ously recognizing the need for specific measures to address the costs of disabilities, to
facilitate participation by disabled persons in the paid labour force, and to provide in-
come support for disabled persons who have difficulty supporting themselves.1 Like-
wise, Canadian governments have demonstrated increasing concern about the welfare
of families with dependent children, employing differing measures to alleviate the fi-
nancial burden associated with the care of children to enable parents to participate in
the paid labour force,2 and agreeing on a combined strategy to combat child poverty
through the National Child Benefit involving federal refundable tax credits and social
assistance delivered by provincial and territorial governments. In each of these areas,
the federal income tax has played a significant role in the pursuit of government poli-
cies.3
With respect to persons with disabilities, the Income Tax Act recognizes the costs
of disabilities through credits for itemized medical expenses (“medical expense tax
credit”) and for mental or physical impairment (“disability tax credit”).4 Other provi-
sions recognize additional costs associated with the care of disabled relatives by pro-
viding credits for infirm dependants over the age of 18 (“infirm dependants credit”),5
and for specified relatives living in an individual’s home who are over the age of 18
1
 See e.g. Canada, Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Social Services, In Uni-
son: A Canadian Approach to Disability Issues (A Vision Paper) (Ottawa: Human Resources Devel-
opment Canada, 1998) [hereinafter In Unison]; Canada, Federal Task Force on Disability Issues,
Equal Citizenship for Canadians with Disabilities: The Will to Act (Ottawa: Human Resources De-
velopment Canada, 1996).
2
 At the provincial and territorial level these measures have involved direct subsidies (as in Quebec)
and tax credits (as in Ontario). At the federal level, the maximum allowable deduction for child care
expenses increased from $2,000 for each eligible child in 1987 (maximum $8,000) to $7,000 or
$4,000 per child (depending on the child’s age and disability) for 1998 and subsequent taxation years.
3
 While disability-related policies are also pursued through federal and provincial sales taxes and
provincial income taxes, the federal income tax is the most important tax instrument for the pursuit of
these policies. This paper examines only the federal income tax.
4
 R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1, ss. 118.2, 118.3 [hereinafter ITA]. S. 118.4 contains definitions rele-
vant to the application of these and other provisions involving mental or physical impairment.
5
 Ibid., s. 118(1)(d), describing B in s. 118(1). For the purpose of s. 118(1)(d), s. 118(6) defines a
“dependant” as
a person who at any time in the year is dependent on the individual for support and is
(a) the child or grandchild of the individual or of the individual’s spouse; or
(b) the parent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, niece or nephew, if resident in
Canada at any time in the year, of the individual or the individual’s spouse.
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and dependent on the individual because of mental or physical infirmity (“caregiver
credit”);6 additional provisions encourage private savings to support disabled persons
through special tax rules for inter vivos trusts with disabled beneficiaries.7 Participa-
tion by disabled persons in the paid labour force is facilitated by exempting specified
disability-related employment benefits from tax,8 by allowing individuals eligible for
the disability tax credit to deduct the cost of attendant care provided to enable them to
participate in the paid labour force,9 by compensating disabled individuals who par-
ticipate in the paid labour force for lost subsidies for disability-related supports under
provincial social assistance,10 and by permitting employers to claim an immediate de-
duction for prescribed disability-related modifications to buildings and prescribed dis-
ability-related equipment.11 Finally, income support for disabled persons is encour-
aged by non-taxation of employer contributions to group sickness or accident insur-
ance plans,12 and enhanced by non-taxation of social assistance benefits,13 workers’
compensation,14 and tort compensation for personal injuries.15
6
 Ibid., s. 118(1)(c.1), describing B in s. 118(1). This credit also applies where the individual main-
tains a “self-contained domestic establishment which is the ordinary place of residence of the individ-
ual” and a parent or grandparent over the age of 65.
7
 See the “election by trust and preferred beneficiary” in ibid., s. 104(14), which allows income re-
tained by the trust to be taxed as if it were received by a preferred beneficiary, and the definition of
“preferred beneficiary” in s. 108(1). As a general rule, inter vivos trusts are taxable at the top marginal
rate (29%) without any recognition of the tax credits available to beneficiaries.
8
 Ibid., s. 6(16), which excludes from an individual’s income benefits or reasonable allowances in
respect of (a) transportation to and from work (including parking) if the individual is blind or eligible
for the disability tax credit because of mobility impairment; and (b) an attendant to assist the individ-
ual in the performance of his or her duties if the individual is eligible for the disability tax credit.
9
 Ibid., s. 64.
10
 See the “refundable medical expense supplement” in ibid., s. 122.51.
11
 Ibid., ss. 20(1)(qq), 20(1)(rr); Income Tax Regulations, C.R.C., c. 945, ss. 8800, 8801 [hereinafter
Regulations]. S. 8800 specifies as prescribed disability-related modifications to buildings
(a) the installation of
(i) an interior or exterior ramp; or
(ii) a hand-activated electric door opener; and
(b) a modification to a bathroom, elevator or doorway to accommodate its use by a per-
son in a wheelchair.
S. 8801 prescribes as disability-related equipment
(a) an elevator car position indicator, such as a braille panel or an audio signal, for indi-
viduals having a sight impairment;
(b) a visual fire alarm indicator, a listening device for group meetings or a telephone
device, for individuals having a hearing impairment; and
(c) a disability-specific computer software or hardware attachment.
12
 ITA, ibid., s. 6(1)(a)(i), which excludes these contributions (among other amounts) from inclusion
in the employee’s income as a taxable benefit. Where an employer has made a contribution to such a
plan, periodic payments received under the plan are taxable as employment income under s. 6(1)(f).
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With respect to families with dependent children, the ITA recognizes the costs of
supporting and caring for children through a credit for single parents (“wholly de-
pendent person credit”),16 a deduction for child care expenses incurred to enable par-
ents to participate in the paid labour force,17 and a refundable tax credit provided to
low-income families with dependent children (“Canada Child Tax Benefit”).18 Other
provisions recognize specific financial needs of dependent children by allowing tax-
deferred savings to be transferred to dependent children and grandchildren on a tax-
payer’s death free of tax.19 While most of these provisions are more generous regard-
ing disabled children, the Canada Child Tax Benefit does not distinguish between dis-
abled and other children.
Notwithstanding these many provisions, however, the pursuit of disability-related
policies through the income tax appears to reflect a series of ad hoc adjustments
rather than a comprehensive approach to the income tax treatment of disabled indi-
viduals and families with disabled persons. The medical expense tax credit, for exam-
ple, is increasingly directed at disability-related expenses, while retaining a structure de-
                                                                                                                                        
13
 Although social assistance benefits are included in computing the recipient’s net income under
ibid., s. 56(1)(u), the amount so included is deductible under s. 110(1)(f) in computing the recipient’s
taxable income. Although the net result of these provisions is to exempt social assistance benefits
from income tax, the inclusion of these payments in computing the recipient’s net income can affect
entitlement to a number of non-refundable and refundable tax credits, the amount of which depends
on net income.
14
 Like social assistance benefits, workers’ compensation is included in computing the recipient’s net
income under ibid., s. 56(1)(v), but deductible under s. 110(1)(f) in computing the recipient’s taxable
income. While these provisions make worker’s compensation exempt from income tax, the inclusion
of these payments in computing the recipient’s net income can affect the calculation of various non-
refundable and refundable tax credits, the amount of which depends on net income.
15
 See Cirella v. M.N.R. (1977), [1978] C.T.C. 1, 77 D.T.C. 5542 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Cirella cited
to C.T.C.], in which the Federal Court held that tort damages for personal injury arising from an
automobile accident were not taxable, even though they were payable in respect of foregone income.
See also ITA, ibid., ss. 81(1)(g.1), 81(1)(g.2), which exempt the income and capital gains derived from
property acquired pursuant to an action for damages in respect of physical or mental injury where the
injured person is less than 21 years old.
16
 ITA, ibid., s. 118(1)(b). This credit is also available to individuals who support in a self-contained
domestic establishment in which they live a wholly dependent relative who is either under the age of
18 or a parent or grandparent of the individual.
17
 Ibid., s. 63.
18
 Ibid., ss. 122.6-122.64.
19
 See ibid., ss. 146(8.9), 146.3(6.2), and the definition of “refund of premiums” in s. 146(1), which
exclude amounts paid to financially dependent children or grandchildren from inclusion in the income
of the deceased, and s. 60(l), which allows the child or grandchild to deduct amounts so received
which are contributed to a registered retirement savings plan or used to acquire an annuity. While this
deduction is generally limited to children or grandchildren under 18 years of age, no such limit exists
for children or grandchildren who were dependent on the deceased “by reason of mental or physical
infirmity”. For a detailed explanation of these provisions, see M.N.R., Interpretation Bulletin IT-500R,
“Registered Retirement Savings Plans — Death of an Annuitant” (18 December 1996).
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signed to recognize extraordinary costs associated with sudden and transitory illnesses.20
Nor are these provisions always consistent with their primary rationale to promote hori-
zontal equity between individuals with and without disabilities and between persons
who support disabled individuals and persons without such support obligations.
This paper reviews and evaluates current income tax provisions and possible re-
forms relevant to families with disabled persons, with the goals of better recognizing
the impact of disabilities on appropriate tax liabilities and bringing a greater degree of
coherence to current income tax provisions bearing on families with disabled persons.
For this purpose, Part I provides a framework for analysis by distinguishing between
the goals of tax policy narrowly defined and broader social policy goals that may be
and often are pursued through the tax system. Part II considers existing provisions and
proposed reforms directed at recognizing the costs of disability, both for disabled in-
dividuals themselves and for families with disabled persons. Part III examines tax
measures designed to facilitate participation by disabled persons in the paid labour
force, while Part IV reviews existing and proposed tax rules regarding income support
for disabled persons who have difficulty supporting themselves. Part V summarizes
the main conclusions of the analysis and makes specific recommendations.
I. Tax Policy and Social Policy
As one of the most significant policy instruments available to the federal govern-
ment, it is not surprising that the ITA might be used to pursue a variety of social policy
objectives. Indeed, to the extent that a progressive income tax is designed to collect a
larger proportionate share of revenue from high income taxpayers than lower-income
taxpayers and exempt those with very low incomes, the tax itself can be said to serve
a broad social policy objective of moderating inequalities in the pre-tax distribution of
income.21
Nonetheless, in reviewing the characteristics of an optimal tax system, commen-
tators generally distinguish between broad social policy goals regarding the appropri-
ate allocation and distribution of economic resources, and the aims of tax policy more
narrowly defined to raise revenue in a manner that is equitable among different tax-
payers, that minimizes unintended effects on economic decisions, and that is relatively
easy to understand and collect. Among those writing in the area, these more narrow
tax policy goals are referred to as equity, efficiency, and simplicity.22
Although these criteria are often employed to discuss the merits of one kind of tax
as compared with another (e.g., income versus consumption), they are also used to
20
 The medical expense tax credit is examined in detail in Part II.A, below.
21
 See e.g. N. Brooks, “Flattening the Claims of Flat Taxers” (1998) 51 Dal. L.J. 287; M.E. Korn-
hauser, “The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction”
(1987) 86 Mich. L. Rev. 465.
22
 See e.g. R.W. Boadway & H.M. Kitchen, Canadian Tax Policy, 3d ed. (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1999) at 52-86.
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examine the various characteristics of specific taxes. With respect to the income tax,
for example, efficiency considerations tend to favour a broad definition of income and
relatively low rates to minimize tax-induced distortions in economic behaviour, while
simplicity concerns favour a relatively straightforward and uniform set of rules to
minimize the cost of administering the tax (involving government collection costs and
the costs of taxpayer compliance). While some equity objectives are consistent with
these efficiency and simplicity goals, others may contradict economic efficiency and
administrative simplicity by supporting higher tax rates at higher income levels or
special allowances to account for relevant differences in taxpayers’ personal circum-
stances. As a result, like other areas of government policy, tax policy may involve dif-
ficult choices among different and conflicting policy goals.
When considering issues of tax equity, commentators generally distinguish be-
tween horizontal and vertical equity.23 According to the former principle, taxpayers
with the same ability to pay tax should pay the same amount of tax. According to the
latter principle, taxpayers with a greater ability to pay tax should pay an appropriately
greater amount of tax. In the context of the income tax, horizontal equity considera-
tions apply to the definition of the tax base, while questions of vertical equity concern
the rate structure.
Although the elaboration of these abstract tax policy principles in the actual de-
sign of a specific income tax is by no means uncontroversial, horizontal equity is of-
ten said to favour a broad or comprehensive definition of income,24 while vertical eq-
uity is said to favour graduated or progressive rates which impose a proportionately
higher tax burden at higher income levels.25 In computing the income that is subject to
progressive tax rates, however, commentators generally agree that horizontal equity
requires that taxpayers be allowed to deduct all costs that are necessary to obtain this
income.26 Moreover, to the extent that a taxpayer’s ability to pay is further diminished
23
 See e.g. R.A. Musgrave, P.B. Musgrave & R.M. Bird, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 1st
Can. ed. (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 214; Boadway & Kitchen, ibid. at 52-73.
24
 See e.g. Boadway & Kitchen, ibid. at 52-56. Among the most prominent concepts of income con-
sistent with this objective is the so-called Haig-Simons concept, according to which income is defined
as the sum total of the taxpayer’s consumption and increases to net wealth. See generally R.M. Haig,
“The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects” in American Economic Association Read-
ings in the Economics of Taxation (Illinois: Irwin, 1954) 54; H.C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation:
The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938);
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966) (Com-
missioner: K. Carter) [hereinafter Royal Commission on Taxation].
25
 See e.g. Musgrave, Musgrave & Bird, supra note 23 at 214-18; Boadway & Kitchen, supra note
22 at 56-73. In addition to vertical equity arguments, progressive income taxation can be justified
more directly on the basis that it moderates pre-tax inequalities in the distribution of income (see e.g.
Brooks, supra note 21; Kornhauser, supra note 21; A. Warren, “Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer
than an Income Tax?” (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 1081 at 1083-93).
26
 See e.g. R. Goode, The Individual Income Tax, rev. ed. (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1976) at 75; W.R. Thirsk, “Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: The Choice between Credits and De-
ductions under the Individual Income Tax in Canada” (1980) 28 Can. Tax J. 32 at 33.
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by various involuntary expenses (e.g., various disability-related expenses27), it is argu-
able that horizontal equity also requires that taxpayers be permitted to deduct these
expenses in computing the income that is properly subject to tax.28 Where the income
tax base is determined in this manner, progressive rates ensure that taxpayers with
more discretionary income pay a proportionately larger share of this income in tax.
In contrast to these tax policy goals narrowly defined, social policy addresses
broader questions concerning the manner in which goods and services are allocated
and economic resources distributed among members of a political community. Taking
disability-related expenses as an example, social policy is concerned less with the de-
ductibility of these expenses in computing an individual’s taxable income than with
the extent to which the additional costs incurred by persons with mental or physical
disabilities are properly borne by the disabled person and/or supporting individuals, or
by the community as a whole. Likewise, where a disability affects a person’s ability to
participate in the paid labour force, social policy is concerned less with the tax impli-
cations for supporting individuals or the deductibility of additional expenses that the
disabled person must incur in order to earn income than with the respective roles of
the private or public sectors in providing for the individual’s support and with the im-
plementation of effective measures designed to make the workplace more accessible
to persons with disabilities.
As indicated at the beginning of this part, these social policy goals can be and of-
ten are pursued through the ITA. Where a social policy decision is made to insure half
of all disability-related expenses, for example, this policy may be effected through a
refundable tax credit equal to 50% of all eligible expenses.29 Likewise, where a social
policy decision is made to provide a guaranteed annual income to persons with dis-
abilities, this policy may be implemented through a refundable tax credit the value of
which diminishes as the recipient’s income increases.30 Similarly, investments in dis-
27
 For the purposes of this explanation, I assume that these disability-related expenses are, in fact,
involuntary, and do not involve an element of personal consumption. To the extent that these expenses
involve a discretionary element, they should be only partly, not wholly, deductible in computing tax-
able income.
28
 For a persuasive articulation of this position, see P. Cloutier & B. Fortin, “Converting Exemptions
and Deductions into Credits: An Economic Assessment” in J. Mintz & J. Whalley, eds., The Eco-
nomic Impacts of Tax Reform (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989) 45 at 54-62. See also Boad-
way & Kitchen, supra note 22 at 131. For a similar argument with respect to the costs of supporting
dependent children, see A. Sayeed, “Choosing between Tax Credits and Exemptions for Dependent
Children” (1985) 33 Can. Tax J. 975.
29
 While the ITA does not contain such a general provision, a refundable credit provides a similar
kind of insurance to low-income taxpayers participating in the paid labour force by reimbursing 25%
of eligible medical expenses exceeding 3% of the claimant’s net income, up to a maximum amount of
$500 ($2,000 of qualifying medical expenses) (see ITA, supra note 4, s. 122.51, examined below).
30
 While the federal government provides disability benefits under the Canada Pension Plan, these
depend on prior contributions and do not diminish as the recipient’s income increases (although they
are included in computing the recipient’s taxable income and are therefore subject to tax at progres-
sive rates). In contrast, the ITA is used to deliver income support to low-income individuals and fami-
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ability-related equipment or modifications to a workplace may be encouraged by ac-
celerated deductions or tax credits (refundable or non-refundable) through which
these costs are shared by the public sector.31
Where social policy goals are pursued through the ITA, however, neither they nor
the provisions by which they are implemented should be regarded as alternatives to
tax policy goals more narrowly defined. Where a social policy decision is made to
reimburse 50% of all privately borne disability-related expenses through a refundable
tax credit, for example, a tax policy issue remains as to whether disability-related ex-
penses that are not reimbursed are properly deductible in computing the payor’s tax-
able income.32 Correspondingly, where a refundable tax credit is paid to low-income
persons with disabilities, tax policy considerations continue to apply in comparing the
ability to pay of higher income individuals with or without disabilities.
Conversely, while tax policy considerations are central to the equitable distribu-
tion of income tax burdens among different taxpayers, neither they nor the basic pro-
visions through which an equitable income tax is applied can substitute for the
broader social policy goals that might also be pursued through the ITA. Indeed, where
the income tax provides a deduction or non-refundable credit to recognize privately
borne disability-related expenses, this allowance is irrelevant to individuals whose in-
come is too low to pay any tax. As a result, although such a provision may be neces-
sary to achieve horizontal equity among different taxpayers, it is neither an effective
nor equitable method of reimbursing a share of privately borne disability-related ex-
penses, nor a coherent way to provide income support to low-income individuals with
disabilities or low-income families with disabled persons.
While this paper is concerned primarily with tax policy issues more narrowly de-
fined, it neither disregards nor devalues broader social policy objectives that are or
might be pursued through the ITA. In considering the costs of disability, therefore, it
reviews both tax and social policy objectives, and the various tax measures through
which these different goals might be best pursued. Likewise, in reviewing measures
by which the ITA might facilitate the integration of disabled persons in the paid labour
force or provide income support for disabled individuals and their families, it consid-
ers both tax and social policy considerations. Although it is important to distinguish
tax and social policy goals from the specific measures by which they are best imple-
                                                                                                                                        
lies through the refundable Goods and Services Tax Credit in s. 122.5 and the refundable Canada
Child Tax Benefit, supra note 18. The Canada Child Tax Benefit is examined in Part II.F, below.
31
 Although the ITA, supra note 4, does not provide tax credits for investments in disability-related
modifications to buildings or the acquisition of disability-related equipment, it allows businesses to
deduct the cost of these investments in the year in which they are acquired, rather than capitalizing
these costs and deducting them over several years (see supra note 11).
32
 Where disability-related expenses are fully covered through one or more social insurance pro-
grams (e.g., public health care, or a refundable tax credit, or both), of course, the tax policy issue be-
comes moot since there cease to be any privately borne disability-related expenses for the income tax
to take into account.
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mented, it is possible to pursue both sets of goals through the ITA without sacrificing
either to the other.
II. The Costs of Disability
As the Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons
has emphasized, “Disability involves costs—to governments and society as a whole,
but most importantly, to disabled persons themselves.”33 For families with disabled
persons, these costs are also borne by supporting individuals—both directly in the
form of out-of-pocket expenses and indirectly in the form of foregone income attrib-
utable to time lost from employment or business activities in order to care for the dis-
abled person. While these costs are partly covered through a variety of public and pri-
vate programs, including social assistance, worker’s compensation, public health care,
and supplementary health insurance, uncompensated costs are necessarily borne by
disabled individuals and their families. It is these privately borne costs that give rise to
the tax policy issues discussed in Part I.
As outlined in the introduction to this paper, the ITA contains numerous provi-
sions through which the costs of disabilities to disabled individuals and their families
are or might be recognized. The most notable of these are the medical expense tax
credit and the disability tax credit. Recent studies have recommended that these provi-
sions be further supplemented or replaced by a separate “disability expenses tax
credit”.34 In addition to these provisions, the income tax recognizes additional costs
associated with the care of disabled relatives through various “personal tax credits”
(the infirm dependants credit, the caregiver credit, and the wholly dependent person
credit), and non-discretionary costs associated with the care of dependent children
through the child care expense deduction, and the Canada Child Tax Benefit. Yet
other provisions encourage private savings to support disabled persons through spe-
cial trust tax provisions, and recognize financial needs of dependent children by al-
lowing tax-deferred savings to be transferred to dependent children and grandchildren
on a taxpayer’s death without any immediate tax liability.
This part examines each of these provisions and their possible reform, including
the introduction of a separate disability expenses tax credit as a supplement or alter-
native to the existing statutory scheme. While the main focus of this analysis concerns
the treatment of disability-related expenses as a matter of tax policy narrowly defined,
the discussion necessarily touches on broader social policy issues considered in Part I.
33
 Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons, “As True as Taxes:
Disability and the Income Tax System” in House of Commons Debates (March 1993) at 3 [hereinafter
Standing Committee].
34
 See e.g. ibid. at 14; Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, supra note 1 at 97-99.
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A. Medical Expenses Tax Credit
1. Description
The medical expenses tax credit (“METC”) provides a credit against basic federal
tax otherwise payable equal to 17% of eligible medical expenses paid during any
twelve-month period ending in the taxation year exceeding the lesser of 3% of the in-
dividual’s net income or $1,637.35 Taking provincial income tax into account, the
combined value of this credit for taxpayers with tax otherwise payable is roughly 25
cents for each dollar of eligible medical expenses exceeding the applicable threshold.36
For the purposes of this provision, eligible medical expenses must be proven by
filing receipts,37 and are limited to expenses in respect of specifically defined goods
and services provided to the individual, the individual’s spouse, or a related dependant
(the “patient”).38 Where an individual claims medical expenses in respect of a related
dependant, the credit is reduced by 68% of the dependant’s income exceeding
$7,294.39
These medical expenses are defined as
• amounts paid to a medical practitioner, dentist or nurse or a public or licensed
private hospital in respect of medical or dental services provided to the pa-
tient;40
• remuneration for one full-time attendant (other than the individual’s spouse or a
person under 18 years of age) or full-time care in a nursing home for a patient
eligible for the disability tax credit;41
• remuneration not exceeding $10,000 (or $20,000 if the patient dies in the year)
for attendant care provided to a patient eligible for the disability tax credit by a
35
 See ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(1), as indexed by s. 117.1. For a detailed explanation of the
METC, see D. Sherman, Taxes, Health, and Disability (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 65-125. Consis-
tent with its announcement to restore full indexing to income tax provisions, the 2000 Federal Budget
increased the dollar amount of this threshold from $1,614 (see “Tax Measures: Supplementary Infor-
mation” in Stikeman Elliott, Canadian Federal Budget 2000: Budgetary Proposals of the Hon. Min-
ister of Finance with Comments by Stikeman Elliott (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Fed-
eral Budget] 3-1 at 3-14 – 3-15 [hereinafter “Supplementary Information 2000”]).
36
 This assumes a provincial income tax rate equal to 45% of basic federal tax payable. For 1999,
basic provincial taxes range from a low of 39.5% in Ontario to a high of 69% in New Brunswick.
Quebec levies its own income tax, with rates ranging from 20% of taxable income below $25,000 to
26% on taxable income over $50,000.
37
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(1).
38
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2), and the definition of “patient” for the purposes of this subsection in s.
118.2(2)(a). For the purposes of this provision, a related “dependant” is defined in s. 118(6).
39
 See the description of D in ibid., s. 118.2(1).
40
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(a).
41
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(b).
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person who is neither the individual’s spouse nor under 18 years of age, pro-
vided that attendant care is not claimed in respect of the patient under any other
provision of the ITA;42
• remuneration for a full-time attendant in the patient’s home (other than the in-
dividual’s spouse or a person under 18 years of age) if the patient has been cer-
tified by a medical practitioner to be a person who, by reason of mental or
physical infirmity, is and is likely to be for a long-continued period of indefinite
duration dependent on others for personal needs and care;43
• amounts paid for the full-time care in a nursing home of a patient certified by a
medical practitioner to be a person who, by reason of lack of normal mental
capacity, is and in the foreseeable future will continue to be dependent on oth-
ers for personal needs and care;44
• amounts paid for the care, or care and training, at a school, institution or other
place of a patient certified by a qualified person to be a person who, by reason
of a physical or mental handicap, requires the equipment, facilities or personnel
specifically provided by that school, institution or other place for individuals
suffering from the handicap suffered by the patient;45
• ambulance fees;46
• various kinds of transportation fees to obtain medical services;47
• the cost of various kinds of devices, including artificial limbs, hearing aids,
kidney machines,48 devices for incontinence,49 eyeglasses,50 a portion of the cost
of a wheelchair-accessible van,51 dentures,52 and other devices designed to assist
persons suffering from visual impairments, hearing impairments, breathing im-
pairments, mobility impairments, diabetes or heart disease;53
• the cost to acquire and maintain an animal (e.g., a guide dog) specifically
trained to assist a patient who is blind or profoundly deaf or suffers from a se-
42
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(b.1).
43
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(c).
44
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(d).
45
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(e).
46
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(f).
47
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(g).
48
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(i).
49
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(i.1).
50
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(j).
51
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.7).
52
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(p).
53
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(m); Regulations, supra note 11, s. 5700.
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vere and prolonged impairment that markedly restricts the use of his or her
arms or legs;54
• costs associated with the transplant of bone marrow or an organ;55
• reasonable expenses related to renovations or alterations to a patient’s home,
including the driveway, for patients with severe and prolonged mobility im-
pairments;56
• up to $2,000 in expenses for a patient with a severe and prolonged mobility
impairment to move to a physically accessible dwelling;57
• reasonable expenses related to rehabilitative therapy to adjust for the patient’s
hearing or speech loss, including training in lip reading and sign language;58
• the cost of sign language services for a patient with a speech or hearing im-
pairment;59
• reasonable expenses for training a caregiver who is related to the patient (other
than the individual’s spouse or a person under 18 years of age), and is a mem-
ber of the individual’s household;60
• the cost of drugs, medicaments or other preparations or substances prescribed
by a medical practitioner or dentist;61
• the cost of lab tests;62 and
• private health insurance premiums.63
Many of these items have been added in recent years, often in response to judicial de-
cisions in which specific expenses were held to be ineligible for the credit.64 Accord-
ing to the 1999 Federal Budget, this list is to be further supplemented by the inclusion of
54
 ITA, ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l).
55
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.1).
56
 Ibid., ss. 118.2(2)(l.2), 118.2(2)(l.6). The 2000 Federal Budget proposes to add to this item “the
portion of reasonable expenses, relating to the construction of the principal place of residence of an
individual who lacks normal physical development or has a severe and prolonged mobility impair-
ment, that can reasonably be considered to be incremental costs incurred to enable the individual to
gain access to, or be mobile or functional within, the individual’s principal place of residence” (see
“Excerpts from Budget Papers” in 2000 Federal Budget, supra note 35, 2-1 at 2-9 [hereinafter
“Budget Papers 2000”]).
57
 ITA, ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.5).
58
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.3).
59
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.4).
60
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.8).
61
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(n).
62
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(o).
63
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(q).
64
 The list of cases in which expenses have been ruled ineligible for the METC or its predecessor
deduction is lengthy. See e.g. Morley v. M.N.R. (1949), 1 Tax A.B.C. 81 (corrective eyeglasses and
812 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 45
• remuneration for the care or supervision in a group home of an individual eli-
gible for the disability tax credit;
• remuneration for specific kinds of therapy administered to a person eligible for
the disability tax credit; and
• remuneration for tutoring services provided to a person with a learning disabil-
ity or a mental impairment who is certified by a medical practitioner to be a
person who requires these services on account of the disability or impairment.65
2. Interpretation
In applying these provisions, the courts have tended to adopt a more liberal ap-
proach than the strict method of interpretation traditionally employed.66 In one case,
for example, the Tax Court of Canada adopted a broad interpretation of the word
“care” in order to permit the taxpayer to claim as eligible medical expenses under
paragraph 118.2(2)(e) of the ITA tuition and other fees paid by the taxpayer to a pri-
vate school for the “care and training” of his learning-disabled children.67 In other
cases, courts have allowed taxpayers to claim the cost of a hot tub, whirlpool equip-
ment, and a security alert system as eligible medical expenses on the basis that they
                                                                                                                                        
ambulance services); Brunet v. M.N.R. (1955), 14 Tax A.B.C. 185 (cost of oxygen purchased for tax-
payer’s wife who suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis); Witthuhn v. M.N.R. (1957), 17 Tax A.B.C.
33, 57 D.T.C. 174 [hereinafter Witthuhn cited to Tax. A.B.C.] (attendant care for wife able to get up
for a few hours and sit in specially designed rocking chair); Cohen v. M.N.R. (1957), 23 Tax A.B.C.
82 (cost of part-time institutional care for mentally handicapped son); Balfour v. M.N.R. (1961), 27
Tax A.B.C. 291 (attendant care for wife suffering from depressed nervous condition); Stefanchuk v.
M.N.R., [1968] Tax A.B.C. 511 (cost of air cleaner installed to help taxpayer’s husband overcome at-
tacks of bronchitis and asthma); Wall v. M.N.R., [1969] Tax A.B.C. 962 (acquisition and maintenance
cost of wig for taxpayer suffering from condition leading to total baldness); Tate v. M.N.R., [1969]
Tax A.B.C. 1172 (attendant care for mentally infirm son); Stewart v. M.N.R., [1972] C.T.C. 2097, 72
D.T.C. 1092 (T.R.B.) (fees paid to school designed to enable qualified medical practitioners to pro-
vide treatment to taxpayer’s schizophrenic child).
65
 “Excerpts from Budget Papers” in Stikeman Elliott, Canadian Federal Budget 1999: Budgetary
Proposals of the Hon. Minister of Finance with Comments by Stikeman Elliott (Toronto: Carswell,
1999) 2-1 at 2-6 – 2-7 [hereinafter 1999 Federal Budget].
66
 See e.g. Coté v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 3 C.T.C. 2607 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Coté]; Vantyghem v.
M.N.R. (1998), [1999] 2 C.T.C. 2159 at para. 19 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Vantyghem], in which the courts
emphasized the need to interpret s. 118.2 “in its most equitable and liberal manner compatible with
the attainment of [its] object … and Parliament’s intent.” For an example of the strict approach, see
Witthuhn, supra note 64 at 37, where a claim for attendant care expenses was disallowed on the basis
that the patient, who could get up for a few hours and sit in a specially designed rocking chair, was
not “necessarily confined to a bed or wheelchair”. On the history of the strict construction approach to
the interpretation of the ITA, supra note 4, see D.G. Duff, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act—Part I:
Interpretive Doctrines” (1999) 47 Can. Tax J. 464 at 469-85.
67
 Rannelli v. M.N.R., [1991] 2 C.T.C. 2040 at 2044, 91 D.T.C. 816 (T.C.C.), referring to the “reme-
dial” role of then s. 110(1)(c)(vi), which “broadened the scope of medical deductions”, and conclud-
ing that, for the purposes of this provision, “care” need not be “custodial”, but could also be of a nur-
turing or solicitous nature as provided by the school to its students.
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constituted reasonable expenses relating to renovations or alterations to a dwelling
within the meaning of paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2) of the ITA.68
Notwithstanding this general tendency toward a more liberal interpretation of the
METC, at least some decisions continue to reflect a narrow reading of the statutory
provisions. In one recent case, for example, a claim for attendant care expenses under
paragraph 118.2(2)(b) of the ITA by an elderly disabled woman who lived in an
apartment building specifically designed to cater to senior citizens was disallowed on
the grounds that the building was not a nursing home, that “full-time” care must be
(but had not been) provided exclusively to the patient, and that the monthly payments
did not distinguish between rent and attendant care.69 In another recent case, a claim
for $10,184 incurred in the construction of a new residence in order to make the resi-
dence wheelchair accessible was disallowed on the basis that the expenses did not re-
late to “renovations or alterations to a dwelling” as required by paragraph
118.2(2)(l.2).70
3. History
The METC originated in 1942, at which time a deduction was introduced for a
limited number of medical expenses up to a maximum of $400 for a single person,
$600 for a married couple, and $100 for each dependant (up to $400), but only to the
extent that these amounts exceeded 5% of the taxpayer’s net income.71 According to
68
 See e.g. Vantyghem, supra note 66 (hot tub for taxpayer’s wife who had severe and prolonged
mobility impairment); Coté, supra note 66 (cost of whirlpool equipment for exercise and a security
alert system to enable the taxpayer, who suffered from a severe and prolonged mobility impairment,
to continue living safely alone).
69
 Flumerfelt v. M.N.R. (1998), [1999] 3 C.T.C. 2168 at paras. 6-8 (T.C.C.). In the absence of a spe-
cific statutory definition of the term “nursing home”, it does not seem unreasonable to regard a build-
ing designed to cater specifically to senior citizens as a nursing home for the purposes of the provi-
sion. Nor is it obvious that the words “full-time” necessitate exclusive care by a single attendant as
opposed to an arrangement in which staff are available to assist the patient on a full-time basis. Nor
does it seem reasonable for the court to have disallowed the taxpayer’s alternative claim for “part-
time” attendant care under s. 118.2(2)(b.1) on the grounds that payments of $2,500 per month under
the building’s “attendant care package” were solely “for the rent of an apartment”.
70
 Gustafson v. M.N.R., 1999 CarswellNAT 718 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (TaxPARTNER Main).
To the extent that the original plans were altered to make the residence wheelchair accessible, it is ar-
guable that the expenses related to “alterations” to the dwelling that might otherwise have been con-
structed. While the court concluded at para. 12 that “there was never any intent” for the expenses at
issue to “be included in any recognition of medical expense under paragraph 118.2(2)(l.2),” it is im-
plausible to suggest that Parliament would have intended to exclude modifications to newly con-
structed dwellings, thereby creating a tax bias in favour of the acquisition and renovation of already
existing dwellings. The 2000 Federal Budget proposes to reverse this decision (see supra note 56).
71
 An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1942-43, c. 28, s. 5(6), adding s. 5(1)(n) to the In-
come War Tax Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 97. This provision was modelled on a similar U.S. deduction
which was also introduced in 1942. For a brief analysis of the U.S. medical expenses deduction, see
Goode, supra note 26 at 156-60.
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then Minister of Finance Mr. Ilsley, the deduction was designed to recognize the di-
minished ability to pay on the part of taxpayers who incurred extraordinary medical
expenses, exceeding average medical expenditures (which were estimated to be ap-
proximately 5% of net income).72 According to subsequent commentators, a threshold
on deductible expenses may have reflected “a judgment that the taxation of income
spent on medical care creates significant horizontal inequities only if the medical ex-
penses are large, since a high level of medical expenditure is more likely to be non-
discretionary than a low one.”73 More plausibly, such a threshold likely reflected a
judgment that average medical expenses, though also involuntary, were adequately
addressed through standardized personal exemptions, and need not be accounted for
through a separate medical expenses deduction.
While the dollar ceilings on allowable claims were originally justified in order to
prevent possible abuses,74 these were eliminated in 1961 on the grounds that “[s]ince
the whole purpose of the deduction for medical expenses is to give relief to those tax-
payers whose ability to pay income tax has been reduced by extraordinary expenses, it
seems both logical and fair to remove the limit entirely ...”75
Other post-1942 amendments lowered the threshold on deductible expenses to
4% of a taxpayer’s net income in 1944 and 3% in 1953,76 and significantly increased
the categories of expenses eligible for the deduction.77 In 1988, the deduction was
converted to a credit computed at 17% of eligible expenses, and the applicable thresh-
old was capped at a dollar amount of $1,500 (now $1,637).78
4. Evaluation and Recommendations
In evaluating the METC, critics have questioned the name of the credit, the defi-
nition of eligible expenses, the structure and existence of the threshold, the 1988 con-
72
 House of Commons Debates (23 June 1942) at 3580.
73
 Cloutier & Fortin, supra note 28 at 60, citing J.E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector (New
York: Norton & Company, 1986) at 427-28.
74
 See G. McGregor, Personal Exemptions and Deductions under the Income Tax (Toronto: Cana-
dian Tax Foundation, 1962) at 18.
75
 House of Commons Debates (20 June 1961) at 3580.
76
 Canada, Department of Finance, Disability Tax Credit: Evaluation of Recent Experience (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 1992) at 11 [hereinafter Disability Tax Credit]. According to this report, the
reduction to 3% in 1953 was “justified on the basis of a statistical study by the Department of Na-
tional Health and Welfare which concluded that the new threshold provided a more accurate measure
of the average medical expenses incurred by taxpayers.”
77
 See e.g. ibid. at 10, noting that twenty new items had been added to the list of eligible expenses
during the eight years from 1984 to 1992.
78
 See An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, the Canada Pension Plan, the Unemployment Insurance
Act, 1971, the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Education and
Health Contributions Act, 1977 and certain related Acts, S.C. 1988, c. 55, ss. 77, 92, repealing former
s. 110(1)(c) and adding, inter alia, s. 118.2, applicable to 1988 and subsequent taxation years [herein-
after 1987 Amendments].
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version of the previous deduction into a credit, the rate at which the credit is com-
puted, and its non-refundability.
a. Name
With respect to the name of the credit, critics have suggested that the METC be
renamed “to make it clearer that disability-related items are included.”79 As the Coun-
cil of Canadians with Disabilities has observed: “It is plausible that many persons
with disabilities and their families would not necessarily identify items and services
such as home renovations, van purchases and modifications, and sign language serv-
ices, as ‘medical expenses’.”80 Indeed, since many of the items added to the list of eli-
gible expenses over the last fifteen years have included disability-related expenses
(e.g., home renovations, van purchases and modifications, sign-language services, and
various devices to assist visually or hearing impaired individuals), it is arguable that
the primary purpose of the credit has evolved from recognizing extraordinary medical
expenses to recognizing both extraordinary and recurring costs associated with physi-
cal or mental disabilities. For this reason, as several commentators have suggested, it
seems both appropriate and desirable to rename the credit the “medical and disability
expenses tax credit”.81 Alternatively, as the Standing Committee has recommended, it
might make even more sense to recognize itemized disability-related expenses
through a new disability expenses tax credit, separate from a more narrowly defined
METC.82 This proposal is examined more thoroughly in Part II.C, below.
b. Eligible Expenses
Regarding the definition of eligible medical expenses, some commentators have
questioned the restriction on allowable expenses to those incurred for goods and
services provided only to the individual, his or her spouse, and a related dependant.83
Although it might be argued that tax recognition for such expenses should be limited
to goods and services provided only to the individual taxpayer and others whom the
taxpayer has a legal obligation to support (e.g., spouses and dependent children) on
the basis that only these expenses are truly involuntary, the ITA currently recognizes
expenses incurred for goods and services provided to grandchildren, parents, grand-
parents, siblings, aunts and uncles, and nieces and nephews, provided that the recipi-
ent of the good or service is “dependent on the individual for support” at any time in
79
 Council of Canadians with Disabilities, Tax Reform Positions (Winnipeg: Council of Canadians
with Disabilities, 1999) at 6. See also G. Williams, The Tax System and the Cost of Disability Sup-
ports: A CACL Discussion Paper (Toronto: Canadian Association of Community Living, 1996) at 18
[hereinafter The Tax System]; D. Baker & H. Beatty, Consultant’s Report on Taxation and Disability:
Summary of Recommended Reforms (Task Force on Disability Issues, 1997) at 7.
80
 Council of Canadians with Disabilities, ibid. at 6.
81
 See e.g. The Tax System, supra note 79 at 18; Council of Canadians with Disabilities, ibid.
82
 Supra note 33 at 14.
83
 See e.g. Council of Canadians with Disabilities, supra note 79 at 6.
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the year.84 Having thus expanded the scope of allowable expenses, it is difficult to un-
derstand why it should not be further extended to include payments for goods and
services provided to anyone who is dependent on the individual for support at any
time in the year, whether the person is a close or distant relative or simply a friend.
Given the exclusion of same-sex couples from the current definition of spouse in sub-
section 252(4) of the ITA, moreover, this reform would seem particularly appropriate.
Turning to specific categories of expenses, several commentators have questioned
why eligible attendant care expenses must be paid to someone other than the individ-
ual’s spouse or a person under 18 years of age.85 While the apparent policy goal of this
exclusion is to prevent income-splitting,86 this concern seems misplaced where a
spouse receives a reasonable amount in exchange for qualifying attendant care.87 Al-
though the income tax used to contain a rule prohibiting the deduction of any amount
paid to a spouse as salary,88 this rule was repealed in 1979 as part of a series of legis-
lative reforms to recognize the equal status of women. The exclusion of payments to a
spouse from eligible attendant care expenses seems to be an anachronistic holdover
from a previous era that should also be repealed.
Commentators have also questioned the characterization of “attendant care”,
which may not include personal services necessitated by the patient’s disability, and
the characterization of nursing home expenses, which Revenue Canada interprets to
include the costs of the patient’s room and board as well as recreational activities.89 In
order to ensure equity among taxpayers in different living situations and to prevent
tax-induced distortions in the kind of care employed, it seems reasonable that atten-
dant care should be specifically defined to include such necessary personal services,
while eligible expenses for care in a nursing home should be defined to exclude basic
room and board.90 To the extent that nursing home expenses are interpreted to include
the cost of recreational programs, moreover, eligible expenses should also include the
cost of similar programs for disabled individuals who are not cared for in a nursing
home.
84
 See the definition of “dependant” quoted in supra note 5.
85
 See e.g. Baker & Beatty, supra note 79 at 10. See also Federal Task Force on Disability Issues,
supra note 1 at 93, recommending that the METC should cover “the reasonable cost of medically
necessary attendant care provided by family members”; Council of Canadians with Disabilities, supra
note 79 at 5, adding that a caregiver spouse in receipt of such payments should qualify for the em-
ployment insurance and Canada Pension Plan benefits upon the payment of EI premiums and CPP
contributions.
86
 See R. Shillington, Taxation and Disability: A Report for the Task Force on Disability (Ottawa:
Canadian Council on Social Development, 1996) at 16.
87
 Concerns about the quality of the care provided may justify an exclusion for payments to caregiv-
ers under 18 years of age.
88
 See former s. 74(3), as rep. by An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax, S.C. 1980-
81-82-83, c. 48, s. 40(1), applicable with respect to fiscal periods ending after December 11, 1979.
89
 See G. Katz, “Tax Assistance for the Disabled” (1999) 47 Can. Tax J. 663 at 682, citing Revenue
Canada document no. 9501515 (May 26, 1995).
90
 See Baker & Beatty, supra note 79 at 10.
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Yet other commentators have criticized the complexity of the rules regarding at-
tendant care, which may be claimed under several different provisions, with different
implications for the patient’s ability to claim the disability tax credit.91 To the extent
that these provisions create complicated planning questions as to the ideal provision
under which to claim attendant care expenses, they are rightly criticized on the
grounds that they increase the complexity of the tax system and favour well-advised
taxpayers who are more likely to calculate the optimal claim for attendant care ex-
penses.92 Anticipating subsequent arguments in this paper, it is suggested that it would
be preferable to allow taxpayers to deduct attendant care expenses under a single pro-
vision, without affecting their right to claim a separate disability tax credit or deduc-
tion.
In addition to these specific criticisms, the Council of Canadians with Disabilities
has recommended that the following items be added to the list of allowable expenses:93
• the cost of repairs and maintenance to all assistive devices;
• the cost of outdoor powered lifts (as well as ramps);
• adaptations to dwellings, broadly defined (thus, include expenses for items
such as shower bench, transfer bars, support bars);
• the extension of the current permitted claim of 20% of a modified van to vans
modified more than six months after purchase;94
• the additional monthly rent on an accessible apartment;
• expenses for widening a driveway to be used by an accessible van (the current
claim is limited to use by a bus);
91
 Attendant care may be claimed under ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(2)(b) (remuneration for one full-
time attendant for a patient eligible for the disability tax credit), s. 118.2(2)(b.1) (remuneration up to
$10,000 or $20,000 in the year of the patient’s death where the patient is eligible for the disability tax
credit and no other amount is claimed for attendant care), s. 118.2(2)(c) (remuneration for one full-
time attendant for care in the patient’s home if the patient has been certified by a medical practitioner
to be a person who, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, is and is likely to be for a long-
continued period of indefinite duration dependent on others for personal needs), s. 63 (child care ex-
pense deduction up to the lesser of $7,000 for each eligible child or two-thirds of the individual’s
earned income), or s. 64 (attendant care deduction up to two-thirds of the individual’s earned income).
Where attendant care is claimed under ss. 118.2(2)(b) or 118.2(2)(c), no amount may be claimed un-
der the disability tax credit, nor under s. 118.2(2)(b.1). Alternatively, while the disability tax credit can
be claimed by taxpayers who claim attendant care under ss. 118.2(2)(b.1), 63, or 64, the expenses that
may be claimed under these provisions are capped at fixed dollar amounts (under ss. 118.2(2)(b.1),
63) and/or a percentage of earned income (in the case of ss. 63, 64). Since ss. 63 & 64 operate as de-
ductions, while ss. 118.2 & 118.3 operate as credits, the optimal claim for attendant care expenses
may also depend on the individual’s marginal rate of taxation.
92
 For critical comments on the complexity of the current rules, see Katz, supra note 89 at 690-91.
93
 Canadian Council on Disabilities, supra note 79 at 7-8.
94
 See ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(2)(l.7).
818 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 45
• the extra costs of building a new accessible home;
• expenses for oral interpreters;
• the cost of readers and persons to assist learning disabled and visually impaired
persons with scanning and editing to create accessible formats;
• voice-operated computer software (e.g., “Dragon Dictate”) required by a per-
son because of a disability;
• a solid base for a computer required by a person because of cerebral palsy or a
related disability;
• grocery delivery required by a person because of a disability;
• clothing alterations provided to an individual with an orthesis or prosthesis, or
to a little person;
• recreation programs and equipment which enhance the skills and capacity of a
person with a disability;
• health care supplies related to incontinence;
• multiple vitamins when related to a disability;
• second residence (e.g., cottage) accessibility;
• replacement and/or cleaning of items and home repairs when breakage or dam-
age is disability-related;
• replacement of clothing when damage is disability-related;
• extra laundry costs related to a disability;
• extra bedding costs related to a disability; and
• extra heating costs related to a disability.
Many of these items (e.g., costs of repairs and maintenance, costs of specific devices,
and costs of grocery delivery), appear to be logical extensions of the current list of
eligible expenses and would appear to be unproblematic for this reason. Others (e.g.,
recreational programs) may seem like a departure from the prevailing list, but are ar-
guably consistent with recent amendments to include the costs of various kinds of
therapy and tutoring services. Yet other items (replacement and/or cleaning of dam-
aged items, and additional laundry, bedding, and heating costs) appear to be the kind
of difficult-to-itemize items that are best recognized through a separate disability tax
credit or deduction.95
While many of these additions would improve the METC, the number of items on
this list and the regular additions to the list of eligible expenses since the medical ex-
pense deduction was first introduced in 1942 suggest a more general concern that
95
 See the discussion of the disability tax credit in Part II.B, below.
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changes in technology and prescribed therapies are certain to lead to the emergence of
comparable items that are not contemplated within the existing categories. For this
reason, as one commentator has suggested, it might be appropriate to supplement the
categorical list in subsection 118.2(2) with a general statement of principle according
to which eligible medical expenses would include all reasonable amounts to the extent
that they are paid for the purpose of acquiring goods or services certified as medically
necessary by a qualified medical practitioner.96 While the existing list should be re-
tained as an example of the kinds of expenses recognized by the provision, this
amendment would allow disabled individuals to obtain a credit for novel treatments or
technologies without having to lobby Revenue Canada and the Department of Finance
to increase the list of eligible expenses. Indeed, to the extent that the current list of
items reflects “the lobbying efforts of groups that are vocal and powerful” it has been
argued that “broader definitions would be useful to assist disabled individuals who are
not as well organized or represented.”97
c.  Threshold
In relation to the threshold on eligible expenses in the year (expressed as 3% of
the individual’s net income or $1,637, whichever is lower), a number of concerns
have been raised. First, to the extent that the dollar amount caps the net income
threshold for individuals with net incomes exceeding $54,567,98 the structure of the
threshold has been rightly criticized as regressive, allowing a larger share of medical
expenses as a percentage of net income to be claimed by high-income taxpayers than
by low-income taxpayers.99 From this perspective, a possible reform might be to
eliminate the dollar limit on the net income threshold, using the revenue saved from
this amendment to finance other disability-related tax reforms.100 A related concern in-
volves the ability of some couples to claim a larger percentage of medical expenses by
claiming the METC in computing the tax payable by the lower income spouse. To the
96
 Shillington, supra note 86 at 28-29. The language in the text borrows from the phraseology in
Shillington’s paper and from the ITA, supra note 4, s. 18(1)(a), which prohibits any deduction in com-
puting the income of a business “except to the extent that it was made or incurred by the taxpayer for
the purpose of gaining or producing income from the business or property,” and from s. 67, which
limits all deductions in respect of an outlay or expense “to the extent that the outlay or expense was
reasonable in the circumstances.” As explained below, where disability-related expenses are recog-
nized under a separate disability expenses tax credit or deduction, this language would have to be
modified accordingly.
97
 J.E. Magee, “Tax Planning for the Disabled and Elderly and Their Caregivers” (1992) 40 Can.
Tax J. 1364 at 1370.
98
 For taxpayers with net incomes exceeding $54,567, the dollar threshold of $1,637 is less than 3%
of net income.
99
 See e.g. Council of Canadians with Disabilities, supra note 79 at 6. For this reason, it is not sur-
prising that taxation statistics demonstrate an increase in allowable medical expenses as a percentage
of taxfiler income for taxfilers with income above $60,000 (see Shillington, supra note 86 at 13-14).
100
 This recommendation was made by the Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, supra note 1 at
93. See also Council of Canadians with Disabilities, ibid.
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extent that the credit recognizes extraordinary medical expenses incurred by families
rather than individuals,101 it would seem more appropriate to set a threshold based on
the aggregate net income of cohabiting spouses, rather than the net income of the in-
dividual who happens to claim the credit. As with amendments to the provisions re-
garding attendant care, this reform would lessen the opportunities for more sophisti-
cated taxpayers to plan their way to a larger METC.102
From a different perspective altogether, one might question the level of the
threshold on allowable expenses, particularly for expenses incurred in respect of an
individual with a mental or physical infirmity that has lasted or may be expected to
last for a lengthy period of time.103 While the purpose of this threshold (both when the
original deduction was introduced in 1942 and when the threshold was reduced to 3%
in 1953) was to exclude “average” medical expenses from recognition for tax pur-
poses, the determination of these thresholds preceded by several years the introduc-
tion of public health insurance, which might have been expected to dramatically re-
duce average private expenditures on medical care. Not surprisingly, therefore, some
commentators have suggested a re-examination of the threshold in light of more re-
cent data on average expenditures.104
Moreover, one should not forget that the primary purpose of the original deduc-
tion was to recognize catastrophic medical expenses incurred by otherwise relatively
healthy individuals, not the ongoing costs associated with a prolonged disability.
While an annual threshold is ideally suited for the former purpose, it is entirely inap-
propriate for the latter. To the extent, therefore, that the primary purpose of the METC
has evolved from recognizing a limited number of extraordinary medical expenses to
recognizing both extraordinary and recurring costs associated with mental or physical
disabilities, it is arguable that the existing threshold should be eliminated altogether.
Alternatively, by introducing a separate disability expenses tax credit or deduction, it
would be possible to retain the existing threshold for a more narrowly defined medical
expense tax credit or deduction, while eliminating any threshold for the tax recogni-
tion of disability-related expenses. Not surprisingly, therefore, when the Standing
Committee recommended the enactment of a separate disability expenses tax credit, it
also recommended that “the government should consider reducing or eliminating the
101
 This is implicit in the definition of the word “patient”, supra note 38, which refers to the individ-
ual taxpayer, the individual’s spouse and dependants.
102
 For a similar concern, see Baker & Beatty, supra note 79 at 8, questioning the ability to select a
twelve-month period for aggregating medical expense payments that differs from the calendar year.
103
 Although the sentence in the text does not define this period of time, the ITA, supra note 4, s.
118.4(1)(a), defines a “prolonged” impairment for the purpose of the disability tax credit as an im-
pairment that “has lasted, or can reasonably be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12
months.” It should be noted, however, that the sentence in the text uses the more general expression
“mental or physical infirmity” rather than the more narrowly defined “severe and prolonged mental
and physical impairment” used for the purpose of the disability tax credit.
104
 The Tax System, supra note 79 at 18.
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three per cent limit that currently applies to the Medical Expenses Tax Credit.”105 This
issue is examined more thoroughly in the discussion of the proposed disability ex-
penses tax credit in Part II.C, below.
d. Credit or Deduction
With respect to the 1988 conversion of the deduction into a credit, commentators
have taken different positions. To the extent that the provision is designed to recognize
the reduced ability to pay of individuals who must incur extraordinary medical ex-
penses, some have argued that a deduction in computing taxable income is a more ap-
propriate measure than a credit computed at a flat rate of 17%.106 Others, noting that
deductions are worth more to high-income taxpayers than to low-income taxpayers
are more favourably inclined to the 1988 reforms but nevertheless criticize the current
non-refundable credit on the grounds that it is of little or no value to low-income tax-
payers, among whom disabled individuals are statistically over-represented.107 Yet oth-
ers have criticized the rate of the credit, suggesting that it be increased from its current
rate of 17% to 30% or more.108
In dealing with these competing proposals, it is important to distinguish questions
of social policy from those of tax policy more narrowly defined. While social policy
considerations might favour public reimbursement for a larger share of medical and
disability-related costs than is currently the case under provincially operated health
care and social assistance programs, this social insurance objective is distinct from tax
policy considerations regarding horizontal equity. As a result, while a refundable tax
credit for medical or disability-related expenses might be an effective way to cover a
larger share of these involuntary costs,109 such a measure should not be viewed as a
substitute for a separate provision recognizing privately borne medical and disability-
related expenses in computing an individual’s taxable income.
To the extent that medical and disability-related expenses are not fully reim-
bursed, the tax policy issue more narrowly defined concerns the manner and extent to
which these privately borne costs should be taken into account in determining the in-
dividual’s tax liability. While deductions are often criticized on the basis that they are
105
 Supra note 33 at 14 (Recommendation 8).
106
 See e.g. Cloutier & Fortin, supra note 28 at 54-62.
107
 See generally Shillington, supra note 86; The Tax System, supra note 79.
108
 See e.g. Baker & Beatty, supra note 79 at 7, suggesting 30-35%; Don Gallant and Associates,
Make Us Canadian: Discussion Paper for the Canadian Association for Community Living (Winni-
peg: Canadian Association for Community Living, 1998) at 20, suggesting 50%.
109
 To evaluate the merits of a social policy measure along these lines is beyond the scope of this pa-
per, the primary focus of which is tax policy narrowly defined, not social policy more broadly under-
stood. To evaluate such a measure properly, however, one would presumably have to consider not
only the relative roles of the private and public sectors in the provision of medical care and disability
supports, but also the respective roles of the federal and provincial governments in these areas.
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worth more to high-income taxpayers than they are to low-income taxpayers,110 this
argument assumes that the income tax should apply not to the discretionary income
that remains after deducting involuntary expenses (such as medical and disability-
related expenses), but to net income from various sources without taking into account
the personal circumstances of the individual taxpayer.111 Although the federal govern-
ment implicitly adopted the latter view when it converted various deductions to non-
refundable credits in 1988, it did so without any explicit argument to this effect, and it
has been suggested that the conversion was “a disguised way of moving the marginal
rate schedule upward” in order to offset the more visible impact of an accompanying
reduction in nominal tax rates.112 In contrast, both the Royal Commission on Taxation
and the Quebec White Paper on the Personal Tax and Transfer Systems favoured a
concept of income according to which “the ability to pay of a taxpayer is reduced by
his obligation to cover essential needs for himself and his dependants.”113 Moreover, as
Pierre Cloutier and Bernard Fortin explain, since “one can obtain whatever degree of
progressivity one desires” by changes to the rate structure, the treatment of involun-
tary expenses such as extraordinary medical and disability-related costs is best under-
stood as a matter of horizontal equity (according to which taxpayers with the same
ability to pay should pay the same income tax) not vertical equity (according to which
taxpayers with a greater ability to pay should pay an appropriately greater amount of
tax).114
From the latter perspective, a deduction for extraordinary medical expenses (and
arguably a separate deduction for necessary costs associated with a prolonged mental
or physical disability) may be justified as a necessary measure to achieve horizontal
equity among taxpayers with different involuntary expenses. Although a non-
refundable credit equal to the lowest marginal rate of tax might be justified on the
grounds that medical and disability-related expenses are entirely involuntary for low-
income taxpayers and increasingly discretionary for taxpayers subject to tax at higher
rates,115 it is implausible that discretionary and non-discretionary aspects of these ex-
penses are perfectly correlated with the rate schedule. Moreover, inasmuch as medical
or disability-related expenses involve an element of personal consumption, the prefer-
110
 See e.g. T.F. Pogue, “Deductions vs. Credits: A Comment” (1974) 27 Nat. Tax J. 659; Canada,
Report of the National Council on Welfare on the Personal Income Tax System in Canada: The Hid-
den Welfare System (Ottawa: National Council on Welfare, 1976).
111
 For an excellent analysis of this argument, see Cloutier & Fortin, supra note 28 at 54-62.
112
 Ibid. at 73.
113
 Quebec, Ministère des Finances, White Paper on the Personal Tax and Transfer Systems (Intro-
ductory Paper) (Quebec: Le Ministère, 1984) at 58. See also Royal Commission on Taxation, supra
note 24 at 5-8.
114
 Cloutier & Fortin, supra note 28 at 58. While one might respond to this statement by questioning
the political feasibility of obtaining “whatever degree of progressivity one desires” through changes to
the rate structure, it seems patently inexcusable to compensate for these political limitations through
what are in effect rate increases on specific categories of taxpayers with additional involuntary ex-
penses such as extraordinary medical or disability-related costs.
115
 See the discussion in ibid. at 59.
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able approach is to recognize only a fraction of these expenses, as is the case with
medically necessary air conditioners for which only 50% of the cost may be claimed
as an eligible medical expense.
e. Social Policy
Lastly, having defined this tax policy objective, it is important to emphasize that it
cannot take the place of broader social policy goals that might also be pursued
through the ITA. To the extent that that the federal government considers it desirable
to assume a larger or more direct role in the reimbursement of medical or disability-
related expenses than it currently does through the Canada Health and Social Transfer,
a refundable tax credit might be appropriate for this purpose.116 In addition or as an
alternative to such a measure, the federal government might provide direct income
support to low-income individuals with disabilities or low-income families with dis-
abled children through a refundable tax credit the value of which diminishes as the in-
come of the individual or family increases.117 In either case, however, these social pol-
icy objectives and the tax measures through which they might be implemented should
be distinguished from the more narrow tax policy goals supporting a deduction for
extraordinary medical expenses and disability-related expenses.
B. Disability Tax Credit
1. Description
The disability tax credit (“DTC”) provides a fixed credit against basic federal tax
otherwise payable where
(1) the individual has “a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment,”118
the effects of which are such that the person’s “ability to perform a basic ac-
tivity of daily living is markedly restricted”;119
(2) a qualified medical practitioner120 has certified that the impairment is “a se-
vere and prolonged mental or physical impairment the effects of which are
116
 While this paper does not examine the constitutionality of such a refundable tax credit, one might
expect provincial and territorial governments to object to such a measure on the grounds that it might
interfere with their primary jurisdiction in this area.
117
 The federal government currently operates various income support programs along these lines
(e.g. Old Age Security), two of which (the Goods and Services Tax Credit and the Canada Child Tax
Benefit) are delivered in the form of refundable tax credits and might serve as models for such a
measure. These issues are examined more fully in this paper, below.
118
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.3(1)(a).
119
 Ibid., s. 118.3(1)(a.1).
120
 For the purposes of this provision, the qualified medical practitioner depends on the kind of im-
pairment (medical doctor or optometrist for a sight impairment, medical doctor or audiologist for a
hearing impairment, medical doctor or occupational therapist for impairments affecting one’s ability
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such that the individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is
markedly restricted”;121
(3) the individual has filed the certificate;122 and
(4) no amount for attendant care or care in a nursing home in respect of the indi-
vidual has been claimed as a medical expense under section 118.2, except
under paragraph 118.3(2)(b.1) which limits the amount that may be claimed
in a year to $10,000 or $20,000 if the patient dies in the year.123
The credit is also available to individuals who support a disabled relative to the extent
that the credit otherwise available to the relative exceeds that person’s basic federal
tax payable before subtracting any non-refundable credits (other than the personal
credits and the credit for employment insurance and Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”) or
Quebec Pension Plan (“QPP”) premiums).124 Similarly, any unused portion of a DTC
in respect of a disabled person may be transferred to that person’s spouse.125
For the purpose of these provisions, subsection 118.3(4) allows the tax authorities
to “obtain the advice of the Department of Human Resources Development” with re-
                                                                                                                                        
to walk, feed, or dress oneself, medical doctor or psychologist for impairment with respect to per-
ceiving, thinking and remembering, and medical doctor with respect to any other impairment), and is
further defined in ibid., s. 118.4(2), as “a person authorized to practise as such … pursuant to the laws
of the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer resides, of a province or of the jurisdiction in which the prop-
erty is provided.”
121
 Ibid., s. 118.3(1)(a.2). The 2000 Federal Budget proposes to extend the DTC to persons certified
by a medical doctor to be markedly restricted in their ability to perform a basic activity of daily living
all or substantially all of the time “but for therapy (other than therapy that can reasonably be expected
to be of benefit to persons who are not so impaired) that is (i) essential to sustain a vital function of
the individual, and (ii) required to be administered at least three times each week for a total period av-
eraging not less than 14 hours a week” (see “Budget Papers 2000”, supra note 56 at 2-9).
122
 ITA, ibid., s. 118.3(1)(b).
123
 Ibid., s. 118.3(1)(c). For a detailed explanation of the DTC, see Sherman, supra note 35 at 29-63.
For a more recent review, see Katz, supra note 89 at 666-74.
124
 ITA, ibid., s. 118.3(2). For this purpose, the only individuals who may claim the DTC are indi-
viduals who claimed an equivalent to spouse credit in respect of the disabled person under s. 118(1),
or could have done so if they were not married (as defined in the ITA to include opposite-sex com-
mon-law spouses); and individuals who claimed a caregiver credit or infirm dependant’s credit in re-
spect of a disabled parent, grandparent, child or grandchild, or could have done so if the disabled per-
son had no income and had attained the age of 18 years before the end of the year. The 2000 Federal
Budget proposes to expand the list of relatives who can claim the DTC to include siblings, aunts and
uncles, and nieces and nephews (see “Budget Papers 2000”, supra note 56 at 2-9). As a result, as the
Budget explains, the list of relatives to whom one DTC can be transferred will be made consistent
with the rules for the METC (see “Supplementary Information 2000”, supra note 35 at 3-35). Where
more than one individual is entitled to claim the disability tax credit in respect of a disabled relative
under s. 118.3(2), s. 118.3(3) provides that the credit may be allocated among these supporting indi-
viduals, but may be allocated by the Minister where the supporting individuals cannot agree. For a
brief discussion of this element of the DTC, see Sherman, ibid. at 135-38.
125
 ITA, ibid., s. 118.8. For a brief discussion of the rules governing the transfer of the DTC to a
spouse, see Sherman, ibid. at 134-35.
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spect to whether an individual in respect of whom the DTC is claimed has “a severe
and prolonged impairment, the effects of which are such that the individual’s ability to
perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted,” and requires individu-
als claiming the credit to furnish this Department with “information with respect to an
individual’s impairment and its effects on the individual” where requested in writing
by the Department. More specifically, subsection 118.4(1) of the ITA provides that
(a) an impairment is prolonged where it has lasted, or can reasonably be ex-
pected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months;
(b) an individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly
restricted only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy
and the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual is blind or
is unable (or requires an inordinate amount of time) to perform a basic ac-
tivity of daily living;
(c) a basic activity of daily living in relation to an individual means
(i) perceiving, thinking and remembering,
(ii) feeding and dressing oneself,
(iii) speaking so as to be understood, in a quiet setting, by another person
familiar with the individual,
(iv) hearing so as to understand, in a quiet setting, another person familiar
with the individual,
(v) eliminating (bowel or bladder functions), or
(vi) walking; and
(d) for greater certainty, no other activity, including working, housekeeping or
a social or recreational activity, shall be considered as a basic activity of
daily living.
Where an individual (or qualifying dependant) satisfies these requirements, the indi-
vidual (or supporting individual) may claim a non-refundable credit of $730 against
basic federal tax otherwise payable,126 which is worth approximately $1,060 when
provincial taxes are taken into account.127
126
 ITA, ibid., s. 118.3(1), which defines the amount of the credit as 17% of $4,293 or $730. These
amounts were increased pursuant to the proposal in 2000 Federal Budget, supra note 35, to restore
full indexation.
127
 This assumes a provincial tax rate equal to 45% of basic federal tax payable. Actual provincial
income tax rates are outlined at supra note 36. The 2000 Federal Budget proposes to introduce an ad-
ditional non-refundable credit worth $500 (or approximately $725 when provincial income taxes are
taken into account) for disabled children who have not attained the age of 18 before the end of the
year. This supplementary amount will be reduced where the aggregate of child and attendant care ex-
penses claimed for the year in respect of the child exceeds $2,000 (see “Budget Papers 2000”, supra
note 56 at 2-9).
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2. History
Like the METC in section 118.2, the DTC originated during the Second World
War, when the federal government introduced a $480 deduction for persons who were
totally blind at any time in the year, provided that they did not claim an amount for
attendant care under the medical expense deduction.128 Although the deduction did not
require blind persons to itemize particular expenses associated with their disability,
the provision was justified on the grounds that it recognized “the additional expenses”
that blind persons are required to incur.129 According to the Department of Finance:
“Given that the itemization was already permitted for the expenses paid to hire a full-
time attendant, the effect of the disability deduction was to provide more complete re-
lief for such costs, including those under the deductible expenses threshold of 5 per
cent of income.”130 In addition, the Department suggests, where the cost of a full-time
attendant was not claimed as a medical expense, the disability deduction “may also
have been intended to compensate for time expended by unpaid family members.”131
Although the provision was amended in 1949 to include, in addition to blind per-
sons, individuals who were “throughout the whole of the year, necessarily confined,
by reason of illness, injury or affliction, to a bed or wheel chair,”132 the disability de-
duction remained largely unchanged until 1986, with the exception of increases in the
dollar value of the deduction which reached $2,590 by 1985.133 In that year, the federal
government announced a major revision to the deduction to include “all severely dis-
abled Canadians” by extending eligibility to all persons with a severe and prolonged
mental or physical impairment.134 For the purpose of this amended provision, former
paragraph 110(1.3)(a) stipulated:
[A] person shall be considered to have a severe and prolonged impairment only
if by reason thereof he is markedly restricted in his activities of daily living and
the impairment has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
at least 12 months.
While this language endures in current paragraphs 118.3(1)(a.1) and 118.4(1)(a) of
the ITA, it was supplemented in 1991 by the statutory definitions of a “marked re-
striction” on an individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living in para-
graph 118.4(1)(b) and of “a basic activity of daily living” in paragraphs 118.4(1)(c)
and (d). Otherwise, the only significant amendments since 1986 involve the conver-
128
 See s. 5(2) of the Income War Tax Act, supra note 71, enacted applicable to 1944 and subsequent
years.
129
 House of Commons Debates (26 June 1944) at 4178.
130
 Disability Tax Credit, supra note 76 at 10.
131
 Ibid.
132
 See the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1948, c. 52, s. 26(1)(c), which became the Income Tax Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 148, s. 27(1)(d) during the revision.
133
 The deduction was increased to $1,000 in 1972, and continued to increase after 1974, through
annual indexing which was introduced in that year.
134
 Department of Finance, Budget Papers (1985), as cited in Disability Tax Credit, supra note 76 at
67.
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sion of the deduction to a credit in 1988,135 and increases in the value of the credit
from $550 during the period 1988-90 to $720 in 1991 and to $730 for the year
2000.136
3. Interpretation
In applying these provisions, the courts have adopted an increasingly liberal ap-
proach, emphasizing the need for a “humane and compassionate construction” to
achieve “the object of Parliament … to give to disabled persons a measure of relief
that will to some degree alleviate the increased difficulties under which their impair-
ment forces them to live.”137 In one recent case, for example, the court concluded that
the taxpayer’s children, who suffered from cystic fibrosis, had a severe and prolonged
physical impairment on the grounds that they required an inordinate amount of time
“to maintain their respiratory capacity”, notwithstanding that paragraph 118.4(1)(c) of
the ITA does not include “breathing” as a “basic activity of daily living”.138 In another
case, the court questioned the mandatory status of the medical certificate described in
paragraphs 118.3(1)(a.2) and (b), reasoning that “[o]ne does not need a person with a
degree in medicine to determine whether a claimant can walk or get dressed, or re-
quires an inordinate amount of time to do so. These matters are within ordinary hu-
man experience.”139
135
 See 1987 Amendments, supra note 78, ss. 77(6), 92, repealing former s. 110(1)(e) and adding s.
118.3, applicable to 1988 and subsequent years.
136
 An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, the Canada Pension Plan, the Cultural Property Export
and Import Act, the Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act, the Tax Court of Canada Act, the Un-
employment Insurance Act, the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, the Can-
ada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act and certain related Acts,
S.C. 1991, c. 49, ss. 90(1), 90(3) [hereinafter Sch. II], being Sch. II to the Income Tax Amendments
Revision Act, S.C. 1994, c. 7 [hereinafter 1993 Amendments], those provisions applying to 1991 and
subsequent years. Additional amendments announced in the 2000 Federal Budget are outlined at su-
pra notes 121, 124, 127.
137
 Radage v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2510 at 2529, 96 D.T.C. 1615 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Radage
cited to C.T.C.], Bowman J.T.C.C., cited with approval by a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal
in Johnston v. M.N.R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 262 at para. 10, 98 D.T.C. 6169 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter
Johnston].
138
 Fillion v. M.N.R., 1998 CarswellNAT 2907 at paras. 18, 21 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Fillion], accept-
ing the taxpayer’s argument that “breathing” should be read into s. 118.4(1)(c), since “otherwise sec-
tion 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would be violated” (at para. 18). For another
case in which a taxpayer with a breathing impairment was considered eligible for the disability tax
credit, see Renken v. M.N.R., [1996] 2 C.T.C. 2687, 1996 CarswellNAT 1351 (T.C.C.), online:
TAXNET (TaxPARTNER Main) [hereinafter Renken cited to CarswellNAT] (concluding that the tax-
payer, who suffered from severe asthma, required an inordinate amount of time to walk and dress her-
self).
139
 Morrison v. M.N.R. (1998), [1999] 1 C.T.C. 2331 at para. 17, Bowman T.C.J. (T.C.C.). For a
contrary view, emphasizing the statutory requirement for a medical certificate, see Partanen v.
M.N.R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2941 (T.C.C.), aff’d [1999] 3 C.T.C. 79, 99 D.T.C. 5436 (F.C.A.).
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At the same time, however, courts have emphasized the limited scope of the
credit, observing that the provision is designed to provide “a modest amount of tax
relief to persons who fall within a relatively restricted category of markedly physically
or mentally impaired persons.”140 In addition, several decisions have noted the restric-
tive impact of the 1991 amendments, which introduced specific statutory definitions
of the expressions “markedly restricted” in paragraph 118.4(1)(b) of the ITA and “a
basic activity of daily living” in paragraphs 118.4(1)(c) and (d).141
140
 Radage, supra note 137 at 2528. See also Caudle v. M.N.R., [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2815 at 2819
(T.C.C.), Sarchuk J.T.C.C., observing that the statutory provisions are “narrow and restrictive”, and
concluding that “it is obvious that Parliament, as a matter of policy … intended to create … an ex-
treme level of disability in order to qualify”; Craven v. M.N.R., [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2883, 1995 Car-
swellNET 304 at para. 6 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (TaxPARTNER Main), Bowman J.T.C.C., con-
cluding that “the inflexible tests in section 118.4” grant the court “no room to apply either common
sense or compassion in the interpretation of the disability tax credit”; Sincock v. M.N.R., [1995] 2
C.T.C. 2449 at 2453, 95 D.T.C. 535 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Sincock cited to C.T.C.], McArthur J.T.C.C.,
referring to “the rigorous and onerous criteria set forth in the legislation”; Moore v. M.N.R., [1995] 2
C.T.C. 2538, 1995 CarswellNAT 522 at para. 17 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (TaxPARTNER Main)
[hereinafter Moore], Sobier T.C.C.J., describing “the stringent tests laid down by Parliament which
must be met by a taxpayer, even one with severe health problems, before he or she is entitled to suc-
cessfully claim the disability tax credit”; Trottier v. M.N.R. (1995), [1996] 2 C.T.C. 2425, 1995 Car-
swellNAT 1461 at para. 34 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (TaxPARTNER Main), Tremblay J.T.C.C.,
concluding from the “restrictive nature” of the statutory provisions that “Parliament’s purpose was
clearly to target an extremely limited class of persons, those severely affected by their disability in
their daily lives”; Renken, supra note 138 at para. 8, Mogan J.T.C.C., referring to the “stringent con-
ditions imposed by sections 118.3 and 118.4 of the Income Tax Act”; Kralik v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997]
1 C.T.C. 2147 at 2151 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Kralik], Rowe D.J.T.C.C., emphasizing that the disability
tax credit “is very narrow in its application.”
141
 See e.g. Jeanlouis v. M.N.R., [1995] 2 C.T.C. 2200 at 2203 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Jeanlouis],
Bowman J.T.C.C., observing that the 1991 amendments resulted in a “restrictive definition that leaves
the Court little flexibility to apply a compassionate and common sense interpretation”; Bérubé v.
M.N.R. (1996), [1999] 3 C.T.C. 2032 at para. 15 (T.C.C.), Tardif T.C.J., noting that “[s]ince 1991, the
Act has contained a very narrow definition which limits the Court’s ability to interpret the phrase [se-
vere and prolonged mental or physical impairment] with compassion, especially since any assessment
must take into account improvement in the condition resulting from the use of devices”; Finegan v.
M.N.R., [1996] 2 C.T.C. 2609, 1996 CarswellNAT 1322 at para. 27 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (Tax-
PARTNER Main), Sarchuk J.T.C.C., concluding that the 1991 amendments made the provision “ex-
tremely narrow and restrictive” and “could only have been made … as a result of the intention of the
legislators, as a matter of policy, to tighten the availability of this section”; Power v. M.N.R., [1996] 2
C.T.C. 2684, 1996 CarswellNAT 1347 at para. 4 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (TaxPARTNER Main),
Bowie J.T.C.C., concluding that the 1991 amendments demonstrated Parliament’s intention to limit
the credit “only to individuals who suffer the most extreme disabling conditions”; Campbell v.
M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2022, 1996 CarswellNAT 1477 at para. 35 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (Tax-
PARTNER Main) [hereinafter Campbell], Rowe D.J.T.C.C., observing that the amended legislation
“is designed to bar the claim for all but the most severely handicapped.” Notwithstanding the state-
ment in budgetary documents accompanying the 1991 amendments that they were not intended to
“change the existing eligibility criteria,” several cases have concluded that a claimant was eligible for
the disability tax credit prior to 1991, but was rendered ineligible by the 1991 amendments (see e.g.
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Most striking is the volume of litigation, which exceeds a hundred reported cases
since 1994. While such a substantial number of reported cases may be attributed in
part to the relatively recent enactment of the relevant statutory provisions, particularly
those adopted in 1991, other factors likely include the relative imprecision of the
statutory language, the importance of detailed factual determinations in the applica-
tion of the rule, and widespread misunderstanding as to the purpose and scope of the
credit.
With respect to the statutory language, the condition that an individual require “an
inordinate amount of time” to perform an activity of daily living is particularly open-
ended. Although several decisions have referred to dictionary definitions to define
“inordinate” as “irregular” or “excessive”,142 courts have differed widely on how “ir-
regular” or “excessive” the amount of time must be to qualify as a “marked restric-
tion” on a taxpayer’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living within the
meaning of the relevant statutory provisions. In one case, for example, a taxpayer who
had “no control over her bowel function” was considered to have required an inordi-
nate amount of time to perform her bowel functions on the grounds that she was “re-
quired, on a continuous and constant basis, around the clock, to attend to her elimina-
tion needs by attending at washrooms and emptying the bag.”143 In other cases involv-
ing similarly disabled individuals, however, courts have held that the amount of time
devoted to elimination functions was not “inordinate”.144 Courts have also differed
over the standard whereby individuals may be said to require “an inordinate amount
of time” to walk,145 or engage in other basic activities of daily living.146 Other cases
                                                                                                                                        
Grey v. M.N.R. (1995), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2310 (T.C.C.); Brushett v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2323
(T.C.C.); Terrigno v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2801 (T.C.C.); De Francesco v. M.N.R., [1997] 3 C.T.C.
2649 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter De Francesco]).
142
 See e.g. Brookshaw v. M.N.R., [1994] 2 C.T.C. 2360 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Brookshaw]; Murphy v.
M.N.R., [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2857, 1995 CarswellNAT 299 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (Taxport or Main)
[hereinafter Murphy]. See also Johnston, supra note 137 at para. 18, where Létourneau J.A. defined
“an inordinate amount of time” as “an excessive amount of time, that is to say one much longer than
what is usually required by normal people. It requires a marked departure from normality.”
143
 Brookshaw, ibid. at 2360. See also Bearss v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 1 C.T.C. 2642 at 2644, 97
D.T.C. 190 (T.C.C.), where the court regarded the time devoted by the taxpayer to her elimination
functions (estimated at 10-15 minutes approximately 13 times a day for a total of 2.5 to 3 hours per
day, plus an additional 45 minutes every 2 days to change her colostomy pouch) as “inordinate”.
144
 See e.g. Ratzlaff v. M.N.R., [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2927 (T.C.C.) (1.5 hours a day plus 10 to 20 minutes
twice a day for 5 out of 7 days considered not an “inordinate” or “excessive” amount of time); Virage
v. M.N.R. (1995), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2392 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Virage] (3 to 4 minutes, 12 to 15 times a
day, not an “inordinate amount of time”); Armit v. M.N.R. (1995), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2393 (T.C.C.)
[hereinafter Armit] (3 to 4 minutes, 15 times per day, not an “inordinate amount of time”); Stewart v.
M.N.R. (1995), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2394 (T.C.C.) [hereinafter Stewart 1995] (3 to 5 minutes, 10 to 15
times a day, not an “inordinate amount of time”).
145
 See e.g. Conner v. M.N.R. (1994), [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2371 at 2372, 95 D.T.C. 198 (T.C.C.) (a tax-
payer required to rest after walking for 100 meters took an inordinate amount of time to walk); Mur-
phy, supra note 142 at para. 23 (the taxpayer who suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome required an
inordinate amount of time to walk because she could not “keep up a normal pace”, was required to
“stop periodically and rest”, had to “monitor her fatigue level so that she does not injure herself
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have grappled with the meaning of the words “perceiving, thinking, and remember-
ing” in subparagraph 118.4(1)(c)(i)147 and the words “feeding and dressing oneself” in
subparagraph 118.4(1)(c)(ii),148 and with the requirement in paragraph 118.4(1)(b) that
                                                                                                                                        
physically,” so that she “performs the activity with difficulty and in considerable pain and with fa-
tigue”); Jeanlouis, supra note 141 (the taxpayer, who took 30 minutes to walk a distance normally
covered in 7 to 8 minutes, was markedly restricted in ability to walk based on inordinate amount of
time test); Wodak v. M.N.R., [1996] 2 C.T.C. 2333 (T.C.C.) (the taxpayer, who took four times a nor-
mal amount of time to walk 100 to 200 yards, was markedly restricted in ability to walk); Wilson v.
M.N.R. (1995), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2652 (the taxpayer, who was required to rest for 1 minute after walk-
ing 25 meters, did not take “an inordinate amount of time” to walk); Noseworthy v. M.N.R., [1996] 2
C.T.C. 2006 at 2007 (T.C.C.) (the taxpayer who took 30 minutes to travel a distance “which shouldn’t
take more than five or ten minutes” took “an inordinate amount of time” to walk); St. Pierre v.
M.N.R., [1996] 2 C.T.C. 2709 (T.C.C.) (the taxpayer not markedly restricted in ability to walk even
though he was sometimes unable to walk 10 feet and was generally unable to walk more than 50
yards); Marshall v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2475 (T.C.C.) (the taxpayer, who took 25 minutes to
cover a distance normally covered in 4 to 5 minutes, took “an inordinate amount of time” to walk);
Spence v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2921 (T.C.C.) (the taxpayer able to walk 50 meters without assis-
tance, though having to stop every 50 or 60 feet, was markedly restricted in an activity of basic living
on the basis that he took an inordinate amount of time to walk); Valley v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 1
C.T.C. 2618 (T.C.C.) (the taxpayer did not require an inordinate amount of time to walk, even though
he walked with crutches and took four times the normal amount of time to walk 2 city blocks); Peters
v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2071 at 2074 (T.C.C.) (the taxpayer took “an inordinate amount of
time to walk any distance that would allow him to operate independently in every day life”); De Fran-
cesco, supra note 141 (the taxpayer, who was able to walk 100 yards with the aid of a leg brace, was
not markedly restricted in his ability to walk); Cameron v. M.N.R. (1997), [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2081
(T.C.C.) [hereinafter Cameron] (the taxpayer, who took about 20 minutes to walk 100 to 200 meters,
did not take “an inordinate amount of time” to walk); Morin v. M.N.R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2722 at 2724
(T.C.C.) (the taxpayer who suffered from severe back pain and was unable to walk more than 25-30
feet without resting was markedly restricted in ability to walk); Johnston, supra note 137 at para. 26
(5 minutes to cover a distance of only 50 feet considered “inordinate”).
146
 See e.g. Mantle v. M.N.R., [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2918 at 2922 (T.C.C.), Kempo J.T.C.C., concluding
that the juvenile diabetes affecting the taxpayer’s son impaired all of his activities of basic living by
requiring an inordinate or excessive amount of time for them to be performed. For contrary decisions
in which juvenile diabetes did not qualify as an eligible disability under ss. 118.3 & 118.4, see Salvail
v. M.N.R. (1995), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2680 (T.C.C.); Moore, supra note 140; Sanders v. M.N.R. (1995),
[1996] 1 C.T.C. 2617 (T.C.C.); Oliver v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2271 (T.C.C.); McGonegal v.
M.N.R., [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2646 (T.C.C.).
147
 See e.g. Radage, supra note 137 at 2526-27, Bowman J.T.C.C., concluding that “perceiving” in-
volves “the reception and recognition of sensory data in a manner that conforms reasonably to com-
mon human experience”; that “thinking” involves “a rational comprehension, marshalling, organiza-
tion and analysis of that which the person has perceived and the formulation of conclusions therefrom
that are of practical utility or theoretical validity”; that “remembering” involves “both the acquisition
of the memory and its retrieval” and that although s. 118.4(1)(c)(i) uses the words disjunctively, “the
activities of perceiving, thinking and remembering are closely connected.”
148
 See e.g. Hodgin v. M.N.R., [1995] E.T.C. 515 at para. 6, 1995 CarswellNAT 2038 (T.C.C.), on-
line: TAXNET (TaxPartner Main) [hereinafter Hodgin], Bonner T.C.J., interpreting the words “feed-
ing oneself” to involve “something more than eating a meal prepared by another person” but also “the
ability to prepare a reasonable range of food and not just to prepare and set out snacks, junk foods or
frozen dinners”; Johnston, supra note 137 at para. 32, where Létourneau J.A., affirming this interpre-
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an individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living be restricted “all or
substantially all of the time.”149
In addition to the broad phraseology of the statutory language, the application of
the provision to the circumstances of individual claimants involves detailed factual
questions regarding the existing and likely duration of their impairment, and the ef-
fects of their impairment on one of the basic activities of daily living specified in
paragraph 118.4(1)(c). Not surprisingly, given the applicable statutory tests, courts
must devote considerable time and effort to determining whether, with therapy and the
use of appropriate devices and medication, claimants are unable or require an inordi-
nate amount of time to perceive, think and remember,150 to feed and dress them-
selves,151 to speak or hear so as to be understood by or understand a familiar person in
a quiet setting,152 to eliminate (bowel or bladder functions),153 or to walk.154
                                                                                                                                        
tation, added that “[t]he notion of feeding … also involves the ability to prepare a meal which con-
forms to a medically prescribed diet and medication which maintains one’s state of health or prevents
its deterioration” and further concluded (at para. 37) that “the notion of dressing oneself includes the
ability to perform basic and elementary personal hygiene associated with it, such as shaving and
bathing”.
149
 See e.g. Sarkar v. M.N.R., [1995] 2 C.T.C. 2750 at paras. 20, 21, 1995 CarswellNAT 583
(T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (TaxPartner Main), Sarchuk J.T.C.C., accepting that the taxpayer took an
inordinate amount of time to walk when subject to a bout of chronic fatigue syndrome, but disallow-
ing the taxpayer’s claim on the basis that she did not experience this restriction “all or substantially all
of the time” during the relevant year. Defining the words “substantially all of the time” as “almost all
or essentially all of the time”, the Court held that “intermittent bouts of illness, even causing a severe
impairment on a sporadic basis” do not satisfy the requirements of the disability tax credit. For a
similar result, relying on the decision in Sarkar, see Campbell, supra note 141.
150
 See e.g. Radage, supra note 137. See also Larivière v. M.N.R., [1995] 2 C.T.C. 2742 (T.C.C.);
Maillet v. M.N.R., [1996] 2 C.T.C. 2656 (T.C.C.); Thomas v. M.N.R., [1996] 2 C.T.C. 2714 (T.C.C.);
Friis v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2172 (T.C.C.); Lamothe v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2423 (T.C.C.);
Luxton v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2449 (T.C.C.); Parsons v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2672 (T.C.C.);
Bradbury v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 1 C.T.C. 2051 (T.C.C.); Kralik, supra note 140; Hill v. M.N.R.
(1996), [1997] 1 C.T.C. 2477 (T.C.C.); Desbiens v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 1 C.T.C. 2653 (T.C.C.);
Robillard v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2067 (T.C.C.); Dallaire v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 3
C.T.C. 2480 (T.C.C.); Shaw v. M.N.R., [1997] 3 C.T.C. 2623 (T.C.C.); Lever v. M.N.R., [1998] 4
C.T.C. 2460 (T.C.C.); Stewart v. M.N.R., 1999 CarswellNAT 1097 (T.C.C.), online: TAXNET (Tax-
Partner Main).
151
 In addition to Hodgin, supra note 148, and Johnston, supra note 137, see Sincock, supra note
140; Edwards v. M.N.R., [1995] 2 C.T.C. 2574 (T.C.C.); Farkas v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2054
(T.C.C.); Dippel v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2202 (T.C.C.); Corbisiero v. M.N.R., [1997] 3 C.T.C.
2108 (T.C.C.); Lareau v. M.N.R. (1995), [1997] 3 C.T.C. 2704 (T.C.C.); Hagen v. M.N.R., [1997] 3
C.T.C. 3128 (T.C.C.); Lacroix v. M.N.R. (1996), [1998] 1 C.T.C. 2213 (T.C.C.); McMaster v. M.N.R.
(1998), [1999] 1 C.T.C. 2658 (T.C.C.).
152
 See e.g. Da Silva v. M.N.R. (1994), [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2255 (T.C.C.); Labelle v. M.N.R. (1994),
[1995] 1 C.T.C. 2576 (T.C.C.); Laforce v. M.N.R. (1995), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2696 (T.C.C.); Adams v.
M.N.R. (1994), [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2801 (T.C.C.); Rioux v. M.N.R. (1994), [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2139
(T.C.C.); Cooper v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2189 (T.C.C.); Bowles v. M.N.R. (1996), [1997] 1 C.T.C.
2045 (T.C.C.).
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With respect to misunderstanding about the purpose and scope of the credit,
courts themselves have raised questions about the extent to which taxpayers and
medical practitioners appreciate the limited categories of disabled persons for which
the credit is intended.155 In one case, for example, the court found it necessary to ex-
plain that a person may be “in receipt of a disability pension regarding her work and
not be entitled to the disability tax credit provided for in subsection 118.3(1) of the
Act.”156 While evidence suggests that many disabled Canadians do not claim the DTC
either because they are not aware of the credit or believe that they would be refused,157
the number of reported cases in which courts have dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal
also suggests that a number of Canadians whose disabilities do not satisfy the specific
requirements of the statutory provision continue to claim credits for which they are
ineligible.
4. Evaluation and Recommendations
In evaluating the DTC, commentators have tended to focus on the eligibility crite-
ria in sections 118.3 and 118.4, the manner in which the credit is administered, the
dollar value of the credit, and its non-refundability. The Council of Canadians with
Disabilities, for example, has made the following proposals for reform:
(1) Eligibility for the credit should be liberalized by
(a) reconsidering the requirement in paragraph 118.4(1)(b) that a “marked
restriction” in a basic activity of daily living be determined only after
taking into account “therapy and the use of appropriate devices and
medication”;158
(b) amending the statutory definitions of speech and hearing impairments to
eliminate the “artificial” tests based on communication in “a quiet set-
ting” with “another person familiar with the individual”;159
                                                                                                                                        
153
 See the cases cited at supra notes 143, 144.
154
 See the cases cited at supra note 145.
155
 See e.g. Virage, supra note 144; Armit, supra note 144; Stewart 1995, supra note 144.
156
 Cameron, supra note 145 at 2087.
157
 Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, supra note 1 at 90.
158
 See Council of Canadians with Disabilities, supra note 79 at 2, observing that this test “does not
allow for the possibility that the ‘appropriate devices and medication’ may actually not be available to
the person, or (with respect to the medication) may involve a significant risk to the person’s health.”
See also Shillington, supra note 86 at 25, suggesting that this requirement “seems contrary to the
factor which we [the disability tax credit] are trying to measure; cost implications.” The 2000 Federal
Budget, supra note 35, responds to this recommendation by making the DTC available to persons
who would be markedly restricted in their ability to perform a basic activity of daily living all or sub-
stantially all of the time but for certain kinds of essential therapy (see supra note 121).
159
 Council of Canadians with Disabilities, ibid. at 2, suggesting that “[t]he test should be whether
the person can speak or hear satisfactorily in typical situations from day to day life, where not all set-
tings are quiet and people have to speak with and hear strangers.”
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(c) repealing the qualification in paragraph 118.4(1)(d) that “no other activ-
ity [other than those listed in paragraph 118.4(1)(c)], including working,
housekeeping or a social or recreational activity, shall be considered as a
basic activity of daily living”;160
(d) repealing the qualification in paragraph 118.3(1)(c) which renders an in-
dividual ineligible for the disability tax credit where remuneration for an
attendant or care in a nursing home in respect of the individual is
claimed as a medical expense under section 118.2 (other than under
paragraph 118.2(2)(b.1));161 and
(e) allowing the credit to be claimed by any supporting person, regardless of
their relationship with the disabled individual.162
(2) The form (T2201) by which qualifying medical practitioners are to certify
that “the individual’s impairment is a severe and prolonged impairment the
effects of which are such that the individual’s ability to perform a basic ac-
tivity of daily living is markedly restricted” should be amended to
(a) refer to the key condition in paragraph 118.4(1)(b) that an individual’s
ability to perform an activity of daily living is “markedly restricted”
160
 Ibid., explaining that this paragraph “directly excludes many people from the DTC who are se-
verely limited in their day-to-day functioning by their disabilities, although their disabilities do not fit
easily into any of the categories listed in [paragraph (c)].” See also Federal Task Force on Disability
Issues, supra note 1 at 89, observing that the list of “Activities of Daily Living” in s. 118.4(1)(c) does
not include “breathing”. Notwithstanding the absence of any such amendment, the Tax Court decision
in Fillion, supra note 138, interpreted the statutory rules as if “breathing” were a basic activity of
daily living.
161
 Council of Canadians with Disabilities, ibid. at 4 [emphasis in original], explaining that
this rule penalizes people who have very significant disabilities, and who are making
high expenditures out of their own pockets to keep themselves or their family members
in the community, as opposed to being in institutions at much greater public expense.
Individuals who have attendant care costs over $10,000 [the maximum amount that
may be claimed under paragraph 118.2(2)(b.1) without disqualifying the individual
from the disability tax credit] have other disability-related expenses which are equal to
or higher than other persons with disabilities. Accordingly, they should be allowed to
claim the DTC.
162
 Ibid. at 5, explaining that the current limitation to specified relatives is “unfair to other relatives
and friends who provide actual support to the person.” See also Federal Task Force on Disability Is-
sues, supra note 1 at 90, recommending that the DTC should be transferable to “any supporting per-
son.” As indicated earlier, the 2000 Federal Budget, supra note 35, extends the list of relatives who
may claim the DTC to include siblings, aunts and uncles, and nieces and nephews (see supra note
124).
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where the individual requires “an inordinate amount of time” to perform
the basic activity of daily living;163 and
(b) delete the example of unimpaired walking as “at least 50 meters on level
ground.”164
(3) The dollar value of the credit should be increased to compensate for inflation
over the last eight years and should be fully indexed to offset future infla-
tion.165
(4) The DTC should be made fully refundable, beginning with a measure like
the refundable medical expense supplement which is available only where
individuals earn at least $2,500 in the year through employment or busi-
ness.166
Other commentators have suggested more significant amendments to the eligibility
criteria for the DTC, such as replacing the current “severe and prolonged mental or
physical impairment” standard with the less restrictive “mental or physical infirmity”
criterion utilized in several other provisions of the ITA.167
a. Purpose
In order to evaluate these and other possible reforms, it is essential to reconsider
the purpose of the DTC, not only as part of the current income tax, but also under a
restructured system in which itemized disability-related expenses might be recognized
under a separate disability expenses tax credit or deduction without any threshold. As
163
 Council of Canadians with Disabilities, ibid. at 3 [emphasis in original], noting that “[m]ost of
the questions are phrased in an ‘all-or-nothing’ manner which implies, to the health professional, that
someone who can do these activities at all is not eligible.”
164
 Ibid. at 3, observing that “[i]n the real world, people have to walk more than 50 meters as part of
their activities of daily living, and they have to walk up and down stairs. These implied limitations
have clearly been put by Revenue Canada into the T2201 form to limit eligibility more narrowly than
the statutory language would indicate.”
165
 Ibid. at 4. See also Shillington, supra note 86 at 26-27; Federal Task Force on Disability Issues,
supra note 1 at 90; Don Gallant and Associates, supra note 108 at 17. Although the 2000 Federal
Budget announced a return to full indexing for income tax provisions like the DTC, it did not increase
the value of the credit to compensate for inflation in the 1990s.
166
 Council of Canadians with Disabilities, ibid. at 3-4. For other proposals to make the DTC re-
fundable, see Standing Committee, supra note 33 at 13-14; Shillington, ibid. at 22-24; The Tax Sys-
tem, supra note 79 at 18; Don Gallant and Associates, ibid. at 17.
167
 The Tax System, ibid. at 13-14. Other provisions employing this criterion include the infirm de-
pendants credit in the ITA, supra note 4, s. 118(1)(d), the definition of an “eligible child” for the pur-
pose of the child care expense deduction in s. 63, and the medical expense credit for remuneration
paid to a full-time attendant in a patient’s home in s. 118.2(2)(c). See also Baker & Beatty, supra note
79 at 4, recommending that the eligibility criteria for the DTC be reviewed “in consultation with the
disability community, aimed at making persons eligible who have indirect, hidden or cumulative costs
of disability.”
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the Department of Finance explains, the original disability deduction was designed to
provide “more complete relief” than did the medical expense deduction at the time for
the additional expenses that blind persons must incur “including those under the de-
ductible [medical] expenses threshold of 5 per cent of income.”168 In addition, it sug-
gests, the deduction “may also have been intended to compensate for time expended
by unpaid family members” instead of paid attendants whose remuneration could be
claimed as a medical expense.169 The Royal Commission on Taxation, however, op-
posed the existence of a separate disability deduction, questioning “the need for the
alternative treatment” to that provided under the medical expense deduction, and not-
ing that the deduction “is used only when the actual deductible expenses are less than
$500.”170
The argument that a separate disability deduction or credit provided more com-
plete relief than the general deduction or credit for medical expenses may have justi-
fied a separate provision at a time when eligible medical expenses were more limited
in scope. Today, however, this justification is much less persuasive as the list of eligi-
ble medical expenses has expanded to cover numerous disability-related expenses, in-
cluding those involving a significant element of personal consumption, such as air and
water filters or purifiers,171 air conditioners,172 wheelchair-accessible vans,173 expenses
to move to a physically accessible dwelling,174 and allowable home renovations.175
Likewise, since a separate credit was recently introduced for in-home care of an aged
or disabled relative,176 the second argument that a separate disability credit or deduc-
tion is necessary to compensate for time expended by unpaid family members is also
questionable. Moreover, it is arguable that the rationale for such a provision would
168
 Disability Tax Credit, supra note 76 at 10.
169
 Ibid.
170
 Royal Commission on Taxation, supra note 24 at 220.
171
 Regulations, supra note 11, s. 5700(c.1), applicable to 1992 and subsequent years.
172
 “Excerpts from Budget Papers” in Stikeman Elliott, Canadian Federal Budget 1997: Budgetary
Proposals of the Hon. Minister of Finance with Comments by Stikeman Elliott (Toronto: Carswell,
1997) [hereinafter 1997 Federal Budget] 2-1 at 2-3, proposing to allow taxpayers to claim “the lesser
of 50% of the cost of an air conditioner prescribed by a medical practitioner as being necessary to as-
sist an individual in coping with the individual’s severe chronic ailment, disease or disorder, and
$1,000.”
173
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(1)(l.7), added by the Income Tax Amendments Act, 1997, S.C. 1998, c.
19, s. 23(2), applicable to 1997 and subsequent years [hereinafter 1997 Amendments].
174
 ITA, ibid., s. 118.2(1)(l.5), added by 1997 Amendments, ibid., applicable to 1997 and subsequent
years.
175
 ITA, ibid., s. 118.2(1)(l.2), added by An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, the Federal-Provincial
Fiscal Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health Contributions Act, the Old
Age Security Act, the Public Utilities Income Tax Transfer Act, the War Veterans Allowance Act and a
related Act, S.C. 1990, c. 39, s. 25, applicable to 1988 and subsequent years [hereinafter 1989
Amendments]. For cases dealing with the application of this provision, see supra notes 68, 70.
176
 ITA, ibid., s. 118(1)(c.1), added by Income Tax Amendments Act, 1998, S.C. 1999, c. 22, s. 32(2),
applicable to 1998 and subsequent years [hereinafter 1998 Amendments]. This provision is examined
below.
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disappear altogether if the ITA were amended to introduce a separate disability ex-
penses tax credit or deduction without any threshold and (as recommended earlier) to
allow disabled individuals to claim remuneration for attendant care provided by a
spouse or other family member.177
Notwithstanding this possible conclusion, there is a further rationale for the exis-
tence of a separate disability credit or deduction even if these amendments were
made: to the extent that disabilities impose various kinds of costs, some of which are
indirect and difficult to itemize, these are appropriately recognized through a credit or
deduction equal to a fixed dollar amount.178 Where, for example, a disability necessi-
tates extra laundry, bedding or heating costs, or results in greater wear and damage to
clothing or household items, these additional undocumented costs are effectively rec-
ognized through a fixed credit or deduction. Likewise, to the extent that restricted ac-
cess to the marketplace and society at large causes disabled persons to incur higher
costs for basic goods and services like groceries, a fixed credit or deduction recog-
nizes these additional costs.179 In this respect, the disability tax credit can be likened to
an additional personal exemption to recognize non-discretionary but difficult-to-
itemize costs associated with a mental or physical disability. For this reason, it might
be more appropriate to include the disability tax credit along with the other “personal
credits” found in section 118, rather than with the other non-refundable tax credits in
sections 118.1 (charitable donations) to 118.7 (employment insurance and CPP/QPP
premiums).180
Having identified this rationale for a separate provision recognizing the indirect
and non-itemized costs associated with mental or physical disabilities, it remains to
reconsider the eligibility criteria for this recognition, the appropriate dollar amount,
and whether these additional costs should be recognized through a non-refundable
credit, a refundable credit, or a deduction. Further comments address the administra-
tion of the provision.
b. Eligibility
Beginning with the eligibility criteria, the basic purpose of the provision to recog-
nize indirect and non-itemized costs associated with a mental or physical disability
suggests that paragraph 118.3(1)(c) (excluding from the DTC individuals in respect of
whom an amount is claimed as a medical expense for attendant or nursing home care
under any of paragraphs 118.2(2)(b), (c), or (d)) should be repealed, that the statutory
177
 See text accompanying notes 85-88.
178
 See e.g. Disability Tax Credit, supra note 76 at 15, explaining that the disability tax credit “rec-
ognizes expenses that are difficult to itemize.”
179
 See e.g. The Tax System, supra note 79 at 7, observing that “a disabled person might rely heavily
on a local grocer because of the difficulty in travelling to larger more competitively priced retailers”
and explaining that one rationale for the DTC is “to offset these [indirect] costs through a non-
itemized, flat tax credit.”
180
 These personal credits are examined in Part II.D, below.
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definition of a “basic activity of daily living” in paragraphs 118.4(1)(c) and (d) should
be revised, and that the definition of a “marked restriction” in an individual’s ability to
perform a basic activity of daily living in paragraph 118.4(1)(b) should also be
amended. As well, since these undocumented disability-related costs may be borne by
supporting individuals as well as by disabled persons themselves, the earlier analysis
of the METC suggests that these individuals should be able to claim any unused por-
tion of the disabled person’s DTC regardless of their relationship with this person.181
With respect to paragraph 118.3(1)(c), an exclusion for individuals in respect of
whom attendant or nursing home care expenses are claimed under any of paragraphs
118.2(2)(b), (c), or (d) seems inconsistent with the modern purpose of the provision to
recognize indirect and difficult-to-itemize costs associated with a mental or physical
disability. Although the exclusion might be justified on the grounds that these addi-
tional costs are minimal or non-existent where the individual is cared for by a full-
time attendant or in a nursing home, this assumption is highly uncertain. On the con-
trary, there is no reason why these individuals might not incur even higher undocu-
mented disability-related expenses (e.g., for extra laundry, bedding or heating costs, or
for wear and damage to clothing or household items) than those incurred by individu-
als who are not cared for by a full-time attendant or in a nursing home.182
Turning to the statutory definition of a “basic activity of daily living”, one can
question the definition of speech and hearing impairments in subparagraphs
118.4(1)(c)(iii) and (iv), the failure to mention other activities that might reasonably
be included in paragraph 118.4(1)(c), and the specific exclusion of other activities in
paragraph 118.4(1)(d). Regarding speech and hearing impairments, it seems unrea-
sonable to establish a statutory test based on communication in “a quiet setting” with
“another person familiar with the individual”, rather than everyday situations which
are likely to give rise to additional undocumented costs which the DTC is designed to
recognize. For this reason, as the Canadian Council for Disabilities has suggested,
“The test should be whether the person can speak or hear satisfactorily in typical
situations from day to day life, where not all settings are quiet and people have to
speak and hear strangers.”183
As for other activities of daily living, it seems reasonable to add “breathing” to
the list in paragraph 118.4(1)(c) on the ground that individuals with these kinds of
181
 See the earlier discussion at text accompanying notes 83-84. This recommendation was made by
the Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, supra note 1 at 90. See also Council of Canadians with
Disabilities, supra note 79 at 5. While the 2000 Federal Budget proposes to expand the list of eligible
relatives who may claim the DTC, eligibility continues to depend on a qualifying relationship with the
disabled person.
182
 See e.g. Council of Canadians with Disabilities, ibid. at 4 [emphasis in original], explaining that
individuals with attendant care expenses over $10,000 (the amount that may be claimed as a medical
expense under s. 118.2(2)(b.1) without disqualifying the individual from the disability tax credit)
“have other disability-related expenses which are equal to or higher than other persons with disabili-
ties.”
183
 Ibid. at 2.
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impairments are also likely to incur undocumented costs which should be recognized
for tax purposes.184 Likewise, although paragraph 118.4(1)(b) stipulates that an indi-
vidual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted where
the individual is blind, it seems appropriate to add “seeing” to the list in paragraph
118.4(1)(c) to include individuals whose ability to see is markedly restricted even
though they are not blind within the meaning of paragraph 118.4(1)(b).
Regarding paragraph 118.4(1)(d), it seems odd to specifically exclude from the
“basic activities of daily living” recognized by the ITA all other activities “including
working, housekeeping or a social or recreational activity.” On the contrary, to the
extent that the purpose of the credit is to recognize additional but undocumented non-
discretionary costs incurred by disabled persons on account of their disabilities, there
is no reason why it should not apply where an impairment results in a marked restric-
tion in the individual’s ability to perform any one of these activities as much as it does
where the disability affects the individual’s ability to perform the specific “activities
of daily living” listed in paragraph 118.4(1)(c). For this reason, it seems reasonable to
repeal paragraph 118.4(1)(d) altogether, to add “working”, “housekeeping”, and “so-
cial or recreational activities” to paragraph 118.4(1)(c), and to replace the word
“means” in the opening words of paragraph 118.4(1)(c) with the word “includes” to
make it clear that the statutory list of basic activities of daily living is not exhaustive
but merely illustrative.
With respect to the concept of a “marked restriction” in an individual’s ability to
perform a basic activity of daily living, the stipulation in paragraph 118.4(1)(b) that
this exists “only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy and the
use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual is blind or is unable (or re-
quires an inordinate amount of time) to perform an activity of daily living” seems
overly restrictive. Although the purpose of the provision to recognize additional un-
documented disability-related expenses suggests that a “marked restriction” should be
determined only after taking into account “therapy and the use of appropriate devices
and medication” the costs of which are properly recognized as itemized medical or
disability-related expenses,185 the other requirements seem certain to exclude persons
incurring otherwise unrecognized disability-related costs. While these costs might be
expected to be somewhat less for individuals who are neither wholly “unable” nor re-
quire “an inordinate amount of time” to perform a basic activity of daily living but are
significantly restricted in their abilities to perform one or more activities of daily liv-
184
 Although the Tax Court decision in Fillion, supra note 138, recognized this activity in any event,
it would be preferable to make this inclusion explicit in the statute.
185
 For this reason, the objection expressed by Shillington, supra note 86 at 25, that this requirement
“seems contrary to the factor which we [the disability tax credit] are trying to measure; cost implica-
tions” appears to be misplaced. With respect to the concern expressed by the Council of Canadians
with Disabilities, supra note 79 at 2, that appropriate devices or medication “may not actually be
available to the person, or (with respect to the medication) may involve a significant risk to the per-
son’s health,” these concerns seem adequately addressed by the use of the adjective “appropriate” to
qualify the words “devices and medication”.
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ing, or for individuals whose ability to perform a basis activity of daily living is re-
stricted not “all or substantially all of the time” but on a recurring but intermittent ba-
sis, they are no less real nor any less deserving of tax recognition. For this reason,
paragraph 118.4(1)(b) might be amended to provide that an individual’s ability to per-
form an activity of daily living is markedly restricted where, even with therapy and
the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual is blind or significantly
restricted in his or her ability to perform an activity of daily living a substantial
amount of the time.
c. Dollar Amount
Turning to the appropriate dollar amount, the rationale for a separate provision
recognizing indirect and non-itemized costs associated with mental or physical dis-
abilities suggests that it should be set at a level reflecting a reasonable estimate of the
annual non-itemized costs generally associated with different kinds of disabilities. To
the extent that these costs are likely to differ based on the severity of the disability,
one approach might be to establish different dollar amounts for mild, moderate, and
severe disabilities.186 Instead of attempting to define different categories of disabilities,
an alternative approach might vary the dollar amount based on the extent to which the
individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is restricted (e.g., “no-
ticeably”, “substantially”, or “extremely”), and/or the amount of time during which
the individual is so restricted (e.g., “some of the time”, “a substantial amount of the
time”, or “all or substantially all of the time”). Under yet another approach, the dollar
amount might differ according to the number of basic activities of daily living that the
individual is markedly restricted in his or her ability to perform.187
In incorporating one of these differentiated approaches, such an amended provi-
sion would reduce the tendency of the current DTC to “undercompensate in many
cases and overcompensate in others,”188 and would also lessen the tax consequences of
disputes at the margin, thereby reducing incentives for litigation. Once these amounts
are established, of course, they should be fully indexed for any loss in real value
through inflation.
d. Credit or Deduction
With respect to the manner in which these additional non-itemized costs should
be recognized for tax purposes, the logic of the earlier analysis of the METC suggests
186
 For a recommendation to this effect, see Shillington, ibid. at 35. Although these categories might
be difficult to define, they are used in Statistics Canada’s Health and Activity Limitation Survey
(“HALS”). This survey was employed to estimate the size of the severely disabled population in a
study of the disability tax credit by the Federal Department of Finance (see Disability Tax Credit, su-
pra note 76 at 17-27).
187
 This alternative has been suggested by Cam Crawford of the Roeher Institute.
188
 Standing Committee, supra note 33 at 13.
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that this should be in the form of a deduction in computing taxable income, as was the
case prior to the conversion of the disability deduction to a non-refundable credit in
1988.189 While deductions are often criticized on the basis that they are worth more to
high-income taxpayers than they are to low-income taxpayers and worth nothing to
taxpayers whose income is too low to pay any tax, the appropriate tax treatment of
disabled individuals is a matter of horizontal equity, not vertical equity. In order to
determine the taxable income of disabled individuals, it is appropriate to deduct all
non-discretionary costs associated with their disabilities, both itemized and direct and
non-itemized and indirect.
e. Social Policy
As for the question of refundability, the analysis in Part I of this paper suggests
that this is properly viewed as a matter of social policy rather than tax policy more
narrowly defined. To provide refundable credits for disability-related expenses,
whether itemized or not, is to provide a form of social insurance for these expenses
based on the rate of the credit, not to recognize non-discretionary disability-related
expenses in computing an individual’s taxable income. While it may be desirable to
reimburse disabled persons or supporting individuals for some part or all of these dis-
ability-related expenses, this social insurance goal must be distinguished from the tax
policy objective to levy an equitable income tax based on taxpayers’ relative abilities
to pay. Likewise, while it might be desirable to implement a guaranteed annual in-
come for disabled individuals in the form of a refundable tax credit the value of which
diminishes as the recipient’s income increases, this social policy measure cannot ful-
fill the tax policy goals of a separate deduction for non-itemized disability-related ex-
penses in computing taxable income. While all of these objectives might be pursued
through the ITA, they and the specific provisions by which they are implemented
should be clearly distinguished.
f. Administration
Having set out the structure of an amended provision recognizing non-itemized
disability-related expenses, it is useful to make two final comments regarding the ad-
ministration of this proposed provision. First, assuming as this proposal does that the
provision would continue to require a qualifying medical practitioner to certify that
“the individual’s impairment is a severe and prolonged impairment the effects of
which are such that the individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is
markedly restricted,”190 the form by which this certification is made would have to be
revised to reflect amended definitions for a “basic activity of daily living” and a
189
 See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 106-17.
190
 As alternatives to this method, neither centralized administration nor self-assessment seem par-
ticularly attractive, since the former is likely to be intrusive and costly while the latter is vulnerable to
a large number of illegitimate claims. For an evaluation of the cost implications of a more centralized
administration of the DTC, see Disability Tax Credit, supra note 76 at 37.
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“marked restriction” on an individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily liv-
ing.191 Second, where employed individuals have a severe and prolonged impairment
the effects of which can reasonably be expected to last throughout the year, it should
be possible to obtain an adjustment to income taxes withheld by the employer at
source in order to account for the expected tax reduction resulting from the credit or
deduction. A similar adjustment might also be available where the individual is able to
establish a continuous pattern of disability-related expenses which can reasonably be
expected to continue throughout the year.
C. Disability Expenses Tax Credit
1. Description
After examining the way in which the Canadian income tax deals with disabled
individuals, at least two government reports have recommended the introduction of a
disability expenses tax credit as a supplement or replacement to the existing medical
expense and disability tax credits. According to the Standing Committee, this credit
should be separate from the METC, based on a more general list of expenses than
those available under the METC, available without any threshold, and refundable.192
According to the 1996 Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, such a credit should
be refundable at a rate of 17% in general but 29% for low-income taxpayers, and
should “combine the best features” of the medical expenses and disability tax credits
by comprising a “base amount” reflecting “an ‘across-the-board’ estimate of undocu-
mented costs,” and a supplementary amount “based on disability-related “out-of-
pocket’ expenditures” including “medically-necessary expenses and increases in em-
ployment-related expenses due to disability.”193
2. Evaluation and Recommendations
Based on the earlier analysis of the METC, the recommendation for a separate
disability expenses tax credit or deduction would appear to have considerable merit.
Abandoning a narrowly medical model of disability, these proposals rightly empha-
size the additional involuntary costs of disabilities as appropriate subjects for tax rec-
ognition. For this reason, such a provision might reasonably include a more general
list of allowable expenses (such as a share of transportation costs made necessary by
an individual’s disability), the full amount of which should presumably be recognized
for tax purposes without any annual threshold. Having settled on this basic character-
istic of a disability expenses tax credit or deduction, additional issues concern the cri-
teria by which an individual would be eligible to claim these amounts, the relationship
191
 For this reason, there is no need to address specific criticisms of the current form (T2201) by the
Council of Canadians with Disabilities, supra note 79 at 3. See also text accompanying notes 163-64.
192
 Supra note 33 at 14.
193
 Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, supra note 1 at 97-99.
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between this measure and a disability tax credit or deduction designed to recognize
non-itemized expenses, the question of refundability, and the rate at which eligible
expenses might be claimed.
a. Eligibility
In many cases, the eligibility criteria could be based on the provisions of the cur-
rent METC. Full-time attendant care in a disabled individual’s home, for example,
could continue to be recognized under a new provision where
the [individual] is, and has been certified by a medical practitioner to be, a per-
son who, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, is and is likely to be for a
long-continued period of indefinite duration dependent on others for the [indi-
vidual’s] personal needs and care and who, as a result thereof, requires a full-
time attendant.194
Likewise, expenses for the full-time care of an individual in a nursing home might be
recognized where the individual “has been certified by a medical practitioner to be a
person who, by reason of lack of normal mental capacity, is and in the foreseeable
future will continue to be dependent on others for … personal needs and care,”195
while expenses “for the care, or the care and training” of a disabled individual “at a
school, institution or other place” could be recognized where the individual
has been certified by an appropriately qualified person to be a person who, by
reason of a physical or mental handicap, requires the equipment, facilities or
personnel specially provided by that school, institution or other place for the
care, or the care and training, of individuals suffering from the handicap suf-
fered by the [individual].196
Since other METC provisions recognizing the costs of attendant or nursing home
care, remuneration for the care or supervision of an individual in a group home, and
remuneration for specific kinds of therapy depend on the patient’s eligibility for the
DTC,197 recognition of these expenses under a separate disability expenses tax credit
or deduction might also depend on the individual’s eligibility for an amended disabil-
ity tax credit or deduction as outlined earlier.198
In addition to the costs of attendant or nursing home care, other expenses cur-
rently included in the METC that might be recognized under a separate disability ex-
penses tax credit or deduction include
194
 See ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(2)(c)(i).
195
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(d).
196
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(e).
197
 See ibid., ss. 118.2(2)(b), 118.2(2)(b.1); 1999 Federal Budget, supra note 65.
198
 See text accompanying notes 181-85.
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• the cost to acquire and maintain an animal specifically trained to assist an indi-
vidual who is blind or profoundly deaf or suffers from a severe and prolonged
impairment that markedly restricts the use of his or her arms or legs;199
• reasonable expenses related to renovations or alterations to an individual’s
home, including the driveway, for individuals with severe and prolonged mo-
bility impairments;200
• up to $2,000 in expenses for an individual with a severe and prolonged mobil-
ity impairment to move to a physically accessible dwelling;201
• reasonable expenses related to rehabilitative therapy to adjust for the individ-
ual’s hearing or speech loss, including training in lip reading and sign lan-
guage;202
• the cost of sign language services for an individual with a speech or hearing
impairment;203
• reasonable expenses for training a caregiver who is related to the individual and
is a member of the individual’s household, if the training relates to the mental
or physical infirmity of the individual;204
• remuneration for tutoring services provided to a person with a learning disabil-
ity or a mental impairment who is certified by a medical practitioner to be a
person who requires these services on account of the disability or impair-
ment;205 and
• the cost of various kinds of disability-related devices, including artificial limbs,
kidney machines,206 devices for incontinence,207 a portion of the cost of a wheel-
chair-accessible van,208 and other devices designed to assist individuals who are
blind or suffer from diabetes, heart disease, or specified kinds of speaking,
hearing, breathing, or mobility impairments.209
While the cost of other devices (e.g., eyeglasses) as well as prescribed drugs or sub-
stances might be included only under a medical expenses tax credit or deduction,210
these costs might also be recognized as disability-related expenses where the patient is
199
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(2)(1).
200
 Ibid., ss. 118.2(2)(l.2), 118.2(2)(l.6).
201
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.5).
202
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.3).
203
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.4).
204
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.8).
205
 See 1999 Federal Budget, supra note 65.
206
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(2)(i).
207
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(i.1).
208
 Ibid., s. 118.2(2)(l.7).
209
 Ibid., ss. 118.2(2)(i), 118.2(2)(k), 118.2(2)(m); Regulations, supra note 11, s. 5700.
210
 ITA, ibid., ss. 118.2(2)(j), 118.2(2)(u).
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eligible for the disability tax credit or deduction, provided that the costs are not oth-
erwise claimed for tax purposes. Other expenses, such as disability-related transpor-
tation expenses and those identified by the Council of Canadians with Disabilities,211
would have to be specifically defined.
In addition to these specific items, moreover, a separate disability expenses tax
credit or deduction might also include a more general criterion of eligibility for all
reasonable amounts to the extent that they are paid for the purpose of ameliorating the
effects of a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment and/or enabling the
disabled individual to perform one or more of the amended basic activities of daily
living suggested earlier.212 As with the addition of a more general criterion of eligibil-
ity for the METC,213 such a general statement of principle would allow disabled indi-
viduals to obtain tax recognition for novel therapies or technologies without having to
lobby Revenue Canada and the Department of Finance to expand the list of eligible
expenses. Still, in order to illustrate the kinds of expenses included and confirm the
inclusion of specific categories of expenses, the provision should retain a specific list
of eligible disability-related expenses.
As a final matter, it seems reasonable to allow these disability-related expenses to
be claimed not only by the disabled person or specified relatives, but also by any sup-
porting individual who incurs the expenses. Although it might be argued that tax rec-
ognition for such expenses should be limited to amounts spent on behalf of disabled
persons whom the taxpayer has a specific legal obligation to support on the basis that
only these expenses are truly involuntary, the earlier analysis of the METC suggests a
broader recognition of expenses reflecting moral as well as legal obligations.214
b. Relationship to Disability Tax Credit or Deduction
Considering the relationship between a credit or deduction for itemized disability
expenses and a credit or deduction for non-itemized costs of disabilities, it is difficult
to see much merit in the recommendation of the 1996 Federal Task Force on Disabil-
ity Issues that these provisions be combined. Since recognition of itemized expenses
depends on a variety of specific disability criteria,215 it seems unnecessary and con-
fusing to combine these criteria with those employed for general recognition of non-
211
 See the list of recommended items at text accompanying note 93.
212
 This formulation is based on a suggestion by Cam Crawford of the Roeher Institute.
213
 See the discussion at text accompanying notes 96-97.
214
 See the discussion at text accompanying notes 83-84.
215
 While some items depend on eligibility for the current disability tax credit (requiring that the in-
dividual has a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment the effects of which are such that
the individual’s ability to perform an activity of daily living is markedly restricted), for example, oth-
ers depend on the less onerous standards of “mental or physical infirmity” (ss. 118.2(2)(c),
118.2(2)(l.8)), “lack of normal mental capacity” (s. 118.2(2)(c)), “physical or mental handicap” (s.
118.2(2)(e)), “illness, injury or affliction” (s. 118.2(2)(i.1)), or lack of normal physical development
(ss. 118.2(2)(l.2), 118.2(2)(l.5)).
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itemized expenses. To the extent that a disability tax credit or deduction for non-
itemized disability-related expenses is viewed as a supplement to the personal exemp-
tions, moreover, it is more appropriate to recognize itemized and non-itemized dis-
ability-related costs through different statutory provisions.216
c. Refundability and Rates: Social Policy and Tax Policy
With respect to refundability and applicable rates, the analysis in Part I of this pa-
per suggests that these issues are properly regarded as questions of broad social policy
rather than tax policy more narrowly defined. Where a disability expenses tax credit is
made refundable, for example, the credit functions as a social insurance program
which reimburses a portion of otherwise privately borne disability-related expenses
based on the rate of the credit. From this perspective, the 1996 Federal Task Force on
Disability Issues recommendation to introduce a refundable disability expenses tax
credit computed at 17% for high-income taxpayers and 29% for low-income benefici-
aries amounts to a social policy proposal to reimburse 17% of otherwise privately
borne disability-related expenses of high-income taxpayers and 29% of privately
borne disability-related expenses of low-income taxpayers.
While social policy considerations might favour a larger and more direct federal
role in the reimbursement of disability-related expenses than is currently the case
through the Canada Health and Social Transfer, this purpose and the refundable tax
credit through which it might be implemented should be distinguished from the more
narrow tax policy goal of achieving horizontal equity among taxpayers with and
without disability-related expenses. For the latter purpose, as this paper has argued
earlier, a deduction in computing taxable income is the most appropriate policy re-
sponse.
D. Personal Tax Credits
1. Description
In computing basic federal income tax payable, the ITA allows individuals to de-
duct non-refundable “personal credits” in addition to other non-refundable credits
such as the medical expenses and disability tax credits. These credits (set out in sub-
section 118(1) of the ITA) include the infirm dependants credit, the caregiver credit,
and the wholly dependent person credit. According to this provision, individuals may
claim as a personal tax credit an amount equal to 17% of an aggregate amount de-
pending on the individual’s marital status, living arrangements, and support for de-
pendent relatives.217 Taking provincial income tax into account, the combined value of
216
 See notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
217
 See the descriptions of A and B in ITA, supra note 4, s. 118(1), and the definition of the words
“appropriate percentage” in s. 248(1).
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the credit for individuals with tax otherwise payable is roughly 25% of the aggregate
amount determined.218
According to paragraph 118(1)B(c) of the ITA, the basic personal amount for a
single individual is $7,231 for 2000, resulting in a basic personal credit of $1,245.219
For individuals who are “married” within the extended meaning of the ITA and sup-
port a cohabiting spouse,220 the basic amount is increased by up to $6,140, resulting in
an additional credit of $1,044 for a combined credit of $2,289.221 As an alternative to
this “married status” credit, individuals who are either “unmarried” within the ex-
tended meaning of the ITA, or who neither lived with nor supported their spouse and
were not supported by the spouse at any time in the year, may claim an equivalent
“wholly dependent person” credit where they (alone or with one or more other per-
sons) maintain a self-contained domestic establishment in which they support a per-
son who is
(A) except in the case of a child of the individual, resident in Canada,
(B) wholly dependent for support on the individual, or the individual and the
other person or persons, as the case may be,
(C) related to the individual, and
(D) except in the case of a parent or grandparent of the individual, either under
18 years of age or so dependent by reason of mental or physical infir-
mity.222
In addition to these amounts, other provisions allow individuals to claim addi-
tional amounts if they support infirm dependants over the age of 18 (infirm depend-
ants credit),223 or share accommodation with parents or grandparents over the age of
65 or specified relatives who are over the age of 18 and dependent on the individual
218
 As before, this assumes a provincial tax rate equal to approximately 45% of basic federal tax.
Actual provincial income tax rates are outlined at note 36.
219
 This amount was increased pursuant to the announcement in 2000 Federal Budget, supra note
35, restoring full indexing to selected income tax provisions.
220
 See ITA, supra note 4, s. 252(4), which defines spouses to include persons of the opposite sex
who cohabit at the relevant time in a “conjugal relationship”. Either they have so cohabited through-
out a twelve-month period before that time or are parents of a child so that it defines marriage to in-
clude such “common law” relationships.
221
 Ibid., s. 118(1)(a). Where the spouse’s income exceeds $614, the additional amount on which this
“married status” credit is calculated is reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis, disappearing when the
spouse’s income reaches $6,754. As with the basic personal amount, these amounts were increased
pursuant to the announcement in 2000 Federal Budget, supra note 35, restoring full indexing to se-
lected income tax provisions.
222
 ITA, ibid., s. 118(1)(b). Where the dependant’s income exceeds $614, the additional amount on
which this credit is calculated is reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis, disappearing when the depend-
ant’s income reaches $6,754. As with the basic personal amount and the “married status” credit, these
amounts were increased by the announcement in 2000 Federal Budget, ibid., regarding indexation.
For a brief discussion of this credit, see Sherman, supra note 35 at 133-34.
223
 ITA, ibid., s. 118(1)(d). For a detailed discussion of this credit, see Sherman, ibid. at 127-32.
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because of mental or physical infirmity (caregiver credit).224 In these circumstances,
the individual may claim an additional amount of up to $2,386 for each qualifying
dependant or co-resident, resulting in an additional credit of $406.225
2. History
Although the caregiver credit was introduced in 1998,226 most of these credits have
much earlier origins and are traceable to personal exemptions found in the first ver-
sion of the 1917 Income War Tax Act.227 According to this statute, individuals who
were either single or widowed and without dependent children were exempt from tax
on the first $1,500 of income, while those who were married or had dependent chil-
dren were exempt from tax on the first $3,000 of income.228
While the statutory language and dollar amounts of these exemptions have varied
considerably over the last eighty years, throughout most of this period the Canadian
income tax has contained a basic exemption for single individuals and additional
amounts for individuals supporting spouses and related dependants.229 In 1986, for ex-
ample, the ITA allowed individuals to deduct the following amounts in computing
their taxable income:
• $1,600 in the case of a single individual;230
• an additional amount of up to $1,400 in the case of married individuals sup-
porting a spouse or unmarried persons supporting a wholly dependent related
person;231 and
• a further amount of up to $710 for each dependant under the age of 18, up to
$550 for each infirm dependant aged 18 years or older, and up to $1,420 for
each other dependant over the age of 18 years.232
224
 ITA, ibid., s. 118(1)(c.1). For the purpose of this credit, s. 118(1)B(c.1)(ii) specifies the qualifying
relatives as (A) the individual’s children or grandchildren, or (B) the individual’s parents, grandpar-
ents, siblings, aunts, uncles, nieces and nephews, provided that they are resident in Canada.
225
 In the case of the infirm dependants credit, this amount is reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis to
the extent that the dependant’s income exceeds $4,845, disappearing when the dependant’s income
reaches $7,231. In the case of the caregiver credit, this amount is reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis
to the extent that the qualifying co-resident’s income exceeds $11,661.
226
 See “Tax Measures: Supplementary Information” in Stikeman Elliott, Canadian Federal Budget
1998: Budgetary Proposals of the Hon. Minister of Finance with Comments by Stikeman Elliott (To-
ronto: Carswell, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Federal Budget] 3-1 at 3-25, proposing the introduction of “a
new tax credit for caregivers” intended “[t]o provide additional tax assistance to Canadians providing
in-home care for elderly or infirm relatives.”
227
 S.C. 1917, c. 28.
228
 See ibid. at para. 4(1)(a).
229
 For a detailed history of these provisions up to the early 1960s, see McGregor, supra note 74.
230
 ITA, supra note 4, former s. 109(1)(c).
231
 Ibid., former ss. 109(1)(a), 109(1)(b).
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 Like the medical expenses and disability deductions in former paragraphs
110(1)(c) and (e), these deductions were converted to non-refundable credits in
1988.233 With the introduction of the child tax benefit in 1993,234 the dependants credit
was amended to apply only where the dependant is 18 years of age or older and is de-
pendent by reason of mental or physical infirmity.235 As a result, except for parents eli-
gible for the child tax benefit and single parents eligible for the wholly dependent per-
son credit, the Canadian income tax no longer recognizes basic costs of supporting
dependent children in computing the tax payable by their parents. Nor does it recog-
nize the basic costs of supporting a disabled child, except where these costs are in-
curred by a single parent (in which case the parent can claim the wholly dependent
person credit) or in respect of an infirm dependant over the age of 18 (in which case
the parent can claim the infirm dependants credit and the caregiver credit if the child
lives with the parent).236
3. Evaluation and Recommendations
a. Purpose
In order to evaluate the personal credits and their potential reform, it is necessary
to consider the purpose of these credits and the deductions that they replaced. Al-
though personal exemptions contribute to the progressivity of the income tax and also
simplify tax administration by excluding low-income individuals from the tax rolls,
                                                                                                                                        
232
 Ibid., former s. 109(1)(d). For the purpose of this paragraph, former s. 109(6) defined a “depend-
ant” as a person who, during the year, was
(a) dependent upon the individual for support;
(b) in respect of the individual or his spouse,
(i) his child or grandchild,
(ii) his niece or nephew, if resident in Canada,
(iii) his brother or sister, if resident in Canada, or
(iv) his parent, grandparent, aunt or uncle, if resident in Canada; and
(c) either
(i) under 21 years of age, or
(ii) 21 years of age or over and
(A) dependent by reason of mental or physical infirmity, or
(B) a person referred to in paragraph (b) (other than subparagraph (iv) thereof)
in full-time attendance at a school or university.
233
 See the 1987 Amendments, supra note 78, ss. 76, 92, repealing former s. 109 and enacting s. 118.
234
 This provision is examined later in Part II.F, below.
235
 See An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, to enact the Children’s Special Allowances Act, to
amend certain other Acts in consequence thereof and to repeal the Family Allowances Act, S.C. 1992,
c. 48, s. 8(1), amending ITA, supra note 4, s. 118(1)(d), applicable to 1993 and subsequent years, be-
ing Sch. VII to the 1993 Amendments, supra note 136 [hereinafter Sch. VII].
236
 This 2000 Federal Budget proposal to provide a DTC supplement for disabled children under 18
years of age may provide further recognition for these costs (see supra note 127).
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the primary rationale for these exemptions is to adjust each individual’s tax burden in
accordance with his or her personal circumstances.237 As a result, like credits or de-
ductions for medical and disability-related expenses, these provisions are designed to
recognize non-discretionary expenses incurred both to provide for one’s own subsis-
tence and to support dependants to whom one is legally or morally obliged.
b. Credit or Deduction
Given this purpose, it follows that this recognition should, like that for medical
and disability-related expenses, take the form of a deduction in computing taxable in-
come rather than a credit in computing tax payable. Although the conversion of the
basic personal amount from a deduction to a credit is equivalent to a downward shift
in the marginal rate brackets and does not affect the relative position among different
taxpayers,238 the conversion of other personal exemptions from deduction to credits
undermines the horizontal equity of the income tax by failing to properly recognize
non-discretionary expenses in determining each individual’s ability to pay.
c. Amounts
Having determined the appropriate structure of a personal exemption, it remains
to determine an appropriate amount necessary to provide for an individual’s basic
subsistence, and which (if any) expenses beyond this basic amount are properly re-
garded as non-discretionary costs in computing the individual’s ability to pay. Moreo-
ver, to the extent that the individual supports a disabled person it is necessary to con-
sider the extent to which any additional costs incurred by the supporting person on
account of this person’s disability should be recognized in computing the supporting
individual’s personal exemption.
Beginning with the amount necessary to provide for an individual’s basic subsis-
tence, this would appear to depend on a view regarding the minimum standard of liv-
ing considered socially acceptable in contemporary circumstances.239 Taking Statistics
Canada’s “low-income cut-offs” (“LICOs”) as a possible standard, 1998 figures sug-
gest that individuals living on their own require approximately $12,000 to $17,500
per year, depending on geographical location, to escape “straitened circumstances”.240
While these amounts may be higher than necessary for a basic personal exemption,
since low-income individuals may be expected to reduce living costs by sharing ac-
237
 See e.g. McGregor, supra note 74 at 9; Goode, supra note 26 at 214-21.
238
 See Cloutier & Fortin, supra note 28 at 57-58.
239
 Goode, supra note 26 at 215.
240
 Canadian Council on Social Development (“CCSD”), “Canadian Low-Income Cut-Offs” online:
CCSD <http://www.ccsd.ca/factsheets/fs_lic98.htm> (last modified: 16 February 2000) [hereinafter
“Low-Income Cut-Offs”].
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commodation,241 a basic amount in the range of $10,000 seems more appropriate than
the current amount of $7,231.242 Once established, of course, any such amount should
be fully indexed for inflation on an annual basis.
With respect to the categories of persons in respect of whom an individual’s sup-
port obligations might reasonably be regarded as non-discretionary, emphasis is gen-
erally placed on spouses and dependent children. Indeed, to the extent that family law
regimes impose legal responsibilities on individuals to support spouses and dependent
children, these expenses would appear to be clearly non-discretionary. Notwithstand-
ing this analysis, however, critics have questioned the involuntary nature of each of
these categories, characterizing the cost of supporting a stay-at-home spouse as the
product of a personal choice by the spouse or couple for that spouse to leave the paid
labour force,243 and viewing the cost of supporting a dependent child as the product of
a personal choice to have the child in the first place.244
While changing patterns of female participation in the paid labour force suggest
that the costs of supporting an otherwise employable stay-at-home spouse might rea-
sonably be regarded as voluntary,245 it is difficult to view the decision to have children
as discretionary in the same way.246 Where an individual’s spouse or child is disabled,
241
 Ibid. For a two-person household, for example, the LICOs range from approximately $15,000 to
$22,000, depending on geographic location, or $7,500 to $11,000 per person.
242
 This paper does not consider whether the exemption should vary based on geographical location.
243
 See e.g. N. Brooks, “The Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability” in
J.G. Head & R. Krever, eds., Tax Units and the Tax Rate Scale (Melbourne: Australian Tax Research
Foundation, 1996) 35 at 73, arguing that “as a matter of tax justice, there is no reason why someone
who voluntarily undertakes to support a spouse at home should be considered to have a reduced abil-
ity to pay.”
244
 See e.g. Simons, supra note 24 at 140, concluding that “it would be hard to maintain that the
raising of children is not a form of consumption on the part of parents—whether one believes in the
subsidizing of such consumption or not.”
245
 To the extent that the stay-at-home spouse provides domestic services (e.g., cleaning and meal
preparation) the cost of which would not be recognized if paid to a third party by the “breadwinning”
spouse, it is inappropriate to allow the breadwinner to claim a credit or deduction for what are in ef-
fect in-kind payments in exchange for these services. Where the stay-at-home spouse provides child
care which enables the breadwinner to participate in the paid labour force, it seems reasonable to al-
low the breadwinner to deduct amounts (up to statutory limits) paid to the caregiving spouse. Al-
though the current rule in the ITA, supra note 4, s. 63, disallows the deduction of child care expenses
paid by one spouse to another, a reform along these lines would be consistent with the proposal made
earlier in this paper to allow individuals to claim as eligible medical expenses under s. 118.2(2) atten-
dant care expenses paid to a patient’s spouse. This proposal is examined more thoroughly in the dis-
cussion of the child care expense deduction in Part II.E, below.
246
 In addition to any biological imperative that individuals might experience to have children, the
decision to have children reflects a dominant norm in our society. Furthermore, to the extent that the
taxpayer’s religious convictions preclude the use of birth control, the birth of a child may not be the
result of a voluntary choice—unless one is prepared to consider celibacy the norm or regard the par-
ents’ religious convictions as a personal choice in their own right. Moreover, to the extent that birth
control is not foolproof, the decision to have a child may not be deliberate even for parents who use
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moreover, the involuntary nature of support obligations seems indisputable. Likewise,
where an individual supports a disabled or elderly person, the moral obligation un-
derlying this support suggests that it should also be recognized for tax purposes.247
Based on this analysis, therefore, it is recommended that the amounts included in the
current personal credits be amended by restoring a separate amount for dependent
children, and by replacing the married status amount, the wholly dependent person
amount, the caregiver amount, and the adult infirm dependants amount with separate
amounts for disabled adults and elderly persons who are dependent on one or more
individuals for support.
A final set of issues concerns the appropriate dollar value of exemptions for de-
pendent children and disabled adults and the extent to which the former should be in-
creased in the case of disabled children. Research conducted in the United States sug-
gests that basic subsistence costs of supporting a dependent child are in the range of
U.S. $2,500-$4,000.248 Studies also suggest that these subsistence costs are greater for
older children than for younger children, but decrease as the number of children in-
creases as families benefit from economies of scale.249 Assuming that basic subsis-
tence costs in Canada are roughly comparable to those in the United States, but ig-
noring exchange rate differentials, these studies suggest that exemptions for depend-
ent children should be in the range of $2,500 to $4,000, should increase as the child’s
age increases, and should be greater for the first child than for the second child and
greater for the second child than for the third and subsequent children.250
Although a precisely calibrated dependants exemption might track these esti-
mated subsistence costs perfectly, any practical income tax reform must take into ac-
count the additional complexity associated with any differentiation between the ex-
emption that may be claimed for different categories of children. In particular, since
parents with taxable incomes are likely to claim deductions for dependent children
throughout the period during which they are responsible for their support, it may be
reasonable to ignore differences in the child’s age in setting the amount of the deduc-
tion. Given economies of scale, however, it makes sense to reduce the size of the ex-
emption for a second child and for subsequent children living in the same residence.
Bearing in mind the research suggesting that the subsistence cost per child decreases
by 25% when a second child is added to a family and by a further 20% when a third
                                                                                                                                        
birth control—unless one accepts the view that the decision not to have an abortion converts an oth-
erwise unplanned pregnancy into a deliberate choice. Finally, even if the initial decision to have a
child is voluntary and deliberate, the existence of the child creates a continuing legal obligation for the
parents to provide for the support the child—an obligation that cannot easily be disowned.
247
 See the discussion at text accompanying notes 83-84, 181, 214.
248
 A.J. Samansky, “Tax Policy and the Obligation to Support Children” (1996) 57 Ohio State L.J.
329 at 366-68.
249
 Ibid. at 368.
250
 These figures are not significantly different from those suggested by Statistics Canada’s LICOs,
which indicate increased living expenses of approximately $3,500 to $5,500 for a third and fourth
member of a household, and roughly $3,000 to $4,000 for a fifth and sixth member (see “Low-
Income Cut-Offs”, supra note 240).
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child is added,251 it might thus be reasonable to permit a deduction of $4,000 for the
first child, $3,000 for a second child, and $2,400 for each additional child. Like other
dollar amounts in the ITA, these figures should be indexed for annual increases in in-
flation.
In the case of disabled children, supporting individuals are likely to incur various
non-discretionary costs in addition to those that are necessary for the child’s basic
subsistence. Since supporting individuals can claim many of these expenses under the
medical expenses or disability tax credits, however, it might be argued that a disabil-
ity-related supplement to an exemption for dependent children is unnecessary. None-
theless, since these additional costs also take the form of foregone income-earning
opportunities for supporting individuals,252 it is arguable that these undocumented
costs should be recognized in part through such a supplement.253 To the extent that
personal exemptions are designed to address actual out-of-pocket expenses, on the
other hand, recognition of these opportunity costs might be considered inappropri-
ate.254
As for disabled adults and elderly persons who are dependent upon an individual
for support, it is difficult to see why the additional exemption available to a supporting
individual should be anything less than the basic personal amount, subject to a reduc-
tion based on the dependant’s income. While a lower amount might be supported on
the basis that two individuals can live more cheaply together than they can apart,255
these economies of scale may not exist in the case of disabled or elderly dependants.
Furthermore, since the basic personal amount is insufficient to enable individuals to
live at an adequate standard of living on their own,256 it seems unreasonable to assume
such independent living in determining the additional exemption available for indi-
viduals supporting a disabled adult or elderly person. Moreover, to the extent that an
individual with a disabled or elderly dependant incurs additional undocumented costs
in the form of foregone income-earning opportunities, it seems that these additional
costs should be recognized through an additional amount that is higher than the basic
personal amount. On the other hand, it is arguable that these opportunity costs are not
251
 Samansky, supra note 248 at 368.
252
 According to a recent survey of parents of disabled children, 39% worked reduced hours, 46%
altered their work schedules, 68% turned down overtime, 27% passed up promotions, and 64% of
two-parent families with one parent unemployed reported their children’s special needs as the major
factor in losing the job (see Canadian Association for Community Living, Preliminary Proposal to
Create an Enhanced National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS) for Families who have Children with
a Disability (Winnipeg: Canadian Association for Community Living, 1998) at 2-3).
253
 For this argument, I am indebted to Connie Laurin-Bowie of the Canadian Association for
Community Living. The 2000 Federal Budget introduces a supplement of this nature in the form of an
additional amount for disabled children in computing the DTC (see supra note 127).
254
 As a general rule, the income tax takes into account only actual income and expenses, not im-
puted income and opportunity costs.
255
 This explains why the additional amounts for the current married status and wholly dependent
person credits ($5,718) are less than the basic personal amount ($6,794).
256
 See text accompanying notes 239-42.
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properly taken into account through personal exemptions or in the income tax more
generally.257
E. Child Care Expense Deduction
1. Description
Although the Canadian income tax does not generally recognize non-
discretionary costs of supporting dependent children in computing the tax payable by
their parents, it does recognize basic costs of caring for dependent children to enable
parents to participate in the paid labour force through the child care expense deduc-
tion (“CCED”). Under subsection 63(1) of the ITA, “supporting persons” who incur
qualifying “child care expenses” in respect of an “eligible child” may deduct these
expenses up to a maximum amount equal to the lesser of two-thirds of the taxpayer’s
“earned income” for the year, or the sum of $7,000 for each eligible child who is un-
der 7 years of age at the end of the year or qualifies for the disability tax credit and
$4,000 for each other eligible child, provided that the expenses are proven by filing
receipts containing the recipient’s Social Insurance Number. In general, however, the
deduction must be claimed by the supporting person with the lower income.258
For the purpose of this provision, subsection 63(3) defines an “eligible child” as a
child of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse or a dependent child whose income
does not exceed $7,294, if at any time in the year the child is under 16 years of age or
dependent on the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse and has a mental or physical in-
firmity. A “supporting person” is defined as a parent of the child, the taxpayer’s
spouse, or an individual who claims a personal tax credit for the year in respect of the
child, provided that the person resided with the child at any time during the year and
at any time within 60 days after the end of the year. A taxpayer’s “earned income” is
defined as the sum of the taxpayer’s employment and business income, scholarships
and research grants, and disability payments under the CPP or QPP. Lastly, qualifying
“child care expenses” are defined as expenses for “child care services including baby
257
 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
258
 See ITA, supra note 4, s. 63(2), which creates an exception to this general rule for “the number of
weeks in the year during which the child care expenses were incurred and throughout which the sup-
porting person was” a qualifying student as defined in ss. 63(2)(b)C(i)(A), s. 63(2)(b)C(ii), disabled
according to s. 63(2)(b)C(i)(B), confined to a prison or similar institution as set out in s.
63(2)(b)C(i)(C), or living separate and apart because of marriage breakdown at the end of the year
and for a period of at least 90 days beginning in the year (s. 63(2)(b)C(i)(D)). For a year in which a
supporting person does not qualify under any of these provisions, the effect of s. 63(2) is to disallow
any deduction for child care expenses incurred by a taxpayer whose income for the year exceeds the
income of the supporting person. In these circumstances, the supporting person may deduct the child
care expenses under s. 63(1) in computing his or her own income. The 2000 Federal Budget proposes
to increase the dollar ceiling on deductible child care expenses for each child eligible for the DTC
from $7,000 to $10,000 (see “Budget Papers 2000”, supra note 56 at 2-10).
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sitting services, day nursery services or services provided at a boarding school or
camp,” if the services were (i) provided to enable the taxpayer or supporting person to
participate in the paid labour force or attend a qualifying educational institution, and
(ii) provided by a person other than the child’s father or mother, another supporting
person, a person related to the taxpayer who is under 18 years of age, or a person in
respect of whom the taxpayer or another supporting person claimed a personal tax
credit.259
In general, therefore, the CCED is available to single parents and lower income-
earning parents who obtain child care from third party providers to enable them to
work or attend school. While the deduction is generally available only for children
under the age of 16, it may be claimed for any dependent child with a mental or
physical infirmity regardless of age, up to $10,000 per year for each child eligible for
the DTC, $7,000 for each child under the age of 7 at the end of the year, and $4,000
for other eligible children.
2. History
Unlike the personal tax credits, the origins of which may be traced back to the
earliest version of the Canadian income tax, the CCED was introduced in 1972, when
the ITA was amended to allow a woman, and in limited circumstances a man, to de-
duct child care expenses up to $500 per child up to a maximum of $2,000 per family
each year, subject to various limitations. In 1976, the maximum deductible amounts
were increased to $1,000 per child per year and $4,000 per family per year.260 In 1983,
these amounts were increased yet again to $2,000 per child per year and $8,000 per
family per year,261 the deduction was limited to children under 14 years of age or over
13 years of age and dependent on the taxpayer by reason of mental or physical infir-
mity,262 and the provision was amended to eliminate gender distinctions that had been
found to be discriminatory by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.263
In 1988, the maximum deduction for children under 7 years of age or eligible for
the DTC was increased from $2,000 to $4,000, and the maximum amount per family
259
 See ITA, ibid., ss. 63(3), 63(3)(a), 63(3)(b), the definition of “child care expense”. See also ss.
63(3)(c), 63(3)(d), which specifically exclude payments for a child’s attendance at a boarding school
or camp to the extent that they exceed a weekly maximum, eligible medical expenses described in s.
118.2(2), and “any other expenses that are paid for medical or hospital care, clothing, transportation
or education or for board and lodging, except as otherwise expressly provided in this definition.”
260
 An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax, S.C. 1976-77, c. 4, s. 21(1), applicable to
1976 and subsequent years.
261
 An Act to amend the statute law relating to income tax and to make related amendments to the
Canada Pension Plan and the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1984, c. 1, s. 25(1), applica-
ble to 1983 and subsequent years.
262
 Ibid., s. 25(6), applicable to 1983 and subsequent years.
263
 Bailey v. M.N.R. (1980), 1 C.H.R.R. 193 (C.H.R.T.).
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was repealed.264 In 1993, the maximum deduction per child was increased from $4,000
to $5,000 for children under 7 years of age or eligible for the DTC, and from $2,000
to $3,000 for other eligible children.265 In 1996, the deduction was extended to apply
to children under 16 years of age,266 and was made available for the purpose of at-
tending a secondary school or designated educational institution.267 In 1998, the
maximum deduction was increased yet again from $5,000 to $7,000 for children un-
der 7 years of age or eligible for the DTC, and from $3,000 to $4,000 for other eligi-
ble children.268 Other than these amendments, and the 2000 Federal Budget proposal
to increase the deductible amount for children eligible for the DTC to $10,000,269 the
basic structure of section 63 has remained the same since 1983.
3. Evaluation and Recommendations
a. Purpose
While the CCED is often criticized on the grounds that it is worth more to high-
income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers and worth nothing to parents whose in-
come is too low to pay any tax,270 this objection ignores the argument that necessary
costs of child care services that enable a parent to engage in various kinds of income-
earning pursuits (e.g., employment, business, research, or training) are properly de-
ductible in computing the parent’s net income as a cost of earning that income.271 In-
deed, a deduction like that in section 63 of the ITA, which is capped at a stipulated
dollar amount per child, is ideally structured to recognize essential child care ex-
penses as a cost of earning income without recognizing additional expenses for goods
and services of a more discretionary character.
With this purpose in mind, the current CCED may be subject to three specific
objections: the first concerning the dollar ceilings, the second regarding the further
limit on allowable deductions based on two-thirds of the claimant’s earned income,
and the third concerning the requirements that the expenses must be claimed by the
lower income-earning parent and must be for services provided by a third party pro-
264
 1987 Amendments, supra note 78, ss. 39(1), 39(2), applicable to 1988 and subsequent years.
265
 An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, the Canada Pension Plan, the Income Tax Conventions In-
terpretation Act, the Tax Rebate Discounting Act, the Unemployment Insurance Act and certain re-
lated Acts, S.C. 1993, c. 24, ss. 23(2), 23(3), applicable to 1993 and subsequent years, being Sch. VIII
to the 1993 Amendments, supra note 136 [hereinafter Sch. VIII].
266
 Income Tax Budget Amendments Act, 1996, S.C. 1997, c. 25, s. 12(5), applicable to 1996 and
subsequent years [hereinafter 1996 Amendments].
267
 See ITA, supra note 4, s. 63(3)(a)(v), added by 1996 Amendments, ibid., s. 12(4), applicable to
1996 and subsequent taxation years.
268
 1998 Amendments, supra note 176, ss. 18(1), 18(2), applicable to 1998 and subsequent years.
269
 See supra note 258.
270
 See e.g. Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Working Group Report: Women and Taxation (Toronto:
Fair Tax Commission, 1992); C. Young, “Child Care: A Taxing Issue?” (1994) 39 McGill L.J. 539.
271
 See e.g. Goode, supra note 26 at 155-56.
856 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 45
vider. For families with disabled persons, a further issue concerns the ability to deduct
the cost of caring for a disabled child, but not the cost of caring for a disabled adult to
enable the supporting individual to engage in income-earning pursuits.
b. Dollar Ceilings
The purpose of the deduction suggests that dollar ceilings should be set at an
amount necessary to obtain a socially acceptable standard of child care. Although evi-
dence suggests that the deduction for school-aged children is roughly comparable to
actual child care costs, the deduction for pre-schoolers appears to be substantially
lower than actual costs.272 With respect to disabled children, moreover, it is likely that
the current ceilings of $7,000 or $4,000 for dependent children with a mental or
physical infirmity (depending on their age) are inadequate.273 While parents may also
claim attendant care expenses in respect of a disabled child under the METC,274 tax
recognition for these expenses is subject to a more restrictive set of eligibility criteria
and takes the form of a 17% credit in computing basic federal tax payable rather than
a deduction. As a result, to the extent that the cost of caring for disabled children ex-
ceeds average child care expenses for other children, it seems desirable to increase the
maximum amount that may be deducted for mentally or physically infirm children
under section 63 in addition to the increases in allowable amounts for children eligible
for the DTC. Like other dollar amounts in the ITA, these amounts should be indexed
for annual increases in inflation.275
272
 See Ontario Fair Tax Commission, supra note 270 at 32, reporting that infant care costs about
$13,000 per year while school-aged care costs about $4,200 per year.
273
 The proposal in 2000 Federal Budget, supra note 35, to increase the allowable deduction to
$10,000 for each child eligible for the DTC is, however, a welcome improvement.
274
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 118.2(2)(b) (remuneration for full-time attendant to care for patient eligible
for the disability tax credit); s. 118.2(2)(c) (remuneration for full-time attendant in patient’s home to
care for patient “certified ... to be a person who, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, is and is
likely to be for a long-continued period of indefinite duration dependent on others for the patient’s
personal needs and care and who, as a result thereof, requires a full-time attendant”); s. 118.2(2)(b.1)
(remuneration up to $10,000 or $20,000 if the individual dies in the year for attendant to care for pa-
tient eligible for the disability tax credit). While attendant care expenses cannot be claimed under s.
118.2(2)(b.1) if an amount in respect of the patient has been claimed as a child care expense under s.
63, attendant care expenses may be claimed under either ss. 118.2(2)(b) or 118.2(2)(c) even if child
care expenses in respect of the patient are claimed under s. 63. However, according to s. 63(3)(d), ex-
penses that are described in s. 118.2(2) are not child care expenses. As a result, provided that child
care expenses are distinguished from attendant care expenses, it appears as though parents could de-
duct the former under s. 63 up to the dollar limits, and claim the full-time attendant care expenses as
eligible medical expenses under s. 118.2.
275
 The 2000 Federal Budget, supra note 35, does not appear to include these amounts among those
subject to full indexation.
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c. Income-Related Limit
As for the income-related limit on allowable deductions, one might question the
need for any further restriction on allowable deductions given the dollar ceilings oth-
erwise applicable. Where otherwise permissible child care expenses exceed the in-
come which child care services enable a taxpayer to earn, however, it is arguable that
the excess expenses are not incurred for the purpose of earning income and are eco-
nomically inefficient. For these reasons, a rule prohibiting taxpayers from deducting
otherwise allowable child care expenses exceeding their earned income for the year
makes more sense than a rule limiting the deduction of these expenses to two-thirds of
this earned income.
d. Claimants and Providers
Turning to the requirements that child care expenses must be claimed by the
lower income-earning parent and must be for services provided by a third party pro-
vider, it appears as though these rules reflect a traditional view according to which
child care is properly the responsibility of a stay-at-home parent and should be recog-
nized for tax purposes only where this parent incurs expenses to engage in income-
earning activities. To the extent that child care is viewed as a joint responsibility of
both parents, however, which may be accomplished through payments to a third party
or by a division of labour in which one parent works in the paid labour force while the
other becomes the primary caregiver, it is arguable that the income tax should recog-
nize alternative child care arrangements by permitting supporting persons to allocate
the deduction between them as they see fit, and allowing a parent participating in the
paid labour force to deduct amounts paid to a caregiving parent up to the maximum
amount permitted by the dollar ceilings. In addition to recognizing the economic part-
nership underlying this division of labour, this reform could enhance gender equality
by encouraging transfers of income from higher income-earning breadwinners (who
tend to be male) to lower income-earning caregivers (who tend to be female),276 and
enable stay-at-home spouses who care for dependent children to accumulate inde-
pendent Registered Retirement Savings Plan (“RRSP”) contribution room and qualify
more easily for CPP/QPP benefits and employment insurance. It is also consistent
276
 While these payments to the caregiving parent would be subject to income tax, employment in-
surance premiums, and CPP/QPP contributions, the combined taxes on these amounts would gener-
ally be less than the tax saving to the income-earning parent from the availability of the deduction—
both because the caregiving parent is apt to be subject to tax at a lower marginal rate than the bread-
winning parent and because the single status tax credit available to a caregiving parent with independ-
ent income exceeds the additional amount of the “married status” credit otherwise available to the
breadwinning spouse. Moreover, to the extent that the “married status” credit is repealed (as recom-
mended earlier in this paper), the tax advantage to this limited form of income-splitting would be even
greater.
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with the earlier recommendation to recognize as eligible medical expenses amounts
paid to an individual’s spouse for qualifying attendant care.277
e. Other Dependants
Considering families with disabled persons, finally, it appears inequitable to allow
taxpayers to deduct the cost of caring for a disabled child, but not the costs of caring
for a disabled adult to enable a supporting individual to engage in income-earning
pursuits. Although attendant care expenses may be claimed as eligible medical ex-
penses under section 118.2 of the ITA, this is the case only where the disabled person
qualifies for the disability tax credit or requires a full-time attendant by reason of
mental or physical infirmity.278 As well, tax recognition through this provision takes
the form of a 17% credit in computing basic federal tax payable rather than a deduc-
tion. For these reasons, it seems reasonable to allow supporting individuals to deduct
the cost of caring for disabled adults to enable them to engage in income-earning pur-
suits. Although such a deduction might be introduced through amendments either to
the child care expense deduction in section 63 or to the attendant care expense deduc-
tion in section 64,279 the objectives of this deduction might be achieved more directly
through a separate provision. To the extent that attendant care expenses are claimed
under one of these deductions, however, the expense should not be recognized as an
eligible medical or disability-related expense for the purposes of separate medical or
disability expense deductions or credits.
F. Child Tax Benefit
1. Description
The Canada Child Tax Benefit (“CCTB”) provides financial support to low-
income families with dependent children in the form of a refundable tax credit worth
an annual amount of up to slightly more than $2,000 per child. According to subsec-
tion 122.61(1) of the ITA, the annual amount of the benefit includes a basic amount
comprising $1,034 per child, an additional $76 for each child in excess of two, and
$216 for each child under age 7 less 25% of child care expenses deducted under sec-
tion 63 of the ITA; there is also a supplementary amount of $966 for the first child,
$763 for the second child, and $687 for each additional child. The basic amount is re-
duced to the extent that the aggregate parental income of cohabiting spouses exceeds
277
 See the earlier discussion in the text accompanying notes 85-88.
278
 ITA, supra note 4, ss. 118.2(2)(b), 118.2(2)(b.1), 118.2(2)(c).
279
 This provision is examined in Part III.A, below.
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$30,004, while the supplementary amounts are reduced to the extent that this aggre-
gate income exceeds $21,214.280
2. History
The CCTB was introduced in 1993, at which time the federal government re-
pealed the non-refundable credit for dependent children,281 a refundable child credit
enacted in 1978,282 the Family Allowances Act283 and a clawback on family allowances
introduced in 1989.284 While the introduction of this refundable credit increased the
role of the federal government in providing income support to low-income families
with dependent children, it also marked the end of universal family benefits and gen-
eral tax recognition of the costs of supporting dependent children.
3. Evaluation and Recommendations
Although the purposes of this paper make it unnecessary to consider arguments
for or against universal family benefits, it has already recommended the restoration of
a separate credit or deduction for dependent children, arguing that a deduction of
$4,000 for the first child, $3,000 for a second child, and $2,400 for each additional
child would recognize the non-discretionary costs of supporting dependent children.285
While such a deduction would be worth more to high-income taxpayers than low-
income taxpayers and worth nothing to taxpayers whose income is too low to pay any
tax, the purpose of the deduction is to achieve horizontal equity among taxpayers with
different incomes but similar ability to pay. This tax policy objective, more narrowly
defined, must be distinguished from broader social policy objectives underlying the
payment of universal family benefits or income-tested benefits to low- and modest-
income families with dependent children.
280
 These amounts are effective July 1, 2000, pursuant to the announcement of full indexing in the
2000 Federal Budget. The Budget proposes to increase maximum benefits to $2,400 by the year 2004
(see “Supplementary Information 2000”, supra note 35 at 3-16 – 3-20).
281
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 118(1)B(d), as it read prior to 1993.
282
 See ibid., former s. 122.2, repealed by Sch. VII, supra note 235, s. 10(2), applicable to 1993 and
subsequent years.
283
 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-1, rep. 1993.
284
 See Canada, Department of National Health and Welfare, The Child Benefit: A White Paper on
Canada’s New Integrated Child Tax Benefit (Ottawa: Department of National Health and Welfare,
1992). For explanations of the evolution and structure of the child tax benefit, see J.R. Kesselman,
“The Child Tax Benefit: Simple, Fair, Responsive?” (1993) 19 Can. Pub. Pol. 109; K. Battle & M.
Mendelson, Child Benefit Reform in Canada: An Evaluative Framework and Future Directions (Ot-
tawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 1997); F. Stairs, “The Canada Child Tax Benefit: Income
Support and the Tax System” (1999) 14 J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 123; K. Battle, “Child Benefit Reform: A
Case Study in Tax/Transfer Integration” (Canadian Tax Foundation Tax Policy Conference, 9-10 May
1999).
285
 See text accompanying notes 248-51.
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As for the CCTB itself, the broad social policy objectives underlying its design
caution against any general conclusions in a paper devoted primarily to disability is-
sues and tax policy more narrowly understood. Nonetheless, from this perspective,
one might venture the following two comments about the CCTB.
First, as the earlier description of subsection 122.61(1) illustrates, the structure of
the CCTB is extremely complex, including two different phase-out provisions and
various dollar amounts, the purposes of which are neither clear nor mutually consis-
tent. For example, while the basic amount appears to reward families with more than
two children by providing an additional $76 per child in excess of two, the supple-
mentary payments appear to recognize economies of scale by providing a lower
amount for the second child than the first and still lower amounts for children in ex-
cess of two. While the various elements of the credit appear to reflect the different
programs and tax provisions that the CCTB replaced, it should be possible to ration-
alize the formula to reduce its complexity.
Second, to the extent that the costs of supporting and caring for disabled children
exceed those for other children, it seems appropriate to provide a supplement to the
CCTB for children with mental or physical disabilities.286 While eligibility for this
supplement might be based on eligibility for an amended disability tax credit or de-
duction, the broader category of mental or physical infirmity might be more appropri-
ate to the extent that the CCTB is designed to compensate for various costs (e.g., child
or attendant care or tutoring services for dependent children with a mental or physical
infirmity) for which higher-income taxpayers with disabled children might obtain a
deduction or credit. In order to ensure that any additional federal benefits are not di-
minished by offsetting reductions in social assistance, finally, implementation of such
a supplement would require agreement with provincial governments.
G. Private Savings
1. Description
In addition to the other provisions examined in this part, the Canadian income tax
encourages private savings to support disabled persons through special trust tax provi-
sions, and recognizes specific financial needs of dependent children by allowing tax-
deferred savings to be transferred to dependent children and grandchildren on a tax-
payer’s death without immediate tax liability. Each of these measures suggests a
broader examination of the role that tax provisions can play in the encouragement of
private savings to support disabled persons.
286
 For a specific proposal to this effect, see generally Canadian Association for Community Living,
supra note 252.
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Although inter vivos trusts are generally taxable at the top marginal rate of 29%
without any allowance for personal credits available to beneficiaries of the trust,287
subsections 104(12) and (14) of the ITA allow income retained by an inter vivos trust
to be taxed as if it were received by a “preferred beneficiary” and not the trustee,
where the trustee and the preferred beneficiary file an election to this effect. For this
purpose, subsection 108(1) defines a “preferred beneficiary” as an individual who is
(a) either eligible for the disability tax credit or at least 18 years of age, depend-
ent on another individual because of mental or physical infirmity, and with an
income (without taking the election into account) no greater than $6,456; and
(b) the settlor of the trust, the spouse or former spouse of the settlor, or a child,
grandchild, or great grandchild of the settlor of the trust or the settler’s
spouse.
Where the preferred beneficiary election is filed, the designated income is taxed under
the rate schedule applicable to individuals, with allowance for personal tax credits
otherwise available to the specific beneficiary.
Other rules allow RRSPs and Registered Retirement Income Funds (“RRIFs”) to
be distributed to a financially dependent child or grandchild on a taxpayer’s death
without any immediate tax liability; this is done by treating the distribution as a “re-
fund of premiums” to the child or grandchild who may deduct amounts contributed to
an RRSP or used to acquire an annuity, thereby offsetting tax otherwise payable on
the initial distribution.288 For this purpose, the ITA stipulates that “it is assumed, unless
the contrary is established, that a dependant was not financially dependent” on the de-
ceased if the dependant’s income for the year preceding the deceased’s death ex-
ceeded $7,294.289 While the deduction under paragraph 60(l) is generally available
only for children or grandchildren under 18 years of age, this restriction does not ap-
ply where the child or grandchild was dependent on the deceased “by reason of men-
tal or physical infirmity”. In this respect, this measure, like the preferred beneficiary
election, encourages private savings to support disabled relatives.
2. Evaluation and Recommendations
Although these provisions provide valuable tax relief under specific circum-
stances, they may be criticized in several ways. With respect to the preferred benefici-
ary election, one might wonder why tax relief is limited to trusts established only for
the benefit of the settlor, the settlor’s spouse, or a child, grandchild or great grandchild
287
 ITA, supra note 4, ss. 122(1), 122(1.1).
288
 See ibid., ss. 146(8.9), 146.3(6.2), and the definition of “refund of premiums” in s. 146(1), which
exclude amounts paid to financially dependent children or grandchildren from inclusion in the income
of deceased if the deceased has no spouse at the time of death, and s. 60(1), which allows the child or
grandchild to deduct amounts so received which are contributed to an RRSP or used to acquire an
annuity.
289
 See ibid., s. 146(1)(b).
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of the settlor or the settlor’s spouse. To the extent that the measure is designed to en-
courage private savings to support disabled persons, it is arguable that the categories
of preferred beneficiaries in subsection 108(1) of the ITA should be expanded to in-
clude other relatives such as parents and grandparents, aunts and uncles, and nieces
and nephews, or any disabled person regardless of his or her relationship with the set-
tlor.
Similarly, where a taxpayer dies, it is unclear why the “rollover” on tax-deferred
savings should be limited to transfers to a financially dependent child or grandchild,
as opposed to any person who at the time of the deceased’s death was financially de-
pendent on the deceased and either under the age of 18 or dependent by reason of
mental or physical infirmity. Nor is it clear that a disabled individual should be pre-
sumed to be financially independent where his or her income exceeds $7,294. As
well, by requiring a disabled recipient to include the “refund of premiums” in income
and claim an offsetting deduction for the acquisition of an annuity or contributions to
an RRSP, the current rules necessitate a complicated process that may be especially
difficult for severely disabled individuals and may affect the recipient’s eligibility for
social assistance.290 Instead, on the death of an individual holding RRSPs or RRIFs,
these amounts should be directly transferable to a tax-exempt trust governed by a
registered savings plan in the name of a disabled beneficiary. While payments from
such a plan should be taxable to the beneficiary, the existence of the plan should not
affect the beneficiary’s entitlement to social assistance.291
With this recommendation in mind, one might imagine a more comprehensive
approach to disability-related savings, such as the introduction of registered disability
savings plans (“RDSPs”) designed to encourage private savings to support individuals
with a mental or physical infirmity.292 Ideally, such plans would operate much like an
RRSP, with contributions deductible up to a maximum amount,293 investment income
exempt from tax, and withdrawals taxable to the disabled beneficiary. Alternatively,
290
 The Tax System, supra note 79 at 27.
291
 While this result can be achieved if the trust is a discretionary trust, since the beneficiary has no
legal entitlement to any of the funds, it would be preferable to amend social assistance legislation to
create incentives for private disability-related savings by exempting specific disability savings plans
from clawbacks based on liquid assets.
292
 For a similar idea on which this proposal builds, see the recommendation for a registered disad-
vantaged residential savings plan (“RDRSP”) in The Tax System, supra note 79 at 25-27. While the
RDRSP could be used only for the purpose of acquiring a residential unit, furniture, and appliances
for a disabled person, payments from an RDSP could be used for any purpose selected by the dis-
abled person or a legal guardian. On the other hand, while the RDRSP proposal imagined that with-
drawals used solely for the purpose of acquiring a residential unit would not be taxable, the RDSP
contemplated here assumes that withdrawals would be taxable to the beneficiary.
293
 This maximum amount could be independent of existing limits on deferred savings plans or co-
ordinated with these limits, so that individuals could contribute to an RDSP instead of, but not in ad-
dition to, allowable contributions to RRSPs, Registered Savings Plans, and Deferred Profit Sharing
Plans. Given the separate purpose of the RDSP, a separate contribution limit would seem more appro-
priate.
2000] D.G. DUFF – DISABILITY AND THE INCOME TAX 863
such plans could be structured along the lines of the current Registered Education
Savings Plans (“RESPs”), with investment income tax-exempt and withdrawals tax-
able to the beneficiary, but with no deduction for contributions.294 If the RESP ap-
proach is selected, however, the federal government might provide additional assis-
tance in the form of direct contributions to the plan such as the Canada Education
Savings Grants, which are designed to encourage contributions to RESPs.295 In either
event, the effect of RDSPs on social assistance benefits would have to be carefully
considered to prevent any reduction in these benefits from discouraging private sav-
ings in this form.
III. Labour Market Integration
Beyond recognizing the costs of disabilities, recent studies have emphasized the
importance of measures designed to enhance the ability of disabled persons to partici-
pate in the paid labour force.296 One such study estimates the participation rate of
working age individuals with disabilities in the paid labour force at 71% for persons
with mild disabilities, 45% for persons with moderate disabilities, and 26% for per-
sons with severe disabilities,297 while another estimates the economic benefits of in-
cluding these people in the workforce at approximately $4.6 billion.298 Additional
studies emphasize the importance of paid work both as a source of income and for the
sense of dignity, accomplishment, and belonging that it provides.299
Although integration of disabled persons into the labour market has measurable
benefits both to disabled persons themselves and to society as a whole, participation
by disabled persons in the paid labour force may also involve additional costs in ex-
cess of those incurred by other participants in the paid labour market. If a person is
blind or mobility-impaired, for example, participation in the paid labour market may
necessitate additional costs necessary for transportation to and from work. Disabled
persons may also require attendant care, either to provide various household services
in order to participate in the paid labour force or to assist in the performance of work
responsibilities. Yet other costs involve the loss of subsidies for various disability-
related supports (services, drugs, and technical devices) otherwise available under
provincial social assistance plans as individuals obtain additional income from em-
294
 See ITA, supra note 4, s. 146.1, which allows individuals to contribute an aggregate of $4,000 per
year for each beneficiary.
295
 As announced in the 1998 Federal Budget, these grants are equal to 20% of the amount contrib-
uted for each beneficiary in a year, up to a maximum amount of $7,200 over 18 years (see 1998 Fed-
eral Budget, supra note 226).
296
 See e.g. Standing Committee, supra note 33 at 6-8; Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, su-
pra note 1 at 50-84; In Unison, supra note 1 at 5-6, 11-12.
297
 G. Fawcett, An Analysis of the Economic Circumstances of Canadians with Disabilities (Ottawa:
Canadian Council on Social Development, 1996), cited in Shillington, supra note 86 at 2.
298
 Canadian Association for Community Living, The Cost of Doing Nothing: A Submission to the
Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled Persons (30 May 1996) at 3.
299
 See e.g. Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, supra note 1 at 50.
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ployment or a business. Likewise, for employers, the integration of disabled employ-
ees may involve additional physical and personnel costs, for disability-related equip-
ment and modifications to buildings and to train disabled employees and their co-
workers.
While measures to facilitate the integration of disabled persons in the paid labour
force may include educational programs, vocational rehabilitation and training pro-
grams, employment counselling programs, and human rights guarantees, the income
tax also has an important role to play by recognizing additional costs of this participa-
tion both to disabled persons themselves as well as their employers. Other provisions
might encourage labour market participation by subsidizing disabled persons or their
employers through the income tax.
This part considers existing and proposed income tax provisions designed to fa-
cilitate integration of disabled persons in the paid labour force, looking at measures
affecting the tax liability both of disabled persons themselves and of their employers.
Among measures directed at disabled persons themselves, it considers the non-
taxation of disability-related benefits provided by employers, the deduction of addi-
tional work-related expenses incurred by disabled persons themselves, and tax-
delivered assistance to mitigate the loss of provincial disability-related supports. With
respect to measures directed at employers, it examines existing and potential tax
measures to encourage investments in disability-related equipment and building modi-
fications and to hire disabled employees.
A. Measures Directed at Disabled Persons
1. Description
At present, the ITA contains three provisions designed to alleviate different kinds
of costs incurred by disabled persons who participate in the paid labour force. Under
subsection 6(16) of the ITA, a disabled individual is exempt from tax on the value of
employer-provided benefits or allowances in respect of expenses incurred by the indi-
vidual for
(a) the transportation of the individual between the individual’s ordinary place of
residence and the individual’s work location (including parking near that lo-
cation) if the individual is blind or eligible for the disability tax credit (or
would be but for claiming remuneration for full-time attendant or nursing
home care as a medical expense) on account of a mobility impairment; or
(b) an attendant to assist the individual in the performance of the individual’s em-
ployment duties, if the individual is eligible for the disability tax credit (or
would be but for claiming remuneration for full-time attendant or nursing
home care as a medical expense).
Under the attendant care expense deduction (“ACED”) in section 64, taxpayers who
are eligible for the DTC may deduct unreimbursed amounts paid for attendant care to
enable them to perform the duties of an office or employment, carry on a business ei-
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ther alone or as a partner actively engaged in the business, or carry on research or any
similar work in respect of which the taxpayer received a grant, up to a maximum of
two-thirds of the taxpayer’s income from employment, business or research.300 This
deduction is allowed provided that the amounts are not claimed as a medical expense
under section 118.2, are paid to someone other than the taxpayer’s spouse or a person
under 18 years of age, and are proven by filing receipts containing the recipient’s So-
cial Insurance Number. Under the refundable medical expenses supplement
(“RMES”) in section 122.51, taxpayers aged 18 or older who earn at least $2,535
through employment or a business may claim a refundable tax credit equal to 25 cents
for each dollar of eligible medical expenses exceeding the threshold stipulated in the
METC, up to a maximum of $500 (maximum medical expenses of $2,000 above the
threshold), and reduced by 5% of the amount by which the combined income of the
individual and his or her cohabiting spouse exceeds $17,664.
2. History
Each of these provisions is of recent origin, reflecting increasing federal concern
about the integration of disabled persons in the paid labour market. Subsection 6(16),
for example, was enacted in 1991,301 with the express purpose of superseding rules
that would otherwise “tend to discourage disabled Canadians from participating in the
work force.”302 Section 64 was enacted in 1989,303 in order to “lower the employment
barrier” to participation by disabled persons in the paid labour force created by un-
reimbursed attendant care expenses, and to “create greater equity between able-bodied
earners and those who incur additional expenses owing to a disability.”304 Although the
300
 The 2000 Federal Budget proposes to extend this deduction to disabled persons enrolled in quali-
fying educational programs (see “Budget Papers 2000”, supra note 56 at 2-9 – 2-10).
301
 Sch. II, supra note 136, s. 3(5), applicable to 1991 and subsequent years.
302
 “Excerpts from Supplementary Information” in Stikeman Elliott, Canadian Federal Budget
1991: Budgetary Proposals of the Hon. Minister of Finance with Comments by Stikeman Elliott (To-
ronto: Carswell, 1991) 4-1 at 4-3. According to the Budget:
Allowances provided to employees for taxi fares, para-transport, and parking will no
longer be considered as taxable benefits for those who are eligible for the disability tax
credit by reason of a severe and prolonged mobility or sight impairment. In addition,
where an employer provides an allowance in respect of attendant care required to en-
able an employee who qualifies for the disability tax credit to perform employment du-
ties (e.g., readers for the blind, signers for the deaf, coaches for the mentally handi-
capped), no taxable benefit will be imputed (ibid.).
303
 1989 Amendments, supra note 175, s. 14, applicable to 1989 and subsequent years. This provi-
sion effectively reversed the Tax Appeal Board decision in Benton v. M.N.R. (1952), 6 Tax A.B.C.
230, 52 D.T.C. 196, in which the disabled taxpayer was unable to deduct the cost of the housekeeping
services that enabled him to engage in the business of farming.
304
 “Excerpts from Supplementary Information” in Stikeman Elliott, Canadian Federal Budget
1989: Budgetary Proposals of the Hon. Minister of Finance with Comments by Stikeman Elliott (To-
ronto: Carswell, 1989) 3-1 at 3-4.
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deduction was originally limited to $5,000,305 this ceiling was repealed in 1997,306 also
to “reduce barriers to work for people with disabilities.”307 Section 122.51 was enacted
in 1997,308 in order to lessen “an important barrier to participation in the labour force
by Canadians with disabilities” caused by “[t]he loss of subsidies for disability-related
supports under provincial social assistance.”309
3. Evaluation and Recommendations
a. Purposes
In evaluating these provisions, it is important, as outlined earlier, to distinguish
between social policy objectives and tax policy considerations more narrowly defined.
Whereas non-taxation of employer-provided benefits or allowances and deductions
for additional expenses incurred by disabled persons to participate in the paid labour
force reflects a tax policy concern to exclude from a taxpayer’s net income all neces-
sary costs to earn this income, the RMES reflects a social policy concern to lessen the
impact of lost subsidies for disability-related supports under provincial social assis-
tance plans on disabled persons who participate in the paid labour force by reimburs-
ing a share of privately borne expenses.
Having identified the distinct policy objectives of these various provisions, it is
possible to consider possible reforms consistent with these separate purposes. While
tax policy addresses the additional out-of-pocket expenses incurred by disabled indi-
viduals in order to participate in the paid labour force, social policy addresses the ex-
tent to which these costs should be borne privately or publicly and the impact of lost
subsidies for disability-related supports under provincial social assistance plans.
b. Direct Costs of Earning Income
As indicated in Part I of this paper, horizontal equity suggests that taxpayers, in
computing their net income, should be allowed to deduct all privately borne costs that
are necessary to obtain this income. Where disabled individuals incur additional nec-
essary expenses to participate in the paid labour force, horizontal equity demands that
these expenses also be deductible. While a progressive rate structure and personal ex-
emptions mean that these deductions are worth more to high-income taxpayers than
low-income taxpayers and worth nothing to disabled persons whose incomes are too
low to pay any tax, this result reflects a prior tax policy concern about the appropriate
definition of the tax base.
305
 ITA, supra note 4, former s. 64(c).
306
 1997 Amendments, supra note 173, s. 11.
307
 “Tax Measures: Supplementary Information” in 1997 Federal Budget, supra note 172, 5-1 at
5-14 [hereinafter “Supplementary Information 1997”].
308
 1997 Amendments, supra note 173, s. 32, applicable to 1997 and subsequent years.
309
 “Supplementary Information 1997”, supra note 307.
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As for the specific provisions through which these additional costs might be rec-
ognized for tax purposes, either a deduction for privately borne expenses incurred by
disabled individuals themselves or an exclusion for employer-provided benefits or al-
lowances in respect of these expenses is appropriate. While a deduction recognizes
these costs directly in computing the disabled individual’s income, an exclusion for
employer-provided benefits or allowances in respect of these expenses recognizes
these expenses indirectly to the extent that the employer is able to deduct amounts that
are not included in the employee’s income. As a result, the exclusion in subsection
6(16) of the ITA should be regarded as an appropriate complement to the deduction of
these expenses elsewhere in the ITA.
From this perspective, however, an obvious criticism of the current statutory
scheme is the non-deductibility of certain kinds of expenses the reimbursement of
which is exempt from tax under subsection 6(16). In particular, while employees who
are blind or mobility-impaired are not subject to tax on employer-provided benefits or
allowances in respect of expenses to travel to and from work (e.g., taxi fares, para-
transport, and parking), these expenses appear to be non-deductible in computing the
income of a similarly disabled employee whose employer does not provide a benefit
or allowance in respect of identical commuting expenses.310 Nor does it appear, where
a disabled individual carries on a business either alone or as a partner actively en-
gaged in the business, that the individual can deduct commuting expenses in respect
of which a similarly disabled employee is exempt from tax under paragraph 6(16)(a)
of the ITA.311 In contrast, by allowing disabled individuals to deduct the cost of atten-
dant care to enable them to perform the duties of an office or employment or carry on
a business either alone or as a partner actively engaged in the business, section 64
prevents a similar inequity that might otherwise result from the non-inclusion of em-
ployer-provided benefits or allowances in respect of these expenses under paragraph
6(16)(b) of the ITA. In order to eliminate any inequity in the treatment of commuting
expenses, these might be explicitly allowed as a separate deduction along the lines of
the ACED in section 64.
310
 Although the ITA, supra note 4, s. 8, provides for various amounts that may be deductible in
computing an employee’s income, none of these deductions includes commuting expenses of disabled
employees; s. 8(2) stipulates that “no deductions shall be made in computing a taxpayer’s income for
a taxation year from an office or employment” other than those specifically listed in s. 8. On the other
hand, Revenue Canada appears to interpret the deduction for “attendant care” in s. 64 to include the
cost of an attendant to provide transportation to work (M.N.R., Interpretation Bulletin IT-519R2,
“Medical Expense and Disability Tax Credits and Attendant Care Expense Deduction” (6 April 1998)
at para. 69). However, it is uncertain whether this deduction would cover other commuting expenses,
such as taxi fares, gasoline, and parking, in respect of which an employer-provided benefit or allow-
ance would appear to be excluded under s. 6(16)(a). For a review of Revenue Canada guidelines on
the meaning of “attendant care”, see Sherman, supra note 35 at 98-99. For a discussion of the exemp-
tion for disability-related employment benefits under s. 6(16), see ibid. at 170-72.
311
 See e.g. Henry v. M.N.R., [1969] C.T.C. 600, 69 D.T.C. 5395 (Ex. Ct.), aff’d (1971), [1974]
S.C.R. 155, [1972] C.T.C. 33, 23 D.L.R. (3d) 571, in which commuting expenses were held to be a
non-deductible “personal or living expense”.
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Turning to section 64 itself, consistency with other statutory provisions and earlier
recommendations in this paper suggests at least two specific reforms. First, consistent
with earlier comments on the METC and the CCED,312 the ACED should be available
notwithstanding the fact that attendant care expenses are incurred in the form of re-
muneration to a taxpayer’s spouse. Provided that the deduction in respect of this re-
muneration is reasonable in the circumstances, as required by section 67 of the ITA,
there is no reason why it should be any less deductible than if it were paid to a third
party.
Second, where attendant care is necessary to enable a disabled taxpayer to earn
income from various sources, it seems unreasonable to limit the allowable deduction
for attendant care expenses to two-thirds of the taxpayer’s income from these sources.
Instead, consistent with the earlier analysis of the CCED,313 the maximum deductible
amount might be limited to the total of all amounts that the attendant care enables the
taxpayer to earn.
More generally, one might question the requirements in both subsection 6(16) and
section 64 of the ITA that the individual in respect of whom employment benefits are
exempt or attendant care expenses are deductible must be eligible for the DTC.314
Given the purpose of these provisions to recognize additional costs incurred by dis-
abled individuals in order to participate in the paid labour force, a broader definition
of disability such as “mental or physical infirmity” would appear to be more appropri-
ate than the highly restrictive eligibility criteria for the DTC. If eligibility for the DTC
is reformed along the lines suggested earlier, however, these criteria might be appro-
priate for the purposes of subsection 6(16) and section 64 of the ITA.315
c. Loss of Social Assistance Subsidies
With respect to the RMES in section 122.51, the design of this provision should
be measured against its stated social policy purpose to offset the loss of subsidies for
disability-related supports under provincial social assistance that results when dis-
abled individuals earn additional income from participation in the paid labour force.316
From this perspective, it suffers from the same deficiencies as the METC, both as a
312
 See the earlier discussion above, at text accompanying notes 85-88 and in Part II.E.3.d, above.
313
 See the discussion in Part II.E.3.c, above.
314
 See e.g. The Tax System, supra note 79 at 22.
315
 See text accompanying notes 181-85.
316
 Although one might begin by questioning the merits of such a federal social policy measure de-
signed to correct acknowledged deficiencies in provincial social assistance programs (which should
be amended by provincial governments themselves), this paper accepts this policy as a basis for
analysis of the RMES. It is interesting to note, however, that federal, provincial, and territorial social
services ministers have agreed on a framework for social policy reform that would separate access to
disability-related supports from eligibility for social assistance (see In Unison, supra note 1). To the
extent that provincial programs are amended along these lines, the social policy need for the RMES
may disappear.
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method of recognizing privately borne disability-related expenses for the purposes of
computing income tax and as an instrument for reimbursing a share of these expenses
as a matter of social policy. These deficiencies are a tendency to define eligible ex-
penses according to a narrow medical model and a threshold on eligible expenses
based on 3% of the individual’s net income or $1,637, whichever is lower.
Although the current METC makes it difficult to achieve the stated purpose of the
RMES to compensate for lost disability-related supports, this social policy goal might
be achieved more directly if the refundable credit applied to a separate measure of
disability-related expenses without any annual threshold. Since the earlier recommen-
dation for a separate disability expenses tax credit or deduction is based on just such a
measure,317 the introduction of such a provision would provide a much better founda-
tion for a refundable credit designed to offset the loss of provincial subsidies for dis-
ability-related supports. Such an amended provision, which would be based on eligi-
ble disability-related expenses for this non-refundable credit or deduction, might more
appropriately be described as a refundable disability expenses supplement (RDES).
B. Measures Directed at Employers
1. Description
In addition to tax provisions directed at disabled persons themselves, the income
tax might also encourage the participation of disabled persons in the paid labour force
through measures directed at employers. Indeed, recent amendments allow businesses
to deduct amounts spent for prescribed disability-related modifications to buildings
and prescribed disability-related equipment in the year in which they are paid,318 rather
than “capitalizing” these costs and claiming deductions in subsequent years, as is gen-
erally the case for investments in physical assets.319 According to the Regulations, the
disability-related investments that are prescribed for the purposes of these provisions are
• the installation of an interior or exterior ramp or a hand-activated electric door
opener;320
317
 See the earlier discussion in the text accompanying notes 83-97 and 192-216.
318
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 20(1)(qq), formerly s. 20(1)(gg), added by Sch. II, supra note 136, s. 15(3),
applicable with respect to renovations or alterations made after 1990; s. 20(1)(rr), added by Sch. VIII,
supra note 265, s. 9(2), applicable with respect to amounts paid after February 25, 1992. See also the
Regulations, supra note 11, ss. 8800, 8801.
319
 See ITA, ibid., s. 18(1)(b), which prohibits the deduction of “an outlay, loss or replacement of
capital, a payment on account of capital or an allowance in respect of depreciation, obsolescence or
depletion except as expressly permitted” by Part I of the ITA; s. 20(1)(a), which allows taxpayers to
deduct “such part of the capital cost to the taxpayer of property, or such amount in respect of the
capital cost to the taxpayer of property, if any, as is allowed by regulation”. For this purpose, the
Regulations specify various capital cost allowances for different categories of capital assets.
320
 Supra note 11, s. 8800(a).
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• a modification to a bathroom, elevator, or doorway to accommodate its use by a
person in a wheelchair;321
• the purchase of an elevator car position indicator, such as a braille panel or an
audio signal, for individuals having a sight impairment;322
• the purchase of a visual fire alarm indicator, a listening device for group meet-
ings, or a telephone device for individuals having a hearing impairment;323 and
• the purchase of a disability-specific computer software or hardware attach-
ment.324
In the United States, investments in disability-related equipment and building modifi-
cations are encouraged by immediate deductions up to specified amounts as well as
tax credits for small businesses.325 In addition to these provisions, the United States
Internal Revenue Code provides a Targeted Jobs Tax Credit equal to 40% of the first
$6,000 of a disabled employee’s salary during the first year of the employee’s em-
ployment.326
2. Evaluation and Recommendations
a. Purpose
Although it might be argued that these measures are designed to recognize addi-
tional expenses incurred by employers in order to facilitate participation by disabled
persons in the paid labour force, these provisions appear to depart from this narrow
tax policy goal by not merely recognizing the additional costs associated with invest-
ments in disability-related equipment and building modifications and the hiring of
disabled employees, but by specifically encouraging these kinds of expenditures
through accelerated deductions and tax credits. As a result, they are properly evalu-
ated not as measures designed to achieve horizontal equity among differently situated
employers, but as tax incentives or tax expenditures designed to serve a broader social
policy objective of integrating persons with disabilities in the paid labour market.
From this perspective, policymakers should evaluate these tax provisions as they
would any other spending program, examining their efficacy in achieving their in-
tended objectives, their distributive impact, the efficiency with which they are admin-
istered, and their transparency for purposes of budgeting and public policy analysis.327
321
 Ibid., s. 8800(b).
322
 Ibid., s. 8801(a).
323
 Ibid., s. 8801(b).
324
 Ibid., s. 8801(c). For a brief discussion of these provisions, see Sherman, supra note 35 at 172-74.
325
 See The Tax System, supra note 79 at 23.
326
 Ibid.
327
 See generally S.S. Surrey & P.R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1985).
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b. Efficacy
With respect to the efficacy of these provisions in achieving their intended objec-
tives, detailed empirical studies are unavailable. According to data released by the
U.S. Census Bureau, however, approximately 800,000 more severely disabled Ameri-
cans were working in 1994 than in 1991, and the employment rate among disabled
Americans increased from 23% in 1991 to 26% in 1994.328 Nonetheless, the extent to
which these figures are attributable to new tax provisions, as opposed to more general
economic conditions, is difficult to determine.
In evaluating these tax provisions, moreover, it might be more appropriate to
compare them not to the absence of any such measure altogether but rather to a direct
spending program designed to achieve the same objective. For example, although the
Canadian income tax does not offer a tax credit to encourage employers to hire dis-
abled employees, the Human Resources Investment Fund (“HRIF”) established under
the Employment Insurance Act offers a wage subsidy to assist in the hiring of disabled
employees.329 Compared to a tax credit that an employer claims at the end of a taxation
year, such a direct subsidy has an obvious cash-flow advantage in making the addi-
tional funds to encourage such hiring available to the employer as needed throughout
the year. Likewise, direct government grants to encourage employer investments in
disability-related equipment and building modifications are likely to be more effica-
cious than deductions or credits which provide tax relief at the end of the year. Un-
fortunately, there do not appear to be any studies in this area on the relative efficacy of
direct grants and tax incentives.
With respect to the design of these kinds of incentives, finally, commentators have
raised two sets of concerns. First, by limiting the immediate deduction for disability-
related investments to those specifically listed in the Regulations, the current Cana-
dian incentive ignores other investments that may also be necessary to improve work-
place accessibility for disabled employees (e.g., other modifications to buildings,
communications systems, furniture, and vehicles used in the business).330 While addi-
tional items might be added to the list, the ITA might also be amended by establishing
a more general criterion of eligibility, according to which incentives for investments in
disability-related physical assets might be available for reasonable amounts to the ex-
tent that they are expended for the purpose of making the workplace accessible to per-
sons with mental or physical disabilities. Consistent with earlier recommendations re-
garding the METC and a proposed disability expenses tax credit or deduction,331 this
approach would allow for the recognition of different kinds of disability-related in-
vestments without having to lobby Revenue Canada and the Department of Finance to
328
 Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, supra note 1 at 64.
329
 S.C. 1996, c. 23. For a brief discussion of this program and the HRIF under which it is adminis-
tered, see ibid. at 54-61, 64.
330
 See e.g. Baker & Beatty, supra note 79 at 16.
331
 See the earlier discussion in the text accompanying notes 96-97, 212-13.
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expand the list, and would also encourage investments in novel strategies of improv-
ing workplace accessibility.
Second, where the hiring of disabled employees is encouraged through a jobs tax
credit or wage subsidy, concern is rightly expressed that an incentive directed at the
first year of a disabled person’s employment might create a “revolving door effect” in
which employers hire disabled individuals for the duration of the credit without cre-
ating sustainable long-term employment for disabled persons.332 As one commentator
has suggested, this deficiency could be addressed by adopting “a credit that accrued in
value over time or was at least available for a period past the first year of employ-
ment.”333
c. Distributive Impact
As for the distributive impact of these tax provisions, one might question whether
they should be in the form of accelerated deductions and non-refundable credits,
rather than refundable credits which provide the same tax benefit for employers irre-
spective of their marginal tax rate or whether tax is payable. Although deductions are
an appropriate way to recognize necessary costs of earning income, refundable credits
are a more equitable way to achieve social policy objectives, since the amount of the
subsidy can be based on the specific policy goal pursued rather than the amount of in-
come the employer happens to earn. If refunds or reduced tax installments were com-
puted throughout the year, moreover, a refundable tax credit for investments in dis-
ability-related equipment or building modifications or for hiring a disabled employee
might address the cash-flow disadvantage of most tax incentives as compared with di-
rect spending programs.
d. Administration and Transparency
Regarding questions of administration and transparency, it may be noted that tax
credits tend to be much simpler and less costly to administer than direct spending
programs but less transparent for purposes of budgeting and public policy analysis. To
the extent that the federal government accounts for tax expenditures on a regular ba-
sis, however, it is arguable that the advantages of efficient administration outweigh
whatever reduction ensues in terms of public transparency.
e. Conclusion
While the limited analysis of these tax provisions and direct spending alternatives
in this paper makes any conclusions on their relative merits extremely tentative, this
analysis suggests that the integration of disabled persons into the paid labour force
332
 G. Williams, Health and Disability Related Costs and the Income Tax (Toronto: Canadian Asso-
ciation for Community Living, 1996) at 5.
333
 Ibid.
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might be facilitated by tax provisions designed to encourage employers to invest in
disability-related equipment and building modifications and to hire disabled employ-
ees. Ideally, these tax expenditures should be designed to encourage sustainable em-
ployment for disabled persons, should take the form of refundable credits, should be
made available to employers throughout the year, and should be reviewed in annual
tax expenditure accounts. On this basis, they might be preferable to direct spending
programs intended to achieve the same purpose.
IV. Income Support
Where disabled individuals have difficulty supporting themselves, income support
may be available in a variety of forms in addition to the financial support provided by
family and friends.334 For the most part, the sources and level of this support depend
on the cause of the individual’s disability and his or her prior attachment to the paid
labour force.
For individuals whose disability is caused by a workplace injury, support is gen-
erally available under provincial workers’ compensation schemes to which employers
pay mandatory premiums. Persons injured in an automobile accident may receive
compensation under fault-based or no-fault automobile insurance which licensed
drivers are required to obtain. Individuals who are otherwise injured as a result of
someone’s negligence may be able to obtain compensation through the tort system.
For individuals who were employed prior to the onset of a particular disability,
support may be available in the form of continued remuneration during a period of
sick leave or as long-term disability benefits under an insurance plan to which the in-
dividual’s employer has contributed. Short-term support for previously employed in-
dividuals may also be available as sick leave benefits under the Employment Insur-
ance program to which employers and employers are required to pay mandatory pre-
miums, while long-term disability benefits are payable under the Canada and Quebec
Pension Plans to severely disabled individuals who have made contributions (related
to employment or self-employment) in four of the six years before they became dis-
abled.335 Otherwise, individuals who have purchased long-term disability insurance
themselves may be eligible for benefits under these plans, while other individuals may
be entitled to disability benefits provided under provincial social assistance plans.336
Numerous studies have criticized the lack of co-ordination among these income
support arrangements, questioning the extent to which a disabled individual’s entitle-
ment to support as well as the amount of support depend on the cause of the individ-
334
 For a useful overview of various public income security programs in Canada, see C. Clark, Can-
ada’s Income Security Programs (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1998).
335
 For a brief explanation of these federal programs, see Boadway & Kitchen, supra note 22 at 418-
25.
336
 For a recent review of Ontario’s Disability Support Program, see H. Beatty, “Ontario Disability
Support Program: Policy and Implementation” (1999) 14 J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 1.
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ual’s disability and the individual’s prior participation in the labour force.337 Where a
person is born with a disability, for example, income support is likely to be limited to
basic amounts available under provincial social assistance programs. Other criticisms
concern the lack of incentives for disabled persons to participate in the paid labour
market under these income support arrangements, which tend to reduce benefits
sharply as individuals derive income from remunerative activities. For these reasons,
the federal, provincial, and territorial governments have considered the introduction of
a more comprehensive disability income plan administered by the federal govern-
ment.338 Indeed, the 1996 Annual Premiers’ Conference proposed that the federal gov-
ernment should take the lead role in reforming Canada’s disability income system to
establish “a single, national program to address gaps and overlaps, to streamline ad-
ministration, and to improve client service.”339
While a detailed analysis of these proposals to create a comprehensive national
disability income plan is beyond the scope of this paper,340 this part examines the role
of the ITA with respect to different kinds of disability income. The first section ex-
amines existing and potential tax rules regarding both the taxation of disability in-
come from various sources and contributions to the plans from which much of this in-
come is derived. The following section considers the use of the income tax to provide
comprehensive income support to low-income persons with disabilities.
A. Tax Treatment of Disability Income and Contributions
1. Description
The tax treatment of disability income and contributions to various income sup-
port arrangements is almost as varied as these arrangements themselves.341 With re-
spect to workers’ compensation, these benefits are included in computing the recipi-
ent’s net income,342 but offset by a corresponding deduction in computing the recipi-
ent’s taxable income.343 While this arrangement renders these payments effectively ex-
empt from tax, the initial inclusion may affect the computation of refundable and non-
337
 See e.g. Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, supra note 1 at 72-78. See also S. Torjman, In-
come Insecurity: The Disability Income System in Canada (Toronto: Roeher Institute, 1988); H.
Beatty, “Comprehensive Disability Compensation in Ontario: Towards an Agenda” (1991) 7 J. L. &
Soc. Pol’y 100.
338
 Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, ibid. at 75.
339
 Ibid. at 76.
340
 See Beatty, supra note 337.
341
 For a useful overview of the taxation of regarding disability income and contributions, see D.
Schulze, “Obstacles to Equity: An Analysis of the Taxation of Disability Income in Canada and Pro-
posals for Reform” (1994) 14 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 135 at 138-40. See also Sherman, supra note
35 at 139-53.
342
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 56(1)(v).
343
 Ibid., s. 110(1)(f)(ii).
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refundable credits for the recipient and a supporting individual.344 Employer-paid pre-
miums are deductible to employers and not considered taxable benefits to employees.
In contrast to workers’ compensation, automobile accident insurance and tort
compensation for personal injuries are fully exempt from tax, pursuant to case law
which has endured without challenge for over twenty years.345 While premiums and
damage payments are generally non-deductible, businesses may deduct liability insur-
ance premiums and payments for tort claims related to the business.346 Other kinds of
compensation provided by the federal government (e.g., veterans benefits and disabil-
ity benefits paid to RCMP officers) are also exempt from tax, but under specific
statutory rules to this effect.347 While investment income on lump-sum damage pay-
ments is generally subject to tax, a specific exemption exists for income and capital
gains derived from such property where the injured individual is less than 21 years of
age.348
Where disabled individuals receive remuneration during a period of sick leave,
this income is fully taxable as employment income.349 Likewise, where an individual
receives long-term disability benefits under an insurance plan to which a former em-
ployer contributed, these benefits are also taxable as employment income, subject to a
deduction for premiums paid under the plan by the individual.350 Employer contribu-
tions to the plan, however, are not taxable as an employment benefit.351 Where indi-
344
 See M.N.R., Interpretation Bulletin IT-202R2, “Employees’ or Workers’ Compensation” (19
September 1985).
345
 Cirella, supra note 15 at 5, concluding that a damage award arising from an automobile injury
was a capital receipt attributable to a loss of the recipient’s earning capacity, not lost income per se. To
the extent that such damage awards are capital receipts, however, it is arguable that the payments
should be subject to capital gains tax; this issue was not considered in Cirella since the facts of the
case preceded the introduction of capital gains tax in 1972. On the other hand, while the damage
award may be characterized as “proceeds” for the involuntary disposition of the recipient’s earning
capacity, it might be difficult to determine the cost of this earning capacity in order to compute the
amount of any gain. As a general rule, the income tax does not account for investments in or depre-
ciation of human capital. For Revenue Canada’s views on the non-taxation of tort compensation, see
M.N.R., Interpretation Bulletin IT-365R2, “Damages, Settlements and Similar Receipts” (8 May
1987). On the non-taxation of automobile insurance, see Private Opinion Letter 9321057, “Treatment
of No-Fault Insurance Benefits” (29 September 1993) [archived with author], which states that pay-
ments under Manitoba’s no-fault automobile insurance plan are “not required to be included in the in-
come of the recipient.”
346
 Imperial Oil v. M.N.R., [1947] C.T.C. 353, 3 D.T.C. 1090 (Ex. Ct.).
347
 ITA, supra note 4, ss. 81(1)(d), 81(1)(e), 81(1)(f), 81(1)(i).
348
 Ibid., ss. 81(1)(g.1), 81(1)(g.2).
349
 Heydom v. M.N.R., [1997] 2 C.T.C. 3088 at 3090 (T.C.C.).
350
 ITA, supra note 4, s. 6(1)(f). For Revenue Canada’s views on the application of this provision, see
M.N.R., Interpretation Bulletin IT-428, “Wage Loss Replacement Plans” (30 April 1979) [hereinafter
I.B. IT-428].
351
 ITA, ibid., s. 6(1)(a)(i), which excludes from the definition of a taxable benefit the value of which
is otherwise included in an employee’s income any benefit “derived from the contributions of the tax-
payer’s employer to or under a … group sickness or accident insurance plan ...”
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viduals receive sick leave benefits under the Employment Insurance program or long-
term disability benefits under the CPP and QPP, these payments are also fully tax-
able.352 While employer contributions to these programs are deductible and are not in-
cluded in the employee’s income as a taxable benefit, employee and self-employed
contributions are not deductible but are eligible for a non-refundable tax credit com-
puted at the lowest marginal rate of tax.353
In contrast to long-term disability benefits under the CPP or QPP or a private plan
to which the recipient’s employer has made a contribution, benefits under a private
plan to which an employer has not contributed are fully exempt;354 this applies even
where the premiums for the plan were actually paid by the recipient’s employer, pro-
vided that these amounts were included in the recipient’s income as a taxable benefit
during the years in which the premiums were paid.355 Contributions to these plans,
however, are not deductible.356
Like worker’s compensation, social assistance payments are also exempt under
statutory provisions that include these amounts in computing the recipient’s net in-
come,357 but provide for a corresponding deduction in computing taxable income.358 As
with workers’ compensation, the initial inclusion may affect the computation of re-
fundable and non-refundable tax credits.
2. Evaluation and Recommendations
a. Purposes
As with other provisions examined in this paper, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween tax and social policy considerations when evaluating the various income tax
rules governing both the taxation of disability income and the treatment of contribu-
tions to various disability income arrangements. While some commentators have pro-
352
 Ibid., ss. 56(1)(a)(iv) (Employment Insurance), 56(1)(a)(i)(B) (Canada Pension Plan).
353
 Ibid., s. 118.7. The combined federal and provincial value of this credit is roughly 25 cents for
each dollar of EI premiums and CPP/QPP contributions. Until 1988, these contributions were de-
ductible in computing the income of the contributing employee or self-employed individual (see ibid.,
former ss. 8(1)(k), 8(1)(l), 60(h)).
354
 See I.B. IT-428, supra note 350 at paras. 14 & 16.
355
 Landry v. M.N.R., [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2712, 98 D.T.C. 1416 (T.C.C.).
356
 For employees, the non-deductibility of these payments is established by the absence of any pro-
vision allowing such a deduction in the ITA, supra note 4, s. 8, and the prohibition in s. 8(2) against
deductions other than those expressly allowed in s. 8. For taxpayers carrying on a business alone or in
a partnership, non-deductibility is premised on the judicial conclusion that premiums are not incurred
for the purpose of gaining or producing income from the business, as required by s. 18(1)(a) (see
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posed that disability income should be generally exempt from tax,359 the following
analysis questions the merits of such a general exemption from the perspectives of tax
and social policy. Instead, it suggests, tax policy and social policy would be better
served if contributions were generally deductible and disability income were gener-
ally taxable.
b. Tax Policy
Beginning with questions of tax policy narrowly defined, a key consideration in-
volves horizontal equity—both in the treatment of contributions that individuals are
required to make to various kinds of income support arrangements, and in the taxation
of amounts received from each of these sources.
With respect to contributions, tax policy considerations suggest that the appropri-
ate treatment depends on whether these payments are viewed as necessary costs of
earning income or as discretionary expenses out of income already earned.360 Where
the payments are mandatory, as in the case of Employment Insurance premiums and
CPP/QPP contributions, characterization as a necessary cost of earning income seems
relatively straightforward. For this reason, it would be desirable to restore the deduc-
tions for these payments that existed prior to their conversion into non-refundable
credits in 1988.361 Such a reform would also be consistent with the non-taxation of
mandatory employer-paid workers’ compensation premiums as taxable benefits to
employees.
Where an employer makes contributions to a long-term disability insurance plan
or requires employees to contribute to such a plan themselves as a condition of em-
ployment, these contributions might also be regarded as a necessary cost of earning
income.362 More generally, to the extent that these contributions, as well as premiums
for other private disability insurance plans, are paid in order to obtain a regular stream
of income in the event of a future disability, they might reasonably be regarded as
necessary costs to obtain this future income.363 For this reason, a rule excluding em-
ployer contributions to such plans as a taxable benefit to employees and allowing in-
dividuals to deduct the cost of premiums they paid themselves would be preferable to
the current rule under which employer-paid contributions are non-taxable benefits but
359
 See e.g. Schulze, supra note 341; Shillington, supra note 86 at 18-22.
360
 See the discussion in Part I, above.
361
 See former ss. 8(1)(k), 8(1)(l), 60(h), repealed by the 1987 Amendments, supra note 78, s. 2(1),
applicable to 1988 and subsequent years.
362
 To the extent that employees bargain for these plans individually or collectively, however, it is ar-
guable that contributions should be regarded as a discretionary expenditure rather than a necessary
cost of earning employment income.
363
 This approach would exclude a deduction for liability insurance premiums, except where they are
incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business. To the extent that automo-
bile insurance premiums provide disability and liability insurance, this approach would require a dis-
tinction between these components.
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employees and self-employed individuals are unable to deduct premiums paid them-
selves.364
With respect to the taxation of disability income, horizontal equity would appear
to require that all such payments should be fully taxable. To the extent that these
amounts contribute to the recipient’s ability to pay, an exemption for some or all of
this income would be inequitable between individuals receiving some or all of their
income in this tax-exempt form and individuals whose income is subject to tax. For
this reason, the Royal Commission on Taxation recommended the taxation of private
long-term disability benefits as well as public benefits through employment insurance
and workers compensation.365
Notwithstanding this general approach, however, there are at least three reasons
why certain kinds of disability payments might reasonably be excluded from a recipi-
ent’s income. First, to the extent that payments are designed to compensate for medi-
cal or disability-related expenses, it is doubtful that they increase the recipient’s ability
to pay tax. Although such payments might be included in the recipient’s income under
a system in which these expenses were fully offset through a corresponding deduc-
tion,366 any limitation on this deductibility suggests that these payments should be ex-
cluded in computing the recipient’s income.367 Second, where a disability payment in-
cludes compensation for pain and suffering, it is questionable whether this component
should be regarded as taxable income. While it is arguable that monetary payments
for this purpose increase the recipient’s ability to pay tax, their character as recom-
pense for the involuntary loss of non-economic assets like personal health and well-
being suggests that they should not be regarded as taxable additions to the recipient’s
net wealth.368 Third, where a disabled individual receives income support under a so-
364
 This approach was recommended by Royal Commission on Taxation, supra note 24 at 436-39.
While it might be argued that any such deduction should be allowed only against disability income
actually received, as is the case with employer contributions to a long-term disability insurance plan to
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1055 (Ex. Ct.)).
365
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Rev. 1 at 22, arguing that “[t]he use of income, not the source of income, should give rise to tax re-
lief.”
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 To the extent that the ITA is amended to make these expenses fully deductible, therefore, com-
pensation in respect of these expenses should be fully included in computing the recipient’s income.
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 For arguments along these lines, see J.J.S. Brooks, “Developing a Theory of Damage Recovery
Taxation” (1988) 14 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 759 at 760-80. For contrary arguments that such payments
should be fully taxable as dispositions of assets with zero cost for tax purposes, see Frolik, supra note
366 at 20-23; J.M. Dodge, “Taxes and Torts” (1992) 77 Cornell L. Rev. 143 at 182-87.
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cial assistance program, it is arguable that these payments should be exempt from in-
come tax as part of a “negative income tax” designed to provide income support to
persons in financial need.
Where disabled individuals receive lump-sum payments, horizontal equity sug-
gests that these payments should be subject to a special set of rules to lessen the bur-
den of progressive rates on amounts that are received in a single taxation year.369 To
the extent that a portion of a lump-sum payment refers to lost income for previous
years, these amounts are properly taxable at the rate applicable to the taxation years in
respect of which they are payable.370 To the extent that some or all of a lump-sum
payment refers to expected reductions in earned income in future years, the impact of
progressive rates can be lessened through a forward averaging mechanism allowing
amounts to be brought into income over several years,371 or through rules allowing re-
cipients to contribute these amounts on a tax-deferred basis to specific savings vehi-
cles (e.g., annuities or registered savings plans) the payments from which would be
fully taxable as received.372
c. Social Policy
Although tax policy considerations may favour a “deduction/inclusion” system in
which contributions to disability insurance plans are either deductible or not taxable if
employer-paid and income replacement benefits are fully taxable, several arguments
have been advanced in favour of an alternate “taxation/exemption” approach under
which contributions would be non-deductible (or taxable if employer-paid) and bene-
fits would be fully exempt.
First, it is argued, while the exemption of all sources of disability income (e.g.,
employment insurance, CPP/QPP benefits, and employer-paid disability insurance)
would increase net after-tax income for many disabled individuals,373 the comprehen-
sive taxation of disability incomes “would likely reduce that standard of living of
many persons with disabilities who are already not well-off.”374 Second, it is suggested
369
 For a discussion of this “bunching problem”, see Schulze, supra note 341 at 152.
370
 See 1999 Federal Budget, supra note 65 where it proposes to introduce such a system to compute
the tax payable by individuals receiving “qualifying retroactive lump-sum payments”. The draft leg-
islation for this proposed amendment has yet to be released.
371
 For proposals along these lines, see Frolik, supra note 366 at 11-12; M.L. Morris, “Taxing Eco-
nomic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury Actions” (1986) 38 U. Fla. L. Rev. 735 at 742-43, 759-69;
M.W. Cochran, “Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?” (1987) 38 Case W. L. Rev. 43
at 49.
372
 For a proposal along these lines, see the Royal Commission on Taxation, supra note 24 at 274-75,
438-39. See also the recommendation for an RDSP at text accompanying notes 292-95, above.
373
 Schulze, supra note 341 at 161.
374
 Shillington, supra note 86 at 21. See also Schulze, ibid. at 151, concluding that “taxing benefits
which are currently exempt will merely reduce the limited income available to the disabled unless
such a measure is combined with an increase in the income tax threshold for low-income earners gen-
erally, since it is currently set far below the poverty line.”
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that since the number of individuals contributing to disability insurance plans greatly
exceeds the number of individuals receiving benefits under these plans, a comprehen-
sive taxation/exemption approach would reinforce the insurance function of these
plans by spreading the tax burden widely on the many individuals making contribu-
tions as opposed to the few who receive benefits.375 Third, since those contributing to
disability insurance plans tend to have higher incomes than disabled individuals re-
ceiving benefits under these plans, a taxation/exemption approach is also favoured on
the grounds that it is both more progressive and likely to produce more revenue than a
deduction/inclusion approach.376
In evaluating the social policy implications of a particular tax reform, conclusions
premised on the immediate impact of the measure may be qualified by considering
potential behavioural responses by affected taxpayers and accompanying policy
measures that might be expected to be adopted by different levels of government.
With respect to the taxation of disability income, for example, it is plausible that a
shift toward a more comprehensive deduction/inclusion system would lead to in-
creased contributions under private insurance plans and increased pre-tax benefit lev-
els under private and public plans to offset the impact of the tax, while a shift toward a
taxation/exemption approach would lead to reduced contributions under employer-
sponsored plans and reduced benefit levels under private and public plans the income
from which is currently subject to tax.
Accordingly, a conclusion that a deduction/inclusion system would reduce the
standard of living of disabled persons while a taxation/exemption approach would in-
crease their standard of living is neither certain nor necessary. Nor is it obvious that a
deduction/inclusion system would undermine the function of disability insurance to
spread the costs of disabilities widely. Indeed, to the extent that a deduction for indi-
vidual contributions and non-taxation of employer-paid contributions encourages in-
dividuals and employees to obtain long-term disability insurance, whereas a taxa-
tion/exemption system might discourage the acquisition of disability insurance in the
first place, it is the former approach rather than the latter that is likely to be more con-
ducive to the insurance goal of spreading the costs of disability and is thereby more
likely to improve the standard of living of disabled persons. As for the argument that a
taxation/exemption approach is more progressive and likely to produce more revenue
than a deduction/inclusion system, these goals are achieved more directly through the
structure and level of tax rates.
In addition to the incentive effect of a deduction/inclusion system in encouraging
the acquisition of long-term disability insurance, two further considerations suggest
that this approach is preferable to the taxation/exemption approach not only from the
perspective of tax policy narrowly defined but also in terms of social policy more
375
 Shillington, ibid. at 21.
376
 See e.g. ibid., observing that a deduction/inclusion system “undermines the vertical equity of the
income tax system and also reduces government revenue compared to taxing the contributions which
are made on average by higher income individuals.” See also Schulze, supra note 341 at 146, 156.
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broadly understood. First, to the extent that current exemptions for workers’ compen-
sation, automobile insurance, and tort compensation allow for lower payments in
these forms than would otherwise be necessary, non-taxation of these forms of dis-
ability income can be viewed as an implicit subsidy to employers, drivers, and tortfea-
sors who are required to finance these payments through insurance premiums or dam-
age awards. Moreover, where these payments are designed to create incentives for
injury avoidance, any subsidy is certain to blunt the effect of these incentives, endan-
gering a higher rate of injuries.
Second, as a social policy measure designed to enhance the after-tax income of
disabled individuals, an exemption may be criticized as an inequitable form of tax
subsidy that favours those receiving larger amounts of disability income more than
those receiving lesser amounts, those with other sources of income in addition to dis-
ability income more than those without income from such other sources, and those
with fewer medical and disability-related expenses to offset against such income more
than those with substantial medical and disability-related expenses.377 For these rea-
sons, social policy would be better served by taxing all sources of disability income
and using the additional revenues from this taxation to finance increased disability
benefits, particularly to low-income persons with disabilities.
B. Comprehensive Income Support for Low-Income Persons with
Disabilities
To the extent that the current mix of private and public disability insurance plans
provides inadequate levels of support and leaves significant gaps in available cover-
age, social policy considerations are likely to favour measures to increase both the
level of disability benefits and the scope of disability coverage. For these purposes,
policymakers might reasonably consider a form of guaranteed annual income (“GAI”)
to provide a basic level of income support to low-income persons with disabilities.378 If
payments under such a GAI were tax exempt and reduced at higher levels of income,
the program would take the form of a negative income tax (“NIT”) whereby benefits
would be fully available to qualifying individuals with incomes falling below a speci-
fied threshold above which payments would be reduced according to a specific rate.
The design of a specific NIT proposal is beyond the scope of this paper, involving
decisions regarding eligibility, benefit levels, the appropriate tax back rate, the thresh-
old income level at which benefits are reduced, and the computation of income (indi-
vidual or aggregate spousal income) for the purposes of this threshold and reductions
in available benefits. While spousal income might reasonably be aggregated for the
377
 See e.g. Schulze, supra note 341 at 159, acknowledging that “a comprehensive exemption is re-
gressive as between disabled people” and that “the exemption would have a special value for those
with high benefits and other sources of income.”
378
 See e.g. Shillington, supra note 86 at 32-33.
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purpose of computing benefits,379 and eligibility might reasonably be limited to work-
ing-aged persons with disabilities whose ability to support themselves is impaired,380
choices concerning benefit levels, tax back rates, and income thresholds turn on broad
social policy decisions regarding appropriate budgetary allocations.
If a GAI for disabled individuals were considered desirable and affordable, a con-
venient way to implement this policy might be through a refundable tax credit the
amount of which is reduced above a stipulated income threshold. Indeed, a “national
disability tax benefit” along these lines would be similar to the CCTB introduced in
1993. Although such a measure could provide an important supplement to the current
mix of private and public disability insurance plans, it should not be viewed as a sub-
stitute for separate provisions designed to recognize the costs of disabilities in com-
puting the income tax payable by disabled persons and supporting individuals. On the
contrary, as explained in Part I of this paper, while it is possible to pursue both tax and
social policy goals through the ITA, each set of policy goals is best pursued by distin-
guishing both the objectives themselves and the measures through which they are im-
plemented.
V. Summary and Recommendations
This paper has examined existing and potential income tax provisions regarding
families with disabled persons, looking at provisions designed to recognize the costs
of disabilities for disabled persons and supporting individuals, measures designed to
facilitate participation by disabled persons in the paid labour force, and tax rules ap-
plicable to various sources of disability income and the contributions from which this
income is often derived. For the purpose of this analysis, Part I distinguished between
tax policy objectives narrowly defined, emphasizing the equitable distribution of tax
burdens among differently situated taxpayers, and broader social policy goals con-
cerning the allocation of goods and services and the distribution of economic re-
sources among members of a political community. While the analysis has touched
upon broader social policy issues at various points, the main focus has been on tax
policy issues narrowly defined, particularly the definition of taxable income necessary
to achieve horizontal equity. With this emphasis in mind, this final part of the paper
379
 Since the purpose of the program is to provide support for disabled individuals in financial need,
it seems reasonable to assess this need by reference to the combined income of disabled individuals
and others from whom they are legally entitled to support. In contrast, is seems unreasonable to re-
duce a disabled individual’s entitlement to benefits where support is provided by someone who is not
legally obliged to do so. To the extent that same-sex couples are subject to legal support obligations
comparable to those of legally defined spouses, this analysis suggests that the income of such couples
should also be aggregated for the purpose of computing disability benefits under a GAI.
380
 Since the purpose of the program is to provide income support to disabled individuals who, but
for their disability, would be able to support themselves, eligibility criteria might reasonably differ
from those for a non-refundable credit or deduction designed to recognize the additional costs of dis-
ability.
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reviews the main conclusions and recommendations of the analysis, following the
structure of Parts II, III, and IV.
A. Recognizing the Costs of Disability for Disabled Individuals and
their Families
1. Description
Current income tax provisions recognize the costs of disabilities in computing the
tax payable by disabled persons and supporting individuals through the medical ex-
penses tax credit (METC), the disability tax credit (DTC), the infirm dependants and
caregiver tax credits, and special provisions governing private savings in the form of
trusts and tax-deferred savings plans. Other provisions recognize the costs of sup-
porting and caring for dependent children through the wholly dependent person
credit, the child care expense deduction (CCED), and the Canada Child Tax Benefit
(CCTB). While the CCED operates as a deduction in computing net income, most of
these provisions (other than the refundable CCTB) take the form of non-refundable
credits against basic federal income tax otherwise payable.
2. Purpose
To the extent that the purpose of these provisions is to achieve horizontal equity
among differently situated taxpayers, the analysis in Part I suggests that they should
take the form of deductions in computing net or taxable income, rather than non-
refundable or refundable credits. To the extent that their purpose is to insure against
otherwise privately borne costs or to provide transfer payments to low- and modest-
income individuals and families, however, they should take the form of refundable
credits, rather than deductions or non-refundable credits. For these reasons, this paper
has questioned both the 1988 conversion of what were formerly personal, disability,
and medical expense deductions into non-refundable credits, and the elimination of
general tax recognition for the costs of supporting dependent children with the intro-
duction of the CCTB in 1993. While the CCTB represents an important social policy
instrument to address child poverty, it does not substitute for a separate deduction for
the costs of supporting dependent children as a matter of tax equity. On the contrary,
as argued throughout this paper, while it is both possible and desirable to pursue both
tax and social policy goals through the federal Income Tax Act, these goals and the
measures through which they are implemented should be clearly distinguished. At a
general level, therefore, this paper recommends that the ITA should be amended to
convert what are now non-refundable personal, disability, and medical expense tax
credits into deductions in computing taxable income. Other recommendations concern
the introduction of a separate provision to recognize disability-related expenses,
amendments to provisions dealing with private savings, and amendments to the
CCED and the CCTB designed to recognize the additional costs of caring for and
supporting disabled children.
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3. Recommendations
a. Personal Tax Credits
Beginning with what are now the personal tax credits, this paper recommends the
following: (1) an increase in the basic personal amount from $7,231 for the year 2000
to $10,000; (2) repeal of the current spousal, wholly dependent person, infirm de-
pendants, and caregiver amounts; (3) the introduction of separate amounts of $4,000
for the first dependent child, $3,000 for the second dependent child, and $2,400 for
the third and subsequent dependent children; (4) the introduction of a separate amount
of up to $10,000 for disabled adults and elderly persons dependent on the individual
for support, subject to a reduction based on the dependant’s income; (5) the addition
to these amounts of the disability amount currently found in sections 118.3 and 118.4
of the ITA; (6) full indexation of these amounts for inflation; and (7) the conversion of
these amounts from non-refundable credits to deductions in computing taxable in-
come.
b. Disability Amount
With respect to the disability amount in recommendation (5) above, this paper
further recommends (8) that eligibility for the disability amount should be independ-
ent of any separate claim for attendant and/or nursing home care; (9) that the statutory
definition of a “basic activity of daily living in relation to an individual” in paragraphs
118.4(1)(c) and (d) be amended by repealing the exclusion of “any other activity, in-
cluding working, housekeeping or a social or recreational activity” in paragraph
118.4(1)(d), by adding “working”, “housekeeping”, “social and recreational activi-
ties”, “breathing”, and “seeing” to the list of basic activities of daily living in para-
graph 118.4(1)(c), by amending subparagraphs 118.4(1)(c)(iii) and (iv) to refer to
communication in everyday settings rather than “a quiet setting” with “another person
familiar with the [disabled] individual”, and by replacing the exhaustive word
“means” in the definition with the open-ended word “includes”; (10) that the defini-
tion of a “marked restriction” in a basic activity of daily living in paragraph
118.4(1)(b) be amended to provide that “an individual’s ability to perform an activity
of daily living is markedly restricted where, even with therapy and the use of appro-
priate devices and medication, the individual is blind or significantly restricted in his
or her ability to perform an activity of daily living a substantial amount of time”; and
(11) that consideration be given to varying the disability amount based on the severity
of the individual’s disability, the extent to which the individual’s ability to perform a
basic activity of daily living is restricted, or the number of basic activities of daily
living that the individual is markedly restricted in the ability to perform.
c. Medical and Disability-Related Expenses
Turning to medical and disability-related expenses currently recognized in section
118.2, this paper recommends (12) that recognition of these itemized expenses also
take the form of a deduction in computing taxable income rather than a non-
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refundable credit against basic federal income tax otherwise payable; (13) that recog-
nition of medical and disability-related expenses be distinguished through the intro-
duction of a separate disability expense deduction; (14) that the list of eligible disabil-
ity-related expenses for a separate deduction be based on disability-related expenses
currently recognized in subsection 118.2(2), be expanded to include disability-related
transportation expenses, recreational programs and equipment designed to enhance
the skills of disabled persons, and other costs identified by the Council of Canadians
with Disabilities, and be supplemented by a general criterion of eligibility for all rea-
sonable amounts to the extent that they are paid for the purpose of ameliorating the ef-
fects of a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment and/or enabling the in-
dividual to perform one or more basic activities of daily living; (15) that eligible at-
tendant care expenses be defined to include reasonable amounts paid as remuneration
to a disabled individual’s spouse; (16) that eligible nursing home care be defined to
exclude room and board; (17) that the list of eligible medical expenses for the medical
expense deduction be amended by repealing those items made eligible for a separate
disability expense deduction, and supplemented by a general statement of principle
according to which eligible medical expenses would include all reasonable amounts
to the extent that they are paid for the purpose of acquiring goods or services certified
as medically necessary by a qualified medical practitioner; (18) that supporting indi-
viduals be allowed to claim the medical and disability expense deductions regardless
of their familial relationship with the patient or disabled person; and (19) that the cur-
rent threshold for eligible medical expenses be re-examined in the case of medical ex-
penses recognized through an amended medical expense deduction and eliminated in
the case of disability-related expenses recognized through a new disability expense
deduction.
d. Private Savings
With respect to tax provisions relating to private savings, this paper has made sev-
eral recommendations: (20) that the preferred beneficiary election should be available
for any disabled beneficiary regardless of his or her relationship with the settlor of the
trust; (21) that “rollovers” on transfers of tax-deferred savings should be similarly
available regardless of the relationship between the deceased and the recipient, pro-
vided that the recipient was financially dependent on the deceased and either under
the age of 18 or dependent by reason of mental or physical infirmity; (22) that these
tax-deferred savings should be directly transferable to a tax-exempt trust governed by
a registered savings plan in the name of the disabled beneficiary rather than subject to
the complex rules set out in the current statute; (23) that consideration be given to the
introduction of a separate registered disability savings plan designed to encourage
private savings to support individuals with a mental or physical disability; and (24)
that the existence of these savings plans should not affect the beneficiary’s entitlement
to social assistance.
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e. Child and Disabled Adult Care Deductions
As for the child care expense deduction, this paper has made the following four
recommendations: (25) that the maximum amounts that may be claimed under the
CCED for infirm children not eligible for the disability tax credit should be increased;
(26) that maximum child care expenses should be fully indexed for inflation; (27) that
the aggregate limit based on two-thirds of the claimant’s earned income should be re-
placed with a rule prohibiting taxpayers from deducting otherwise allowable child
care expenses in an amount exceeding their earned income for the year; and (28) that
the provision should be amended to permit the deduction to be claimed by either
spouse for amounts up to the stipulated maximum that are paid either to third parties
or the other spouse. A further related recommendation (29) involves the introduction
of a separate deduction for the costs of caring for a disabled adult to enable a sup-
porting individual to engage in income-earning pursuits.
f. Canada Child Tax Benefit
Although this paper has not examined the CCTB in any detail, it makes two rec-
ommendations: (30) that the numerical formula in subsection 122.61(1) be rational-
ized to reduce its complexity; and (31) that this formula be further amended by the
introduction of a supplement for children with mental or physical infirmities.
B. Facilitating Labour Market Integration
1. Description
With respect to tax measures designed to facilitate integration of disabled persons
in the paid labour market, the ITA contains several provisions directed at disabled per-
sons themselves and other provisions directed at employers. The former include the
exemption for employer-provided transportation and attendant care benefits in sub-
section 6(16), the attendant care expense deduction (ACED) in section 64, and the re-
fundable medical expense supplement (RMES) in section 122.51. The latter consist of
provisions allowing businesses to deduct amounts spent for prescribed disability-
related modifications to buildings and prescribed disability-related equipment in the
year in which they are paid, rather than being required to capitalize these costs and
claiming deductions in subsequent years.
2. Purpose
While the exemption for employer-provided transportation and attendant care
benefits and the deduction for attendant care expenses reflect a tax policy concern to
exclude from a disabled person’s net income all necessary costs to earn this income,
the RMES and accelerated deductions for business expenses on disability-related
equipment and building modifications reflect social policy concerns to reduce the im-
pact of lost subsidies for disability-related supports under provincial social assistance
plans (in the case of the RMES) and to actively encourage investments in disability-
related equipment and building modifications in order to make the workplace more
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accessible to disabled persons. These distinct purposes should be taken into account
in evaluating these provisions and considering alternatives for their reform.
3. Recommendations
a. Costs of Earning Income
With respect to costs of earning income, the exemption for employer-provided
transportation and attendant care benefits is properly seen as a complement to a corre-
sponding deduction for transportation and attendant care expenses which must be in-
curred by a disabled person in order to work, but which are not reimbursed by an em-
ployer. For this reason, this paper recommends (32) the introduction of a separate de-
duction for commuting expenses that must be incurred by a disabled taxpayer in order
to engage in income-earning activities (employment, business, or education). While
this deduction should be structured along the lines of the current attendant care ex-
pense deduction, this paper has also recommended (33) that this provision should be
amended to make eligibility turn on the lesser standard of mental or physical infirmity
rather than the more onerous standard of severe and prolonged mental or physical im-
pairment used for the current disability tax credit; (34) that the deduction should be
available for reasonable amounts paid for attendant care provided by a disabled per-
son’s spouse; and (35) that attendant care expenses should be deductible up to the full
amount of the claimant’s earned income rather than the two-thirds limit contained in
paragraph 64(b). Where applicable, a similar structure should apply for a separate de-
duction for commuting expenses. Likewise, (36) the exemption for employer-
provided transportation and attendant care benefits should be available for employees
with a mental or physical infirmity, even if they do not satisfy the more onerous stan-
dard of severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment used for the current dis-
ability tax credit.
b. Refundable Medical Expense Supplement
As for the RMES, this paper does not question the social policy objective to offset
the loss of subsidies for disability-related supports under provincial social assistance
where disabled individuals earn additional income from participation in the paid la-
bour force, but makes two recommendations to amend the provision in a way that
might better achieve this objective: (37) to calculate the refundable credit on a sepa-
rate measure of disability-related expenses without any annual threshold (such as
would be provided by a separate disability expenses deduction or credit); and (38) to
rename the refundable credit the “refundable disability expenses supplement”
(RDES).
c. Tax Incentives Directed at Employers
With respect to tax incentives directed at employers, this paper has questioned the
current use of accelerated deductions, and recommended instead (39) that any such
incentives (whether for investments in physical assets designed to make the workplace
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more accessible to disabled persons or for hiring disabled persons themselves) should
be delivered in the form of refundable tax credits delivered throughout the year rather
than deductions the value of which depends on the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate and
the amount of which is received only at the end of the year; and (40) that the cost of
these incentives be regularly reviewed in annual tax expenditure accounts. Moreover,
to the extent that tax or non-tax incentives are used to encourage employers to hire
disabled persons, this paper recommends (41) that these incentives should be de-
signed to discourage a “revolving door effect” (for example by ensuring that the value
of the incentive accrues over a period of more than a year rather than immediately
upon the hiring of the disabled person).
C. Income Support for Disabled Individuals
1. Description
Income support for disabled individuals is available from a variety of sources, in-
cluding workers’ compensation programs, the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans,
Employment Insurance, employer-provided sick leave or long-term disability insur-
ance, private disability insurance, tort compensation, and provincial social assistance
plans. The tax treatment of income from and contributions to these various plans is
almost as varied as these sources themselves.
2. Purpose and Recommendations
 While most commentators agree that contributions to and payments from differ-
ent disability income plans should be subject to a consistent set of rules, some suggest
that this consistency is best achieved by exempting all sources of disability income
from tax and including employer-paid disability insurance premiums as taxable bene-
fits. For reasons of tax and social policy, this paper has argued (42) that disability in-
come should be generally taxable regardless of the source, while (43) contributions to
public and private disability insurance plans should be deductible or non-taxable as a
benefit if paid directly by the taxpayer’s employer. To the extent that disability pay-
ments are designed to offset non-deductible medical or disability-related expenses,
however, this paper has recommended (44) that payments for these purposes be ex-
empt. Likewise, insofar as disability payments reflect compensation for pain and suf-
fering, this paper has suggested (45) that these payments should also be exempt. Yet
another recommendation (46) would exempt social assistance payments from tax on
the basis that they are part of a “negative income tax” designed to provide income
support to persons in financial need. Where disabled individuals receive lump-sum
payments, this paper has also recommended (47) the introduction of various measures
(e.g., rollover rules for contributions to deferred savings plans) to lessen the burden of
progressive rates on amounts that are received in a single taxation year.
Finally, to the extent that the current mix of public and private disability insurance
plans provides inadequate levels of support and leaves significant gaps in available
coverage, this paper has recommended (48) that consideration be given to the intro-
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duction of a refundable tax credit modeled on the CCTB and designed to provide a
basic guaranteed annual income to all Canadians with disabilities. In addition to the
other measures recommended in this paper, the introduction of a National Disability
Tax Benefit along these lines would be the crowning achievement in a series of tax
and social policy reforms designed to ensure that disabled persons can assume their
proper place as full participants in the economic and social life of this country.
                                
